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The primary objectives of this thesis are to clarify and distinguish the existence of 
regulatory expropriation from other types of indirect expropriation and to propose 
alternative ways to rescrutinise regulatory expropriation in light of its establishment 
and justification in international law. In pursuing the first objective, the research 
delves into certain national, regional, and international contexts, identifying the key 
features of regulatory expropriation – for instance, regulatory autonomy and 
regulatory interference – and conducts an extensive exploration of the relevant 
principles of international law. This exploration concentrates especially on the 
doctrine of police power and on principles that can contribute to an elaborated 
application of the doctrine for the identification of regulatory expropriation. With 
regard to the second objective, the research examines the principle of necessity in 
international law that functions to preclude the wrongfulness of a state’s act and also 
takes into account the interacting relationship between customary international law 
and bilateral investment agreements. In addition, the research goes a step further by 
means of its analysis of the necessity exception in WTO law. This thesis puts 
forward the conclusion that an arbitral approach to bona fide regulatory 
expropriation that can be justified in international law, if it is based on the 
elaborated application of the doctrine of police power and on the application of the 
principle of proportionality within the framework of the ends-means and the cause-
effect, will be more desirable for investment treaty arbitration given that arbitration 
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The outstanding and long-disputed question in international investment law 
concerning expropriation asks how one distinguishes compensable expropriation 
from that of an ordinary regulation that incurs no obligation to pay compensation, 
and vice versa. The notion of ‘regulatory expropriation’ takes a central place in the 
context of this question. Regulatory expropriation, which arises as a legal issue on 
the ‘boundaries of state responsibility’, fundamentally leads to an inquiry into the 
appropriate allocation of risk in the modern state that exercises regulatory power.1 
The allocation of risk entails balancing the interests of sovereign powers and the 
interests of investor rights by conducting due evaluation. 2  This task can be 
characterised as ‘fact driven’ and a ‘case-based method’.3 It is widely recognised 
that the occurrence of an expropriation is to be considered on a case-by-case basis,4 
despite the difficulties involved in such a balancing task, which considers all 
circumstances. 5  The principal risk of such an analysis is demonstrated by 
circumstances where different arbitral tribunals, confronted with the same set of 
facts, have reached different conclusions concerning expropriation claims. Campbell 
McLachlan QC has highlighted this risk and notes the cases of Lauder v Czech 
Republic6 and CME v Czech Republic7 by way of example. Both cases arose out of 
two expropriation claims, submitted by two different claimants in similar factual 
circumstances. The two claimants were ‘Lauder’, a US national, and ‘CME’, a 
Dutch company. The facts were that the government of the Czech Republic issued a 
television broadcasting licence to a domestic company, which then entered into an 
                                                
1 Andrew Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law’ 
(2005) 20(1) ICSID Review 1, 7.  
2 ibid. 
3 ibid 6. 
4  Campbell McLachlan and others, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive 
Principles (OUP 2010) 298. 
5 ibid. 
6 Ronald S Lauder v The Czech Republic (Final Award) 3 September 2001 UNCITRAL 
Arbitration.  




agreement with a subsidiary of CME. The actions of the government caused some 
revision of the agreement and thus it was disputed whether, as a result of the 
revision, expropriation had occurred. The Lauder tribunal found no such 
expropriation, whereas the CME tribunal did. Besides expropriation claims, arbitral 
tribunals have also dealt with the same set of facts and reached different conclusions 
in relation to investment claims. The Argentine emergency measures cases 
demonstrate such differing conclusions in investment claims; for example, CMS, 
Enron, and Sempra on the one hand, and the LG&E case on the other. These cases 
arose out of investment disputes, which contended that Argentine emergency 
measures, taken in response to the economic crisis, resulted in a violation of 
investment treaty obligations.  
 
This research paper proceeds on the basic premise that the regulatory expropriation 
issue, in international investment law, should be handled by a case-by-case based 
analysis. On this basis, the research will proceed by reformulating the dominant 
question concerning regulatory expropriation and with an exploration of this 
question; seeking viable methods to address the challenged credibility of the 
investment treaty regime. Prior to explaining the research methodology and specific 
approaches used, the selected questions and research aims will be introduced. 
 
The central question of this research is: ‘Under what conditions can bona fide 
regulatory expropriation be justified in international law?’ This central question is 
divided into two further specific questions. Firstly, when is a regulatory 
expropriation to be found or established? Secondly, under what conditions is a bona 
fide regulatory expropriation lawfully justified? In consideration of the absence of 
sufficient guiding rules that govern regulatory expropriation and the standard of 
compensation, Surya P Subedi has pointed out that it is desirable to discern some 
regulatory expropriations, permissible under evolving and extant international law, 
which may call for less than full compensation and permissible but compensable 
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types of regulatory expropriation that entail the Hull formula-based full 
compensation.8  
 
In relation to the first question, it should be noted that conditions or criteria that 
direct the determination of the finding of regulatory expropriation are different from 
conditions that determine the lawfulness of expropriation in international investment 
law. Careful attention should be paid and efforts should be made to articulate the 
former conditions in order for the nature or characteristics of regulatory 
expropriation to be closely observed. Regulatory expropriation is classified as a type 
of indirect expropriation. In an attempt to address the central question of this 
research, endeavours will be made to articulate certain distinctive characteristics of 
regulatory expropriation so that these can be distinguished in consideration of the 
functionality of regulatory expropriation. In so doing, the doctrine of police power 
will be subjected to a close analysis. The doctrine of police power is invoked to 
circumscribe the boundaries within which an ordinary regulation does not constitute 
an expropriation. The second question is premised on the idea that a state is 
essentially entitled to expropriate in the exercise of its right. The issue of lawfulness 
only arises as international law places some legal restraints on the aforementioned 
right. A broad view to look into relevant rules of international law will be necessary 
to examine how international law may constrain the state’s right to expropriate.  
 
There are several aims that this research intends to pursue. One aim is to seek to 
identify the elaborated ways in which the doctrine of police power can be applied. 
This doctrine is usually relied upon in order to discern a normal regulation from an 
alleged indirect expropriation. This research seeks to find ways to use the doctrine 
of police power for the purpose of identifying the existence of regulatory 
expropriation. Additionally, this research aims to shed light on the legitimate 
characteristic of regulatory expropriation from the perspective of international law, 
given that it originates from the exercise of regulatory autonomous power. The 
                                                
8 Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart 
Publishing 2012) 153. 
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research will try to identify useful and viable rules and principles of international 
law for their use within international investment law on regulatory expropriation. In 
this way, the research also aims to provide investment treaty arbitration tribunals 
with guidelines on which to rely when setting appropriate standards of deference to 
a state’s regulatory autonomy. Further, it aims to offer a challenge to the barrier 
between trade and investment, showing that both fields of international trade law 
and international investment law share a common concern over a state’s regulatory 
autonomy. In this way, the research, by using a range of rules and principles of law, 
will demonstrate when bona fide regulatory expropriation can be established and 
justified in international law. 
 
This research adopts a doctrinal methodology. This methodology is basically aimed 
at analysing legal doctrines on the basis of the reading of primary and secondary 
sources of literature. In conducting this methodology, the research concentrates on 
setting out applicable rules and principles and comparatively analysing them in 
order to derive available rules or principles of international law or of international 
investment law from the different works. This method or approach is selected in 
consideration of the concerns about the doubted credibility of the investment treaty 
regime. In this research, two sources of challenge to the credibility of the investment 
treaty regime are to be noted. First is the autonomous effect of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) on investment treaty arbitration. Second is the nature of investment 
treaty arbitration, as this public law dispute resolution should be sufficiently taken 
into account in the process of arbitral award-making.  
 
Among the sources of international law, 9  customary international law and 
international agreements or conventions mainly shape the substance of international 
law. These two sources of law are very different in terms of nature, formation, and 
ways of changing, and so on. BITs tend to prevail in the field of international 
investment law. In comparison with customary international law, that needs state 
practice and opinio juris, BITs stand out in terms of clarity, concreteness, 
                                                
9 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  
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availability for invocation, speedy formation, and so on. BITs have proliferated in a 
simple way whereby they can be formed merely based on bilateral negotiations and 
a consensus on investment protection. It is now no exaggeration to call it the era of 
BITs. It is noteworthy that BITs have a considerable potential to expand the 
international minimum standard of treatment, which has been formed based on 
customary international law, into the international maximum standard of 
treatment.10 BITs can function as a mechanism through which states can codify their 
own lex specialis, applicable to investment disputes that arise in relations within 
those states.11 In addition, before BITs and regional trade agreements were actively 
concluded, it was less convenient to establish an internationally wrongful act from 
the scrutiny of a state’s particular act that interfered with a foreign owner’s property 
interest.12 BITs and regional trade agreements can contain specific provisions of 
protections, extra privileges, and concessions, which may all allow a foreign 
investor to claim that a state has committed an internationally wrongful act.13 On the 
other hand, as generally recognised, customary international law, the other main 
source of international law, is not static, but evolving. These two main sources of 
international law do not exist in isolation, but interact with each other, which may 
cause uncertainty in relation to international investment law concerning standards of 
treatment. There are diverging opinions connected to the relationship and interaction 
between these two sources of law. This problem sometimes makes a practical 
difference to the determination of arbitral awards in investment disputes. In an effort 
to address this problem, it is desirable to seek appropriate viable rules and principles 
of international law that can guide the interpretations and the applications of 
customary international law and BITs.  
 
Traditionally, arbitration was recognised as a mechanism through which commercial 
disputes between private parties were to be resolved, as well as a means to promote 
                                                
10 Subedi (n 8) 137–39. 
11 ibid 91. 
12 ibid 141. 
13 ibid.  
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international commerce.14 Under the regime of the United Nations Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York 
Convention) of 1958, which implemented the recognition and the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, the function of international arbitration was limited to 
addressing claims by private parties over commercial matters, leaving the authority 
to resolve public disputes to the domestic courts.15 Investment treaty arbitration took 
shape by incorporating the traditional arbitration model, as investment treaties 
imported the procedural framework including employing privately selected 
arbitrators, and the enforcement form from arbitration treaties. 16  As a result, 
traditional commercial arbitrations and investment treaty arbitrations display 
similarities. Even so, it must be acknowledged that investment treaty arbitration is a 
mechanism that resolves a matter of public law. This is not only because the 
arbitration regime is established by sovereign acts of states parties to an 
international investment agreement, but also because the subject matter is a dispute 
concerning a state’s regulatory act and a foreign private person who is subject to the 
state’s public authority.17 In this respect, the nature of investment treaty arbitration 
makes it necessary to contemplate applicable rules and principles of international 
law that may govern states’ acts in general. It is accepted that this is more relevant 
in investment cases that dispute a state’s regulatory autonomy and its right to 
expropriate.  
 
The discussions of this thesis are structured as follows. In Chapter 1, the research 
takes a wide view over international investment law with the intention of making 
foundational preparations on which to develop expositions and arguments about 
indirect and regulatory expropriations in international law. Firstly, the origin and 
development of international investment law is identified and articulated. 
Subsequent to the codification by UN Draft Articles of state responsibility and the 
                                                
14 Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of 
Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL No 1 121, 125. 
15 ibid.  
16 ibid 126. 
17 ibid 148–49. 
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state taking of property, the establishment of the customary international law 
standard of treatment, the emergence of international investment treaties such as 
BITs and FTAs, the relationship between customary and treaty laws, issues and 
cases regarding expropriation and other standards of treatment in the context of 
BITs and FTAs are to be observed. Chapter 1 will provide the opportunity to 
examine and understand the issues of the protection of foreign-owned property and 
expropriation in the context of the development of international investment law. It is 
worthwhile to note the importance of the relationship between customary 
international law and international investment agreements, and the development of 
international investment law on expropriation. Thereafter, the mechanisms of 
investment treaty arbitration and the standard of treatment will be explained in detail. 
It will be shown how international investment agreements function in a manner that 
consequently expands the scope of protection. The linkage between a foreign owner 
and his or her property can be legally characterised by two concepts: ownership and 
control. These two concepts are related to the scope of the notion of a foreign 
investor. The notion of investment is also extended to cover indirect investment. 
International investment agreements have enabled these changes. Judgments by 
investment treaty tribunals of a state’s act or measure cannot be unlimited. With 
appropriate deference to a state’s sovereignty and its right to regulate within its 
territory, the international legal supervision of a state’s regulatory interference with 
a foreign owner’s property should follow a proper standard of review. In 
consideration of this, the standard of review will be carefully examined. Also, 
standards of treatment (or investment protection) will be expounded, such as 
expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, most-favoured-nation 
treatment, full protection and security, the prohibition of arbitrary and 
discriminatory measures, and the free transfer of funds. In the end, the mechanisms 
of investment treaty arbitration will be considered. As touched upon above, in 
Chapter 1 the research covers investment treaty arbitration and standards of 
treatment in detail. It intends to establish a concrete understanding of how the 
arbitration mechanism works and to help identify how expropriation disputes can 
arise and be handled within the mechanism. It will also aid in the understanding of 
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how the expropriation standard is unique in comparison with other standards of 
treatment. 
 
In Chapter 2, the research is aimed at exploring international law on expropriation in 
order to proceed with the analysis of regulatory expropriation in Chapter 3. The 
focus in Chapter 2 shifts from the typical form of expropriation, namely, direct 
expropriation, to indirect expropriation. As mentioned briefly, this research draws 
upon a state’s right to expropriate when dealing with issues of indirect and 
regulatory expropriations. It is necessary to bear this in mind when considering 
international law on expropriation, focusing on the concept of expropriation and the 
lawfulness of expropriation. In Chapter 2, the discussion starts with an explanation 
of the premise that a state has the right to expropriate. Thereafter, the discussion 
develops into an analysis of the basic aspects of indirect expropriation.  
 
Indirect expropriation contains an essential element that also constitutes a critical 
part of direct expropriation from the conventional perspective of international 
investment law. It is the consequential effect of an alleged indirect expropriation on 
investment. Conventional arbitral jurisprudence shows a strong propensity for 
relying on the effect that a state’s measure has on an investment in order to identify 
an expropriation. The effect is typically described as deprivation. Based on the 
notion of deprivation, a close analysis of arbitral jurisprudence will be conducted. 
Specifically, deprivation that represents the consequential effect of an alleged 
indirect expropriation will be grouped into two types: the deprivation of the 
economic value of a right or an investment and the deprivation of effective control. 
Also, it will be shown that not all deprivations are regarded as indirect expropriation 
in arbitral jurisprudence. Next, as a subjective aspect of a state’s measure, the intent 
of indirect expropriation will be examined. In addition, a rather new type of indirect 
expropriation will be explained, this being ‘creeping expropriation’. In a broad 
sense, indirect expropriation merely means a non-direct form of expropriation. On 
the other hand, creeping expropriation connotes more than a non-direct form. In 
finalising the analysis of the establishment of indirect expropriation, the question of 
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how to distinguish expropriation from an ordinary regulation is approached, using 
certain doctrines. In the following part of this chapter, the lawfulness of 
expropriation and the four conditions for lawful expropriation will be dealt with.  
 
In the final part of this chapter, a comparative analysis will be conducted concerning 
the principles of international law that determine the lawfulness of a state’s act 
under international law. For this analysis, three principles of necessity types will be 
selected, as they are considered closely relevant to expropriation as well as 
international investment law. These three types will be grouped into two, owing to 
the fact that two of the principles are usually regarded as interconnected. The first 
group is the principle of necessity, the application of which precludes the 
wrongfulness of a state’s act that violates international obligation and is derived 
from the non-preclusion measure (NPM) clause. The second is the necessity 
exception test that comes from the WTO General Exceptions. Even though these 
principles are different, they convey a high degree of similarity. Furthermore, the 
traditional convergence and divergence between international trade law and 
investment law may indicate that the two different systems have developed 
complementary relationships.18 The principles of the first group can apply when a 
state violates international obligations in pursuit of certain purposes and the legal 
effect of their application exempts a state from international responsibility. The 
necessity exception test, although originally applicable to trade issues, can also 
prove its potential in the field of international investment law. The goal of the 
examination of these principles in this chapter is to suggest that in addition to 
certain conditions that must be met for lawful expropriation, there are other 
available principles requiring consideration that are applicable in the justification of 
indirect or regulatory expropriation. 
 
                                                
18 Mavluda Sattorova, ‘Defining Investment Under the ICSID Convention and BITs: Of 




All research efforts that are made in this chapter aim to demonstrate general aspects 
of international law relating to indirect expropriation, in preparation for dealing with 
more specific aspects, particularly those concerning regulatory expropriation. 
 
In Chapter 3, the research explores regulatory expropriation. Initially, it undertakes 
a comparative analysis of the 5th Amendment of the US Constitution, the so-called 
US Takings Clause, the NAFTA rules on expropriation, and the jurisprudence of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the European Convention) regarding 
expropriation. Relying on the review of relevant expropriation provisions and cases, 
the comparative analysis of significant rules of law on expropriation will reveal that 
there are certain similarities and common elements between them. Deriving from 
these similarities and elements, it is aimed at identifying viable rules, principles, and 
even guidance applicable to regulatory expropriation.  
 
The principal question for international investment law on expropriation is: ‘at what 
point can a state’s sovereign regulation justifiably interfere with private property?’ 
Said differently, it may be asked as: ‘how can a normatively desirable balance be 
struck between sovereign regulatory interests and property interests in the 
consideration of policy and principles of international investment law?’ It will be 
noted that the US Takings Clause doctrine, the NAFTA expropriation rule, and the 
EU expropriation rule all seek to answer this question. These rules will be 
contemplated in the later part of the chapter, in connection to regulatory 
expropriation.  
 
Thereafter, an intensive analysis, identifying key constituent elements of regulatory 
expropriation, will be conducted. In addition, certain conditions for establishing 
regulatory expropriation will be scrutinised. The state’s exercise of police power 
takes a central place in contemplating these conditions. In view of these elements 
and the conditions, it will be possible to re-evaluate the relationship between 




Compensation is one of four conditions which have been firmly recognised as 
required in international law for lawful expropriation. There have been many 
scholarly discussions on the standard of compensation. In Chapter 4, the research 
does not delve into the details surrounding the standard of compensation, but 
concentrates solely on the consideration of compensation as a conditional aspect of 
lawful expropriation; in particular, regulatory expropriation. The main goal in this 
section is to see whether the Hull doctrine, which requires full fair market value 
compensation, should be an absolute rule that governs compensation for 
expropriation.  
 
At the start of this chapter, the research suggests that there have been differing 
views relating to the standard of compensation, which have attempted to cast doubt 
on the status of the Hull doctrine. Both the Hull doctrine and the Calvo doctrine, 
strongly supported by developing countries, are compared. Efforts are made to seek 
and identify exceptions to the Hull doctrine. So-called ‘evidence’ indicating 
exceptions to the Hull doctrine is located and reviewed. In contemplating viable 
principles, applicable as exceptions to the Hull doctrine, ECtHR jurisprudence is 
also scrutinised. 
 
In Chapter 5, the Lone Star case is explored. This case is the first investor-state 
arbitration case under ICSID involving an expropriation claim, in which the 
Republic of Korea was confronted. The case involves a taxation-based expropriation 
claim. Even though the award has not yet been determined, the analysis of this case 
will be conducted with a view to gaining an understanding of regulatory 
expropriation. The brief facts of the case are that Lone Star filed an arbitration claim 
on behalf of six Belgian investors against the government of the Republic of Korea 
(Korea). It is claimed that Korea violated several standards of treatment provided 
for by the BIT between Korea and Belgium, in particular, fair and equitable 
treatment, the prohibition of arbitrary and discriminatory measures, non-
discriminatory treatment, uncompensated expropriation, and the free transfer of 
funds. It was argued by Lone Star that Korea committed a violation of 
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uncompensated expropriation, in that the financial supervisory body of Korea 
delayed the approval process and caused Lone Star to lose share transaction 
agreements with Korean companies, and tax authorities imposed undue taxes on and 
conducted an improper tax assessment of Lone Star’s sales of shares to Korean 
companies. Proceedings were commenced on 15 May 2015, and the case is still on-
going. Even though the dispute has not yet been resolved, it is still meaningful to 
examine the claims by Lone Star, which provide an opportunity to address a 
taxation-based expropriation claim and to analyse taxation in the context of 
regulatory expropriation.  
 
Even though taxation could be considered as a state’s normal right to tax, it may 
also be regarded as indirect expropriation, given that it constitutes a measure that 
directly confiscates a portion of property. Nonetheless, there is a concept that 
indicates a type of regulatory expropriation which allows a broader perspective to 
see taxation in the context of regulatory expropriation, this being ‘creeping 
expropriation’. Creeping expropriation is unique in comparison with general indirect 
expropriation because it involves a series of regulatory measures at issue, whether 
related or unrelated, rather than a single measure. From the perspective of creeping 
expropriation, a range of taxation measures, including measures for tax enforcement, 
not a single tax measure, becomes an issue.  
 
In this chapter, the research seeks to demonstrate how taxation issues may form the 
subject matter in investment treaty arbitration. Additionally, it seeks to analyse 
cases relating to taxation-based expropriation claims; the analysis sets out when 






Chapter 1: Overview of International Investment Law on 






Currently, international investment law is represented by Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs), Regional Free Trade Agreements (RTAs) that contain provisions 
dealing with investment as well as trade, and investment treaty arbitration that 
provides for an investor-state dispute resolution mechanism. International 
investment law appears to be moving to its next phase, as geographical scopes are 
expanded in new types of regional trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) agreement, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
agreement. Additionally, the previous landscape of international investment law is 
very different. The history of international investment law will be expounded in the 
following sections. In summary, prior to the advent of international investment 
agreements, international investment was regulated by customary international law, 
the principle of state responsibility, and diplomatic protection. Since the conclusion 
of the first BIT between Germany and Pakistan, on 25 November 1959, the growth 
of BITs and RTAs has been swift, and they have formed an extensive global 
network.  
 
Prior to the advent of the BIT and RTA era, conflicting positions arose over the 
extent of alien treatment between capital-importing states and capital-exporting 
states. On the other hand, after the era commenced, the appropriate level of 
treatment, namely the standards of treatment, has reconciled conflicting interests 
between a private foreign investor and a host state. During these periods, the 





regulatory power has remained unchanged. To be more specific, from the 
perspective of investment protection, how much a state can justifiably interfere with 
a foreign-owned investment within legitimate boundaries of the standards of 
treatment of international investment law has remained static. In this context, this 
thesis focuses on a state’s right to expropriate. Furthermore, the credibility of 
investment treaty arbitration has been doubted. There is concern that under the 
resolution mechanism of a dispute between a private foreign investor and a state, a 
state’s sovereignty will be seriously challenged. In this first chapter, the major goal 
is to examine the growth and development of international investment law and gain 
a degree of background knowledge. It will prove useful to understand the flow of 
debates concerning the state’s regulatory power, in terms of the treatment of 
foreigners, and to obtain some clues that will enable the exploration of a state’s right 
to expropriate, and furthermore, a state’s regulatory expropriation.  
 
 
1.1 The Beginning and Growth of International Investment Law on the 
Protection of Foreign-Owned Property and Expropriation 
 
1.1.1 The Codification of Rules of International Law on State Responsibility 
and the Taking of Foreign-Owned Property 
 
In international law, state responsibility refers to the legal consequences of an 
internationally wrongful act of a state. 19  State responsibility was originally 
envisaged as rules of international law that address violations of states’ international 
obligations based on customary international law. 20  The concept of state 
responsibility for injuries to aliens first emerged in the middle of the eighteenth 
century. Its central idea was manifested by Emmerich Vattel in 1758: ‘[W]hoever 
uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends the state, which is bound to protect this 
                                                
19 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 241. 
20  Sompong Sucharitkul, ‘State Responsibility and International Liability under 
International Law’ (1996) 18 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Review 821, 823. 
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citizen’.21 This concept developed as concern for the protection of the property of 
aliens and was recognised.22 A state is obliged to pay compensation or make 
reparation for injuries sustained by nationals of other states.23  
 
The League of Nations made efforts to codify state responsibility since 1924. Firstly, 
it did this by instituting a Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of 
International Law, which made recommendations in 1927 for seven subjects for 
codification. On 27 September 1927, the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations 
decided to put forward three topics to the First Conference for the Codification of 
International Law, including the ‘Responsibility of States for Damage done in their 
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners’.24 Harvard Law School, in 
preparing a draft international convention on the three topics to be dealt with at the 
1930 Codification Conference, proposed a ‘Draft Convention on Responsibility of 
States for Damage done in their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners’ 
(1929 Harvard Draft).25 According to the 1929 Harvard Draft, ‘a state is responsible, 
when it has a duty to make reparation to another state for the injury sustained by the 
latter state as a consequence of an injury to its national’.26 A following Draft 
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (1961 
Draft Convention) revised the 1929 Draft Convention.27  
 
Article 10 of the 1961 Draft Convention prescribes the concepts of the ‘taking of 
property’ and the ‘taking of the use of property’, and the conditions to be met for 
those takings not to be wrongful; such as the pursuit of public purpose, the non-
                                                
21 Jonathan Gimblett and O Thomas Johnson Jr, From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of 
Modern International Investment Law (Covington & Burling LLP 2011) 649. 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid. 
24 Newcombe (n 1) 15. Two topics are set out in the reference section to Newcombe’s book, 
in addition to ‘State Responsibility’; these are ‘Nationality’ and ‘Territorial Waters’.  
25 ibid. 
26 Harvard Law School, ‘Research in International Law – Responsibility of States for 
Damage done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners’, Article 1, 




violation of a treaty, and just compensation.28 It defines the ‘taking of property’ and 
the ‘taking of the use of property’ as follows: 
 
(a) A ‘taking of property’ includes not only an outright taking of property but 
also any such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment, or disposal 
of property as to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be able 
to use, enjoy, or dispose of the property within a reasonable period of time 
after the inception of such interferences. 
 
(b) A ‘taking of the use of property’ includes not only an outright taking of use 
but also any unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of property 
for a limited period of time.29 
 
In the ‘Explanatory Note’ to Article 10, it was acknowledged that a ‘taking’ could 
take place through, inter alia, the ‘enforcement of legislation or an executive 
decree’, the ‘taking of an administrative measure’, or a ‘failure to take an 
administrative measure’. 30  According to the ‘Explanatory Note’, a state is 
legitimately entitled to take property as the exercise of its right, subject to some 
conditions. As can be observed domestically, all legal systems allow a state to 
forcefully acquire its citizens’ private property, through specific processes, such as 
eminent domain, requisition, preemption, expropriation, or nationalisation, upon the 
payment of compensation.31 Thus, a state can exercise its right to take property 
without committing any wrongdoing, provided that it conducts itself in accordance 
with the governing rules of municipal law, and pays compensation.32 Likewise, 
international law permits a state to take foreign-owned property, but is subject to 
certain limitations, such as the payment of compensation, there being a public 
                                                
28 Paragraph 1 to Article 10 of the Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of 
States for Injuries to Aliens.  
29 Paragraph 3 to Article 10 of the Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of 
States for Injuries to Aliens. 
30 ibid 554. 
31 ibid 555. 
32 ibid.  
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purpose, and the non-violation of a treaty.33 It can be noted that a state’s right to 
take a private property is recognised in a similar manner in both municipal law and 
international law. 
 
In December 1974, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (the 
Charter) was adopted by the UN General Assembly by a vote of 120 to 6 with 10 
abstentions. Article 2 of the Charter recognises that a state has the right to regulate 
foreign-owned property within its national jurisdiction in conformity to its laws and 
regulations and also provides for a state’s right to expropriate: 
 
Each state has the right to nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership of 
foreign property in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the 
state adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and 
regulations and all circumstances that the state considers pertinent.34 
 
Although the Charter reflects the views of a great majority of developing countries 
that strongly advocate sovereignty, being a UN General Assembly resolution, it is 
only a political and programmatic announcement, and is not legally binding.35 In 
addition, it does not contribute to the formation of state practice concerning the 
protection of foreign-owned property, as developing countries have joined 
international investment agreements, competing for the inflow of foreign 
investments.36 Even so, from a comparison of the Charter and the previous Draft 
Conventions, it can be concluded that under international law, a state has the 
legitimate but limited right to expropriate foreign-owned property. Additionally, the 
prevailing view is that the state’s right to expropriate is subject to certain conditions 
imposed by customary international law. 
 
                                                
33 ibid 555–56. 
34 Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. 
35 Newcombe (n 1) 32. The Charter, like the NIEO Declaration, was an assertion of national 
sovereignty by developing states. Although it was adopted by an overwhelming majority, 




1.1.2 Disputes concerning the Level of Protection of Foreign Investors and 
Expropriation  
 
1.1.2.1 The International Minimum Standard of Treatment versus National 
Treatment 
 
Conflicting positions have existed in relation to the level of protection of aliens, 
advocating either the national treatment or the international minimum standard. In 
the nineteenth century, when investment flows expanded between imperial powers 
and colonised countries, investments were regulated by the municipal laws of the 
colonial powers. State practice in this period was mainly shaped by the Western 
viewpoint, which held that their nationals should not be treated by host states under 
a standard of treatment that fell below a certain international minimum standard, 
even though that minimum standard might connote treatment more favourable than 
that accorded to their own nationals.37 However, when colonised territories became 
independent, a contrasting position emerged based on the doctrines of sovereignty 
and sovereign equality. 38  Latin America has substantially contributed to the 
development of rules and principles governing state responsibility in relation to the 
doctrine.39 With the recognition that the reality of diplomatic protection in the 
nineteenth century involved the use of military self-help, in other words, ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’,40 Latin America was opposed to diplomatic protection as well as to 
international minimum standards.41  
 
Against this backdrop, the Calvo doctrine was adopted by some Latin American 
states. This maintained that the responsibility of governments towards foreigners 
could not be greater than that which governments would have owed to their own 
                                                
37 ibid 12. 
38 Subedi (n 8) 8. 
39 ibid. 
40 Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitution and 
Administrative Law in the BIT Generation (Hart Publishing 2009) 32. 
41 ibid 38. 
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nationals.42 This doctrine was pursued in attempts to strike a balance between the 
goals of encouraging foreign investment and addressing the abuse of diplomatic 
protection.43 According to Article 9 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States, which was signed at the Seventh Pan-American Conference, because the 
jurisdiction of a state within its territorial limit reaches all inhabitants, nationals and 
foreigners are under the same protection of the law and, accordingly, the national 
authorities and foreigners cannot claim rights beyond those provided for nationals.44 
The Calvo doctrine can be summarised as follows: 
 
(1) Foreign nationals are entitled to no better treatment than host state nationals; 
(2) The rights of foreign nationals are governed by host state law; and 
(3) Host state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving foreign 
nationals.45 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the diplomatic and arbitral practices that 
were shaped in the previous century gave rise to a rule governing the treatment of 
aliens and their property. This was deemed to be generally applicable under 
international law. The former US Secretary of State, Elihu Root, maintained the 
following: 
 
There is a standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such 
general acceptance by all civilised countries as to form a part of the 
international law of the world … If any country’s system of law and 
administration does not conform to that standard, although the people of the 
country may be content or compelled to live under it, no other country can be 
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compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of treatment to its 
citizens.46  
 
Schwarzenberger also supported this position by claiming as follows:  
 
The national standard cannot be used as a means of evading international 
obligations under the minimum standard of international law. Even if the 
standard of national treatment is laid down in a treaty, the presumption is that it 
has been the intention of the parties to secure to their nationals in this manner 
additional advantages, but not to deprive them of such rights as, in any case, 
they would be entitled to enjoy under international customary law or the general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations.47 
 
These conflicting views concerning national treatment and the international 
minimum standard almost came to an end as the international minimum standard 
became predominant. The international minimum standard was strongly maintained 
during the 1920s in significant decisions of the US-Mexico General Claims 
Commission; for instance, in the cases of Neer, Roberts, and Hopkins. This standard 
was further reinforced by the judgments of the PCIJ in cases such as the Case 
Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, where the PCIJ held 
that a foreigner’s vested rights must be protected, and in the Case Concerning the 
Factory at Chorzów, in which the PCIJ held that an illegal taking of property incurs 
the obligation of reparation.48 This latter judgment connoted that a state is obliged to 
treat a foreigner and his or her property in accordance with a minimum standard of 
treatment. 49  Subsequently, Mexico, a loyal advocate of the Calvo doctrine, 
embraced Chapter XI of the North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA). 
Many other countries in Latin America have chosen to leave the Calvo doctrine by 
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entering into bilateral investment treaties (BITs).50 However, in 2002, the US 
Congress passed the Trade Promotion Authority Act, requiring that US trade 
negotiators ensure that foreign investors are not provided with greater substantive 
rights than US nationals.51  
 
Early arbitral cases involving the international minimum standard usually addressed 
the ‘physical maltreatment’ of foreigners and their property by agents of the state or 
the state’s failure to punish those who committed physical injuries to foreigners or 
their property.52 The Neer, Roberts, and Hopkins53 cases, decided by the Mexican-
US General Claims Commission (‘the Commission’), are deemed to indicate the 
emergence of the international minimum standard in international law.54  
 
Although the Neer case demonstrates the standard of treatment for foreigners, it was 
not concerned with an investment dispute, but with the murder of an American 
national. The Commission concluded that the Mexican authorities’ failure to arrest 
or punish those who were responsible for Neer’s death did not per se violate the 
international minimum standard of treatment of a foreigner. The Commission 
described the minimum standard as follows: 
 
The treatment of aliens, in order to constitute an international delinquency, 
should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an 
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that 
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognise its insufficiency.55 
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The Roberts case is also regarded as reflecting the international minimum standard. 
In this case, the Commission concluded that the treatment of Roberts, who was 
confined in a small cell with no sanitary equipment, necessitated indemnity because 
it constituted cruel and inhumane imprisonment.56 The Commission stated that the 
international minimum standard does not indicate the equality of treatment of a 
foreigner, but the treatment of a foreigner ‘in accordance with ordinary standards of 
civilisation’.57 On the basis of the Roberts case, the international minimum standard 
is regarded as a norm of customary international law which governs states in their 
treatment of aliens, irrespective of their domestic legislation and practices, by 
providing for a minimum set of principles.58  
 
Paragraph 165.2 of the 1965 American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States articulates the definition of the 
international minimum standard, as follows: 
 
The international standard of justice … is the standard required for the treatment 
of aliens by: (a) the applicable principles of international law as established by 
international custom, judicial and arbitral decisions, and other recognised 
sources or, in the absence of such applicable principles, (b) analogous principles 
of justice generally recognised by states that have reasonably developed legal 
systems.59 
 
There are several elements that constitute the international minimum standard and 
denial of justice has long been recognised as one such element. The denial of justice 
is considered to refer to both the narrow notion of judicial misconduct as well as a 
range of other injuries that would today be recognised as expropriation or as other 
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claims.60 Another element of the standard involves the obligation of host states to 
exercise due diligence to prevent injuries to aliens or to make reasonable efforts to 
bring the culprits to justice.61 The third element is the one of due process. It is 
required in the ‘administration of justice’.62 If a violation of due process is not 
rectified by the judicial mechanism, a denial of justice will occur.63 Due process in 
customary international law concerns a host state’s conduct that may affect the right 
of a foreign investor or foreign-owned property. 64  For instance, a lack of 
transparency or unfairness in an administrative process, such as the revocation of a 
business license without notice or hearing, will result in a breach of the international 
minimum standard of treatment.65 In addition, the international minimum standard 
protects a foreign investor and foreign-owned property from arbitrary host state 
acts.66 §712 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States provides that a state is responsible for its arbitrary acts that cause injury to the 
‘property or other economic interests’ of a foreign national. The commentary to 
§712 describes ‘arbitrary’ as referring to an ‘act that is unfair and unreasonable, and 
inflicts serious injury to established rights of foreign nationals, though falling short 
of an act that would constitute an expropriation’.67 Finally, non-discrimination is 
related to the international minimum standard. Discrimination in the context of 
international investment agreements connotes a form of illegitimate differentiation 
between persons or things that are in a similar circumstance.68 For instance, in 
Waste Management II, the tribunal concluded that the conduct of a state which ‘is 
discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice’ is 
prohibited by the international minimum standard of treatment.69 
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A significant issue arises as to whether the notion of the international minimum 
standard remains to be interpreted as in the early arbitral cases, such as Neer and 
Roberts, or whether it refers to an evolving customary international law that has 
been formed under the influence of the extensive BITs.70 According to the Free 
Trade Commission of NAFTA, the fair and equitable treatment of Article 1105(1) 
prescribes the international minimum standard of the treatment of foreigners and of 
their property.71 From this perspective, certain NAFTA tribunals such as ADF and 
Mondev have advocated that the international minimum standard has continued to 
evolve since 1926 and Neer. For instance, the ADF tribunal affirmed that the 
international minimum standard of treatment has developed as follows: 
 
What customary international law projects is not a static photograph of the 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as it stood in 1927 when the Award in 
the Neer case was rendered. For both customary international law and the 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens it incorporates, are constantly in a 
process of development.72 
 
The Mondev tribunal indicated the development of the minimum standard, 
influenced by the increased numbers of BITs, when interpreting Article 1105(1) of 
NAFTA: 
 
Both the substantive and procedural rights of the individual in international law 
have undergone considerable development. In the light of this development it is 
unconvincing to confine the meaning of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full 
protection and security’ of foreign investments to what those terms – had they 
been current at the time – might have meant in the 1920s when applied to the 
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physical security of an alien. To the modern eye, what is unfair or inequitable 
need not equate with the outrageous or the egregious.73 
 
1.1.2.2 The Relationship between the International Minimum Standard and 
Expropriation 
 
A state is obliged by customary international law to provide a foreign investor and 
foreign-owned property with the minimum standard of treatment.74 Without an 
international investment agreement, the international minimum standard of 
treatment functions as the relevant standard of treatment for diplomatic protection.75 
In a dispute concerning an international investment agreement, the international 
minimum standard of treatment serves for the interpretation of the obligations of an 
international investment agreement as the minimum standard is equated with fair 
and equitable treatment and is required in some international investment agreements 
as ‘treatment in accordance with international law’.76 On the other hand, the 
international minimum standard of treatment may assist in other ways in relation to 
the international law rules on expropriation.  
 
As previously noted, in the competing race between national treatment and the 
international minimum standard of treatment, the latter became predominant. This 
implies that developing countries, which once advocated the former, have changed 
their position, choosing to endorse the international minimum standard of treatment 
as a more acceptable standard. Furthermore, the basic function of the international 
minimum standard is to set a minimum criterion with which any municipal law 
should comply. Elihu Root, who supports the application of the international 
minimum standard to the treatment of aliens, argued that there existed a standard of 
justice, forming a part of international law, which became a ‘general international 
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standard’ with which any municipal law regulating the treatment of aliens had to 
comply.77  
 
In this respect, the international minimum standard in itself can be a minimum 
criterion on which investment treaty arbitration tribunals can rely when addressing 
expropriation cases; in particular, in assessing the lawfulness of expropriation. It is 
noteworthy that the international minimum standard of treatment and the conditions 
required by customary international law for lawful expropriation share a few 
common elements, such as due process and non-discrimination. Considering the 
legal nature of the international minimum standard and these common elements, it is 
reasonable to contemplate that the international minimum standard of treatment can 
exert some influence on the evaluation of the lawfulness of expropriation. This 
potential will be explored in the subsequent chapter where the lawfulness of 
expropriation will be examined. 
 
1.1.3 International Investment Treaty Law on the Protection of Foreign-
Owned Property and Expropriation 
 
1.1.3.1 BITs, the Standard of Treatment, and Expropriation 
 
1.1.3.1.1 The Advent of the Era of BITs  
 
International investment agreements have been negotiated or concluded at bilateral, 
regional, inter-regional and multilateral levels, in an attempt to address uncertainties 
and the paucity of customary international law on state responsibility for injuries to 
aliens and their property.78 Also, capital exporting states have striven to secure 
enhanced market access commitments from capital importing states for their 
nationals, and to fulfil progressive development in the standard of investment 
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protection. 79  Prior to the advent of international investment agreements, the 
primitive form of the investment protection treaty was the treaty of ‘Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation’ (FCN). For example, the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation between Nicaragua and the United States is a type of 
general economic treaty which serves the same function as a BIT.80 Since the first 
BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959 and came into force in 
1962,81 BITs have grown expansively. According to UNCTAD monitoring, there 
exist 2,923 BITs; 2,240 having come into force, along with 345 other international 
investment agreements.82 Today, the era of BITs has emerged in a background 
where the division between developed and developing countries over the customary 
norms regulating foreign direct investment has not reached a compromise.83 In this 
situation, each country has conducted BIT negotiations based on bilaterally agreed 
terms.84  
 
1.1.3.1.2 The Relationship between BITs and Customary International Law in 
Connection to the Standard of Protection in International Investment 
Law 
 
The expansion of an international network of BITs raises an important question in 
the relationship between BITs and customary international law. According to 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, BITs, as 
international conventions, and customary international law, are the source of 
international law. The question is what the relationship between BITs and 
customary international law is when addressing the common subject of the 
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treatment of foreign-owned property. One view is that the extensive network of 
BITs embodies rules on the treatment of foreign investment, by re-establishing rules 
of customary international law on the treatment of foreign investment. It may not be 
immediately understood that BITs not only legally bind parties to the specific 
treaties, but can also constitute general international law that may exert a general 
binding force on the international community. The UN International Law 
Commission has admitted the possibility that treaties can generalise rules on the 
basis of similarity in treaty provisions, as follows: 
 
An international convention admittedly establishes rules binding the contracting 
states only, and based on reciprocity; but it must be remembered that these rules 
become generalized through the conclusion of other similar conventions 
containing identical or similar provisions.85 
 
Mann argued that BITs would provide the evidentiary support for the existence of 
an international obligation, by contending that where BITs ‘express a duty which 
customary law imposes or is widely believed to impose, they give very strong 
support to the existence of such a duty and preclude the contracting states from 
denying its existence’.86 The tribunal in the Mondev case also admitted the potential 
for BITs and RTAs to exert such an influence with regard to some treatment of 
foreign investment: 
 
The vast majority of bilateral and regional investment treaties (more than 2000) 
almost uniformly provide for fair and equitable treatment of foreign 
investments, and largely provide for full security and protection of investments. 
… On a remarkably widespread basis, states have repeatedly obliged themselves 
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to accord foreign investment such treatment. In the Tribunal’s view, such a body 
of concordant practice will necessarily have influenced the content of rules 
governing the treatment of foreign investment in current international law.87 
 
Another view is that due to a lack of consistency, BITs fall short of exercising such 
an influence on the formation of customary international law. Even though a state 
may obtain a right on the basis of the consent of the other state parties concerned, a 
general rule of customary international law demands more than such consent.88 
There should be indications that states not party to the formation of the rule have in 
fact come to abide by it as part of their general law and have acted in accordance 
with this perception.89 For all states concerned to accept a legal principle, there 
should be a ‘general conviction’ that states honour the rights based on the customary 
principle by endorsing it as a legal obligation.90 In order to examine whether BITs 
can create customary international law concerning foreign investment, it is 
necessary to consider a few key aspects of the rules on foreign investment. It is 
evident that BITs exhibit varying scopes in relation to the definition of the property 
to be protected by treaties, require different combinations of conditions for lawful 
expropriation, show differences in terms of applicable law and the methods of 
investment dispute resolution, and also do not include a unified standard of 
compensation.91 In this respect, this opinion concludes that BITs fail to demonstrate 
consistency that is sufficient to support the possibility that any definite rules of 
customary international can form from them.92  
 
A third view suggests that even when admitting that the content of BITs and custom 
is different, and BITs as a whole may not indicate a new custom, BITs can exert a 
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‘marginal’ effect in reinforcing and materialising rules of customary international 
law.93 This view acknowledges that because ‘cross-fertilisation’ between BITs and 
customary international law can happen, the extensive network of BITs can 
influence customary international law.94 Firstly, certain standards of investment 
protection can result in the ‘consolidation’ of existing rules of customary 
international law, so-called ‘codification’. 95  Secondly, the ‘common law of 
investment protection’, which stems from BITs, will lead to the future 
materialisation of new rules of customary international law.96 In addition, according 
to this view, customary international law can assist the provisions of BITs by filling 
the gaps when incompleteness, ambiguity or abstractness exists in the BITs’ 
provisions. For instance, the ADC tribunal supported such a role of customary 
international law when there is a gap in treaty provisions, as follows: 
 
Since the BIT does not contain any lex specialis rules that govern the issue of 
the standard of assessing damages in the case of an unlawful expropriation, the 
Tribunal is required to apply the default standard contained in customary 
international law in the present case.97 
 
Based on their bilateral nature, it is conceivable that BITs can be relied on by 
negotiating states to extend the scope of the standard of treatment afforded by 
customary international law.98 Also, it is possible that BITs, rather than simply 
codifying the rules of customary international law, can provide extended protection 
to foreign investors by endeavouring to reflect more favourable treatment in BIT 
provisions.99 Although each BIT could be deemed as a lex specialis, it can be argued 
that the practice of states in concluding BITs is capable of reinforcing the alleged 
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rules of customary international law of relevant subjects.100 It is further admitted 
that there exist a great number of BITs that even contain provisions of high 
similarity. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily mean that such provisions materialise 
rules of customary international law,101 given that BITs cannot sufficiently meet the 
two constituent requirements of customary international law: i.e. consistent state 
practice and opinio juris. In addition, rules of customary international law can be 
relied upon in certain occasions for the interpretation of an investment treaty 
provision. For instance, in interpreting Article 1105 of NAFTA, reference should be 
made to principles of customary international law.102  
 
Even though it may be hard to accept that BITs are capable of modifying the 
meaning, nature and scope of general customary international law,103 it may be 
admitted that customary international law can play a larger role than simply filling 
gaps in BITs. For instance, the international minimum standard of treatment, as a 
rule of customary international law, is regarded as a constituent element that forms 
part of fair and equitable treatment or full protection and security, which are 
provided for in treaty provisions. In this respect, customary international law is 
capable of shaping some BIT standards of treatment.  
 
1.1.3.1.3 BITs and Expropriation 
 
For the purpose of promoting foreign investment and thus protecting it from 
unjustifiable expropriation, BITs typically contain provisions codifying a lex 
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specialis to address expropriation claims. 104  Within the legitimate scope, 
circumscribed by BITs, states can directly exercise their right to expropriate foreign-
owned property in pursuit of economic development and reform, environmental 
protection, and other public welfare interests; albeit that direct expropriation became 
rare with the end of socialism.105 In an attempt to evade the perception that they 
could abuse their expropriation authority, capital-importing countries began to 
alternatively pursue indirect forms of expropriation.106 BITs have since reflected 
that a foreign investor’s investment can be expropriated ‘indirectly through 
measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation’. 107  This substantive 
language is shared in almost all BITs (as well as in RTAs) and reflects various types 
of indirect expropriation. 108  The so-called ‘tantamount clause’ is capable of 
extending the scope of the notion of indirect expropriation for the purpose of 
establishing or sustaining favourable legal conditions in the host state.109 It is a 
universal requirement, adopted by BITs as well as RTAs, which obliges a state to 
pay compensation when it expropriates foreign-owned property.  
 
Along with this obligation of compensation, there are other conditions to be met for 
lawful expropriation, including public purpose, non-discrimination, and due process. 
These conditions are also required by customary international law. For instance, the 
Agreement between Korea and Russia 110  for the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment stipulates: 
 
Investment of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, 
expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation 
or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as ‘expropriation’) in the territory of the 
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other Contracting Party except for a public purpose. The expropriation shall be 
carried out under due process of law, on a non-discriminatory basis and shall be 
accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective compensation.111 
 
The Investment Agreement between Chile and China also provides a similar 
provision which allows a state to expropriate upon certain conditions: 
 
Neither Contracting Party shall expropriate, nationalise or take similar measures 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘expropriation’) against investments of investors of 
the other Contracting party in its territory, unless the following conditions are 
met: 
(a) for the public or national interest; 
(b) under domestic legal procedure; 
(c) without discrimination;  
(d) against compensation.112 
 
With regard to expropriation and the accompanying requirement of compensation, 
there are two critical issues. The first one is whether the tantamount clause can 
expand the scope of expropriation beyond the concept as recognised by customary 
international law. The second one is whether the so-called Hull formula, which 
requires ‘prompt, adequate, and effective’ compensation, should be universally 
accepted in all international investment agreements and relied on for the 
interpretation of the compensation requirement as such. These two issues will be 
explored in detail in later parts of this thesis.  
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1.1.3.2 Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), Standards of Treatment, and 
Expropriation 
 
In addition to BITs, there have appeared comprehensive regional agreements 
covering trade and investment, such as the Energy Charter Treaty, the North 
American Free Trade Agreements, and the ASEAN Investment Agreements. The 
first multilateral treaty that included investment provisions was the Energy Charter 
Treaty of 1994. The treaty was designed to create ‘a level playing field’ to promote 
Western investment in the development of energy resources in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, and accordingly to produce a legal framework which 
would contribute to long-term coordination in the energy sector.113 The treaty covers 
trade, transit, the transfer of technology, the sovereignty over energy resources, and 
dispute settlement, as well as investment. 114  Earlier, in December 1991, the 
European Energy Charter (EEC) had been adopted and signed.115 This was a non-
binding treaty, but put forward guidelines for the negotiation of a subsequent 
binding treaty, which was to become the ECT, and a set of protocols.116 As of 2010, 
the ECT has been signed and ratified by 45 states and the European Union. The 
Russian Federation, while embracing the provisional application of the ECT, had 
signed it in 1991, but not ratified it. 117  It later withdrew from the ECT by 
terminating provisional application in 2009.118 
 
ECT ‘investment’ covers a broad concept of ‘every kind of asset’ owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by an investor and enumerates specific asset 
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types.119 The aim of the ECT provisions related to investment is to create a ‘level 
playing field’ for investments in the energy sector and to minimise the non-
commercial risks that can be involved in such investments.120 It is noteworthy that 
the ECT draws a distinctive line between the pre-investment phase of making an 
investment and the post-investment phase that comes after an investment is 
completed.121 While the provisions regarding the pre-investment phase establish a 
‘soft regime of best endeavour’ obligations, a ‘hard regime’ is established for the 
post-investment phase on the basis of the standards of investment protection, the 
types being observed in the provisions of NAFTA and other BITs. 122  The 
substantive protections under the ECT include fair and equitable treatment, constant 
protection and security, the protection from impairment by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures of investment management or disposal, national treatment, 
most-favoured-nation treatment, and the observance of any obligations committed 
by treaty states.123 The ECT dispute settlement procedure can commence after the 
lapse of a three-month cooling-off period. The procedure has a few more options 
than state-to-state or investor-state dispute resolutions. There are additionally: (i) the 
courts or administrative tribunals of the host state; (ii) any applicable, previously 
agreed dispute settlement procedure; and (iii) the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.124 
 
A few cases can be used to exemplify the violations of the standards of treatment or 
investment protection. The case of Petrobart Limited v The Kyrgyz Republic125 
concerned a sales contract, wherein the Kyrgyz state-owned company KGM bought 
200,000 tonnes of gas condensate from Petrobart. When Petrobart attempted to 
enforce its right regarding unpaid shipments, the Kyrgyz authorities took measures 
to privatise KGM and transferred its assets to new companies, plus directed the 
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domestic court to accord a stay of enforcement, in which period KGM was declared 
bankrupt and could not be subjected to the enforcement of Petrobart’s rights. The 
tribunal concluded the Kyrgyz government acted against the principle of fair and 
equitable treatment126 by transferring KGM assets and impairing the benefits of 
KGM’s creditors. Additionally, it also breached the obligation to ensure effective 
means of assertion and the enforcement of rights with respect to investment127 by its 
intervention in court proceedings.  
 
The arbitration case of Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v The Republic 
of Latvia128 involved an expropriation claim. In 1997, Latvenergo, a state-owned 
Latvian company, and Windau, a subsidiary wholly owned by Nykomb, entered into 
an agreement for the construction of power plants in Latvia. In accordance with the 
agreement, Latvenergo was to purchase the surplus electric power by paying at a 
tariff which was twice the average tariff for electric power sanctioned by the Public 
Utilities Commission of Latvia (the Double Tariff). Latvenergo, however, refused to 
pay the Double Tariff, and instead purchased surplus electric power from Windau at 
75 per cent of the average tariff under the new Energy Law, which came into force 
after the construction agreement was concluded. Nykomb argued that Latvenergo’s 
reliance on the new Energy Law, and consequential refusal to pay the Double Tariff, 
deprived Windau of its right to the Double Tariff, which amounted to a regulatory 
taking that had an effect equivalent to expropriation and was discriminatory. The 
tribunal held that because there was no interference with the shareholder’s rights or 
with the management’s control over the business, the refusal to pay the Double 
Tariff did not constitute an expropriation under the ECT. However, it accepted 
Nykomb’s discrimination claim for the reason that Latvenergo accorded double 
tariffs to other companies and failed to put forward evidence against its varying 
treatment. 
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NAFTA is also a regional trade agreement signed by the United States, Canada and 
Mexico, which came into effect on 1 January 1994. Although NAFTA is a trade 
agreement, it contains provisions for foreign investment protection in Chapter 11, 
with the aim of establishing a ‘predictable commercial framework’ for 
investment.129 NAFTA provides for several substantive obligations, which are: (i) 
national treatment (Article 1102); (ii) most-favoured-nation treatment (Article 
1103); (iii) treatment in accordance with international law (Article 1105); (iv) the 
prohibition of imposition of performance requirements (Article 1106); (v) the 
prohibition of appointing individuals to senior management positions (Article 
1107); (vi) freedom of currency transfers (Article 1109); and (vii) expropriation and 
compensation (Article 1110).  
 
Among those obligations, Article 1105 (1) raises a particularly significant issue with 
regard to the level of protection accorded by the provision in comparison to 
customary international law. It stipulates that ‘Each Party shall accord to investment 
of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security’.130 
 
This provision is construed to connote that the protection of investment accorded 
under customary international law is as extensive as that provided in the NAFTA, 
based on the premise that the NAFTA provisions simply codify rules of customary 
international law.131 However, it may not be certain whether the protection of 
customary international law in practice extends as far as NAFTA protection does.132 
Also, it is doubtful as to whether the new concepts introduced by NAFTA in 
Articles 1110(1) and 1105(1), such as the due process of law, fair and equitable 
treatment, and full protection and security, can be absorbed into the notion of the 
minimum international standard of treatment of foreign investment accepted in 
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traditional international law under the heading ‘Minimum Standard of 
Treatment’.133  
 
As BITs adopt a ‘tantamount’ clause in their expropriation provisions, the NAFTA 
also contains such a clause in its expropriation provision: 
 
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalise or expropriate an investment of an 
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalisation or expropriation of such investment (expropriation) except: 
 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); 
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraph 2 through 6.134 
 
It can be noted that there has been a NAFTA case which concerned the relationship 
between the expropriation provision of Article 1110 of NAFTA and customary 
international law. In Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada,135 Pope & Talbot Inc raised an 
expropriation claim. Pope & Talbot Inc is a Delaware company that owns a British 
Columbia wood-products company which manufactures and sells softwood lumber 
and exports its softwood lumber production to the United States. Canada instigated 
a Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) with the United States, which set a 
restriction on the export to the United States of softwood lumber originally 
manufactured in British Columbia. Pope & Talbot Inc argued that Canada’s Export 
Control Regime carrying out the SLA had undermined its company’s ability to 
conduct the business of exporting softwood lumber to the United Sates, thus 
expropriating Pope & Talbot Inc’s investment. The claimant based its argument on 
the fact that the measure at issue, though not falling within the ambit of customary 
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international law’s definition of expropriation, constituted a ‘measure tantamount to 
expropriation’ as provided for in paragraph 1 to Article 1110 of NAFTA, which can 
be defined as a broader concept than the expropriation definition based on 
customary international law.136 The tribunal rejected the claimant’s expropriation 
claim,137 along with its interpretation of ‘measure tantamount to expropriation’. The 
tribunal construed ‘tantamount’ as being no more than equivalent.138  
 
Of significance in the NAFTA regime is investor-state arbitration, which is set out 
in Section B (Articles 1115 to 1138). An investor can bring a suit against the host 
state by claiming a violation of one of the obligations in Chapter 11. When both the 
home and host states are parties to the ICSID, a foreign investor can rely on the 
rules of the ICSID. However, in a scenario when a state is not a party to the ICSID, 
then other available dispute settlement rules may be relied upon, such as the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules of 1978 and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Because 
the United States is the only NAFTA party that is a signatory to the ICSID 
Convention, only the latter two choices are available.  
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has ten member states,139 
which have considered the importance of a regional investment agreement and made 
efforts into realising such a provision. The first ASEAN investment agreement was 
introduced by way of the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, which set up a 
plan to rebuild ASEAN as a community of high economic integration by 2015.140 
On 26 February 2009, ASEAN’s member states signed the ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement (ACIA). The ACIA was designed to establish a 
comprehensive, rules-based framework for investment protection.141 Furthermore, 
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within the ACIA, ASEAN member states sought to embrace the principles of the US 
Model BIT and NAFTA Chapter 11.142 
 
In an attempt to establish a universal legal instrument regarding international 
investment, states negotiated to agree on rules concerning investment at a 
multilateral level, but to no avail. Subsequent to the failure to encompass investment 
protection in the Uruguay Round Agreements, the United States drove negotiations 
for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) within the OECD.143 The MAI 
was intended, as a harmonisation effort, to be a solution to deal with the paucity of 
unity in investment protection, caused by a great number of BITs.144 However, the 
MAI was confronted with serious opposition from NGOs having the concern that it 
could undermine the regulatory authority of host states, while according advantages 
to foreign investors. 145  Under domestic electoral pressure, many states that 
advocated the MAI, such as the United States and France, withdrew their 
participation in 1998. 
 
Lately, new negotiation efforts have been embarked upon in order to establish 
comprehensive regional free trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The TTP originated from 
the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (Trans-Pacific SEP) of 
2005 whose member states were Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. 
Following the joining of the United States in the negotiations, the Trans-Pacific SEP 
expanded, with the joining of Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Mexico, Canada, Malaysia, 
and Japan. The TTP is the first non-customs union trade agreement that is designed 
to develop into a large, multilateral free trade agreement.146 According to the 
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Congressional Research Service Report of the United States, in relation to foreign 
investment, it is likely that the standards of investment protection of the TPP will be 
mostly based on the US Model BIT, including non-discriminatory treatment, the 
rules on expropriation, and the transfer of funds.147 Currently, one obstacle to the 
negotiations is Australia’s objection to the inclusion of an investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanism. In addition, an issue that has been raised is whether in 
periods of global financial crisis a state is allowed to exercise its authority to impose 
controls on capital flow in order to weaken short-term balance of payments 
problems when the financial system becomes unstable.148 Former US FTAs have 
protected the free transfer of funds. If the TPP employs the same approach, it will 
likely undermine a state’s power to control a balance of payment problem when an 
economic crisis occurs.149 An approach that is recommended by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) is to allow a state to control short-term capital in dealing with 
balance of payment problems.150 
 
The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations began on 
14 June 2013, and were aimed at increasing trade and investment between the 
European Union (EU) and the United States by alleviating and removing the 
remaining barriers to transatlantic trade and investment. Because trade policy 
belongs to the EU’s exclusive authority, the European Commission, being the EU’s 
executive body, negotiates the TTIP on behalf of EU Member States, by 
maintaining close cooperative relationships with the EU’s co-legislators, the 
Council of the EU and the European Parliament.151 Trade agreement negotiations 
can only begin once they are authorised by the Council on the basis of a mandate 
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(negotiating directives) set out by the European Commission.152 The conclusion of 
trade agreements is subject to the approval of both the Council and the European 
Parliament.153 In the case of certain trade agreements that involve matters that 
belong to Member State jurisdiction, the additional requirement is ratification by the 
legislatures of the Member States.154 As the EU’s “mandate” proceeds, the TTIP 
will cover three key elements: (1) market access; (2) regulatory issues and non-tariff 
barriers; and (3) rules.155 
 
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a free trade 
agreement between ASEAN states and ASEAN’s FTA partners, such as Australia, 
China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand. The RCEP plan was pronounced by 
the ASEAN leaders in November 2011 during the 19th ASEAN Summit. The RCEP 
was conceived as an ASEAN-driven process through which the ASEAN would 
widen and reinforce its economic engagement with its FTA partners in pursuit of 




1.2 The Investment Treaty Arbitration System 
 
1.2.1 The Scope of Protection under International Investment Agreements 
 
1.2.1.1 A Foreign Investor 
 
A foreign investor refers to one who is entitled to exercise legal ownership or 
control of investment, whether directly or indirectly, and enjoys the protections 
accorded by international investment law. The definitions of a foreign investor and 
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foreign-owned investment are the very factors that determine the scope of the 
application of international investment agreements.157 In relation to expropriation, 
the concept of a foreign investor has an important bearing on the question as to who 
may be entitled to raise a claim that his or her investment was expropriated by a host 
state.  The broader the definition of investor, the greater the exposure of host states 
to claims of regulatory expropriation.  
 
Two types of investors exist: a natural person, and a juridical or legal person. The 
investor’s nationality determines which foreign country takes jurisdictional 
precedence in relation to the investment.158 The origin of investment has little 
bearing on the potential existence of a foreign investment.159 What matters is the 
nationality of a foreign investor, as this determines the applicable treaty to which the 
investor bases his or her investment arbitration claim.160 
 
First of all, it is a well-established principle in international law that the nationality 
of the investor, as a natural person, is determined by the national law of the state in 
which nationality is claimed.161 The right of a state to grant and withdraw the 
nationality of a natural person is a sovereign matter.162 An important issue with 
which investment treaty arbitration tribunals are usually confronted is as to whether 
and to what extent a state can refuse to accept the nationality claim of a natural 
person.163 The practice of international law concerning nationality has developed 
mainly in the context of diplomatic protection. The exemplary case of Nottebohm 
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sheds light on the issue. In this case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held 
that, although it involves a state’s own accord or legislation as to whether to grant 
nationality to a specific person, there must be an authentic connection between the 
state and the national: 
 
Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a 
genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the 
existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical 
expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either 
directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more 
closely connected with the population of the state conferring nationality than 
with that of any other state. Conferred by a state, it only entitles that state to 
exercise protection vis-à-vis another state, if it constitutes a translation into 
juridical terms of the individual’s connection with the state that has made him its 
national.164 
 
The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Report on Diplomatic Protection, 
however, has admitted the limitations of the genuine link requirement set forth by 
Nottebohm: 
 
It is necessary to be mindful of the fact that if the genuine link requirement 
proposed by Nottebohm was strictly applied it would exclude millions of 
persons from the benefit of diplomatic protection since in today’s world of 
economic globalisation and migration, there are millions of persons who have 
moved away from their state of nationality and made their lives in states whose 
nationality they never acquire or have acquired nationality by birth or descent 
from states with which they have a tenuous connection.165  
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However, the Nottebohm principles are still applicable in cases of dual or multiple 
nationalities when the claimed nationality is to be accepted as ‘predominant’.166 The 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal employed the ‘test of dominant and effective 
nationality’ in addressing the question of whether a claimant with dual US-Iranian 
nationality should be deemed predominantly American or Iranian, so as to be 
entitled to bring an arbitration claim before the Tribunal. In Esphahanian v Bank 
Trejarat, Chamber Two admitted the claimant’s entitlement to bring a claim for the 
reason that his ‘dominant and effective nationality at all relevant times was that of 
the United States and the funds at issue in the present case related primarily to his 
American nationality, not his Iranian nationality’.167 In addition, the criterion of 
permanent residence is adopted by some BITs or RTAs, as an alternative to 
citizenship or nationality. For instance, in the Canada-Argentina BIT, the ‘investor’ 
refers to ‘any natural person possessing the citizenship of or permanently residing in 
a Contracting Party in accordance with its laws’.168 The ECT and NAFTA also 
contain similar provisions that stipulate permanent residence.169 In the absence of 
such provisional guidance in international investment agreements, general principles 
of international law will apply; having recourse to the ‘effective’ nationality test.170 
It should also be noted that when the ICSID Convention is applicable, it requires a 
claimant to demonstrate that they had the nationality of a contracting state on two 
dates: the date at which the parties consented to ICSID’s jurisdiction, and the date of 
the registration of the request for arbitration.171 
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Secondly, the nationality of a juridical person has become complicated in today’s 
world as it is common today for a company to extend its ownership or control chain 
across borders, incorporating itself under the laws of state A, operating its centre of 
control in state B, and conducting its main business activities in state C.172 On the 
other hand, international tribunals have tended to abstain from delving into a 
company’s control structure when determining the nationality of a juridical person, 
instead typically considering the location of incorporation or seat.173 Unlike the case 
of a natural person, the general practice in international investment agreements is to 
rely on objective criteria in order to determine the nationality of a juridical person. 
The most common objective criteria are incorporation, the main seat of business, or 
their combination. Some investment agreements require a ‘preponderant interest’ of 
nationals in a juridical person174 or control.175  
 
An important issue has arisen as to the determination of the nationality of a juridical 
person who is locally incorporated and registered in the host state, but is controlled 
by a national of a third state. Host states frequently demand that investments be 
made through locally incorporated companies. On such occasions, it is normal that 
these local companies will not be deemed to be foreign investors and thus will not 
be entitled to enjoy ICSID Convention protection. Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID 
Convention addresses such an occasion; it provides as follows: 
 
National of another Contracting State means … any juridical person which had 
the nationality of a Contracting State other than the state party to the dispute on 
the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation 
and arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign 
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control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another 
Contracting State for purposes of this Convention.176  
 
Prior to the development of investment treaty arbitration, the general rules of 
international law only allow the national state of the company to bring a claim. This 
can be observed by the judgment of the ICJ in the case of Barcelona Traction.177 In 
this case, the Canadian company, which was majority owned by Belgians, was 
conducting business in Spain. As a result of acts of the Spanish government, the 
company became bankrupt. The ICJ rejected Belgium’s standing to bring a claim on 
behalf of the Belgian shareholders against Spain, as according to the general rule of 
international law, only the national state of the company is entitled to bring a claim 
in the event of an unlawful act committed against the company.  
 
However, the above ICJ ruling has never been truly respected in subsequent 
investment treaty arbitration cases.178 The issue arose in the first BIT arbitration 
case, Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Sri Lanka.179 In this dispute, under the UK-
Sri Lanka BIT (1980), a Hong Kong corporation owned 48 per cent of the shares in 
a Sri Lankan company that suffered due to the acts of the Sri Lankan government. 
The tribunal accepted the claimant’s standing by concluding that the value of the 
shareholding in the joint-venture entity was to be protected by international law. 
 
Article 25(2)(b) can be applied on the basis of an agreement between a host state 
and a foreign investor. Such an agreement can be included in the form of an ICSID 
arbitration clause in the relevant contract.180 It is, however, generally the norm that 
contemporary investment treaty arbitration is not established on the basis of prior 
consent made by a host state and a foreign investor, but on the basis of an ‘offer of 
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consent’ included in a treaty.181 Particularly, in a situation where an investment is 
made through a locally incorporated company, there can be no such prior consent.182 
Instead, the ‘proviso’ in a treaty that a local company, due to foreign control, would 
be treated as a national of another contracting state, is part of the terms of the offer 
of consent to jurisdiction made by the host state.183 When the offer to submit a 
dispute to the ICSID is accepted by the investor, the proviso forms part of the 
consent agreement between the parties to the dispute.184 In Vacuum Salt v Ghana 
case,185 the foreign investor party was incorporated in Ghana and the agreement 
between the parties carried an ICSID clause. In deciding the ICSID jurisdiction, the 
tribunal admitted that the ICSID clause indicated an agreement to treat the claimant 
investor as a foreign national and furthermore required foreign control: 
 
The parties’ agreement to treat Claimant as a foreign national ‘because of 
foreign control’ does not ipso jure confer jurisdiction. The reference in Article 
25(2)(b) to ‘foreign control’ necessarily sets an objective Convention limit 
beyond which ICSID jurisdiction cannot exist …186 
 
An additional issue exists as to foreign control. This issue focuses on whether a 
juridical person can claim the nationality of another contracting state based on a 
legal control or through actual control. In solving this issue, the most helpful case to 
look into is Aguas del Tunari SA [AdT] v Republic of Bolivia.187 In this case, the 
claimant company, AdT, was incorporated in Bolivia and entered into a concession 
agreement. When the concession was completed, AdT’s shares were co-owned by 
Bolivian companies (20%), a Uruguayan company (25%), and a small number of 
other companies. However, after a few months and prior to the termination of the 
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concession, the whole ownership came to belong to a Dutch company. The 
claimant, AdT, claimed that as it was a national of Bolivia ‘controlled directly or 
indirectly’ by nationals of the Netherlands, in terms of claimant status, it was a 
national of the Netherlands under Article 1(b) of the BIT, which provided that ‘legal 
persons controlled directly or indirectly, by nationals of that Contracting Party, but 
constituted in accordance with the law of the other Contracting Party’. AdT 
contended that Bolivia’s actions and omissions regarding the concession violated 
the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT. Both Netherlands and Bolivia are parties to the ICSID 
Convention. In identifying the meaning of ‘controlled directly or indirectly’, the 
tribunal interpreted the BIT provisions by relying on Articles 31 to 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which codified customary international 
law.188 The tribunal concluded as follows: 
 
The Tribunal, by majority, concludes that the phrase ‘controlled directly or 
indirectly’ means that one entity may be said to control another entity (either 
directly, that is without an intermediary entity, or indirectly) if that entity 
possesses the legal capacity to control the other entity. Subject to evidence of 
particular restrictions on the exercise of voting rights, such legal capacity is to 
be ascertained with reference to the percentage of shares held. … In the 
Tribunal’s view, the BIT does not require actual day-to-day or ultimate control 
as part of the ‘controlled directly or indirectly’ requirement contained in Article 
1(b)(iii). … in the circumstances of this case, where an entity has both majority 
shareholdings and ownership of a majority of the voting rights, control as 
embodied in the operative phrase ‘controlled directly or indirectly’ exists.189 
 
In this respect, the tribunal was of the view that the ‘foreign control’ meant legal 
control based on ownership, as well as factual or actual control. Therefore, a foreign 
investor, whether a natural person or a juridical person, is entitled to raise an 
expropriation claim on the basis of ownership or foreign control. 
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1.2.1.2 An Investment  
 
The definition of investment is the other key determinant of the scope of treaty 
protection.190 Especially in order for a foreign investor to raise an expropriation 
claim, the investment owned by the investor should be deemed to be expropriated. 
Furthermore, it is significant to precisely determine the scope of an investment to be 
subject to protection, because the calculation of compensation in a case of 
expropriation is primarily based on the value of the expropriated investment. If the 
notion of investment is given a broad interpretation, the scope of state liability, 
including in cases of regulatory expropriation, becomes correspondingly greater. 
This will be more closely investigated in Chapter 4.  
 
Investment has long been classified as either direct or portfolio investment. During 
the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the prevalent form of foreign 
investment was portfolio investment.191 After the flow of direct and portfolio 
investment into developing countries was interrupted by two wars, the reinvigorated 
expansion of foreign investment in the form of multinational corporations occurred 
by establishing wholly or majority-owned subsidiaries.192 Earlier agreements that 
dealt with investment took a narrow approach of establishing the exhaustive list of 
notions of investment covered by the agreements. However, most contemporary 
international investment agreements tend to employ a broad notion of investment. In 
referring to foreign investment, the typical provision of these agreements stipulate 
‘every kind of asset’ or ‘every kind of investment’ that is ‘directly or indirectly 
owned’ by a foreign investor. This concept can be exemplified in an illustrative list 
of several types of investment, such as: (i) tangible and intangible property, (ii) 
shares, bonds, and other interests in companies, (iii) the right to money or any 
performance with economic value, (iv) intellectual property rights, goodwill, and 
know-how, and (v) rights granted in law or contract, including concessionary 
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rights.193 The scope of these notions extends beyond tangible and directly-owned 
assets that have been protected under customary international law.194 
 
Investment treaty tribunals should consider the definition of investment under two 
instruments: (i) the international investment agreement concerned, and (ii) Article 
25 of the ICSID Convention.195 This is because the term ‘investment’ does not only 
appear in the very treaty, but also in Article 25 as a jurisdiction requirement.196 Two 
issues have arisen from this situation. The first issue is the interpretation of the term 
‘investment’ in Article 25 of the Convention. The second issue is whether the term 
appearing in Article 25 is subject to the definition proposed in the treaty that 
provisionally endorses ICSID jurisdiction.197 The practice of arbitral tribunals to 
interpret the notion of ‘investment’ in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention has 
existed independently of the particular investment clause in the BIT concerned.198 
Therefore, when an investment dispute arises under a BIT that contains the ICSID 
jurisdiction clause, it is necessary to scrutinise the two respective notions of 
investment; being the so-called ‘double keyhole approach’.199 For instance, the 
tribunal in CSOB v Slovakia stated: 
 
A two-fold test must therefore be applied in determining whether this Tribunal 
has the competence to consider the merits of the claim: whether the dispute 
arises out of an investment within the meaning of the Convention and, if so, 
whether the dispute relates to an investment as defined in the Parties’ consent to 
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ICSID arbitration, in their reference to the BIT and the pertinent definition 
contained in Article 1 of the BIT.200 
 
In addition, with regard to the ‘in accordance with the laws and regulations of the 
host state’ phrase adopted by many BITs, an issue arises as to whether this phrase 
indicates some exclusion from treaty protection, or is otherwise concerned with the 
definition of investment and provides a jurisdictional requirement. The positions of 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals diverge on this issue. In the ICSID case of 
Salini v Morocco, the tribunal understood the requirement as the former: 
 
This provision refers to the validity of the investment and not to its definition. 
More specifically it seeks to prevent the Bilateral Treaty from protecting 
investments that should not be protected, particularly because they would be 
illegal.201 
 
Non-conformity with the laws and regulations of the host state was also construed 
as a jurisdictional requirement. In Fraport v The Republic of the Philippines, the 
tribunal stated that an ‘investment intentionally structured in violation of Philippine 
Law … did not qualify as an investment and fell outside the ICSID jurisdiction and 
the competence of the tribunal’.202 
 
The issue of nationality in a situation where a locally incorporated company is under 
foreign control leads to the issue of ‘indirect investment’.203 In terms of corporate 
structure, a locally incorporated company is an investment made by a national of 
another state, as well as by itself – a juridical person that possesses its own legal 
entity. This type of investment can be termed an ‘indirect investment’. Thus, the 
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issue arises as to whether investment treaty jurisprudence permits ‘piercing the 
corporate veil’.204 In other words, the issue is whether a foreign investor of another 
state party is entitled to claim losses sustained by its locally incorporated juridical 
entity under the BIT concerned.205 There are two possible claimants in relation to 
this issue. They are the holding company and the ultimate beneficiary. Firstly, a 
holding company can be any entity in a corporate ownership chain, except for the 
ultimate beneficiary and the local company directly affected by a state’s conduct.206 
For instance, in Tokios Tokelès v Ukraine,207 under the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT 
(1994), the claimant, Tokios Tokelès, was organised under the laws of Lithuania 
and owned and controlled by Ukrainian nationals. In a dispute over ICSID 
jurisdiction, the respondent argued against jurisdiction as the claimant was not a 
‘genuine entity’ of Lithuania, as it was owned and controlled predominantly by 
Ukrainian nationals.208 The tribunal, relying on the rules of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, found that the claimant was an investor in Lithuania under 
Article 1(2)(b) of the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT 209 , 210  and confirmed that this 
interpretation accorded with the objective requirement of Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention.211 Secondly, the ultimate beneficiary can bring an arbitration claim. In 
the case of Franz Sedelmayer v The Russian Federation, a German national brought 
a claim under the Germany-Russia BIT for the loss sustained by his investment, 
which was a United States corporation. The tribunal admitted the claimant’s 
standing as an investor under the BIT and additionally confirmed the ‘control 
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theory’, stating that ‘the control theory leads to the piercing of the United States 
corporation’s corporate veil and to putting the de facto investor in the focus’.212  
 
One additional issue is whether or not a shareholder is entitled to raise an 
investment treaty claim. Investment can be made through the purchase of shares in a 
locally incorporated company and a shareholder of foreign nationality may seek to 
recover the loss of his or her shares. In the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ denied 
the capability of the majority of shareholders of a company to pursue claims against 
a host state that did not represent the nationality of those shareholders.213 The ICJ, 
however, accepted that this decision was made under customary international law 
and that treaties may provide otherwise. 214  In this respect, under current 
international law, the protection of shareholders is accorded by international 
investment agreements or by contracts between a foreign investor and a host 
state.215 Still, the status of a minority shareholder does not appear sufficiently solid 
to accord the qualification of a foreign investor claimant because of a lack of control 
over the company. Even so, given that minority shares fall within the broad concept 
of investment protected by international investment agreements, it can be 
acknowledged that a minority shareholder owns a property to be protected.216 
Nevertheless, some complicated problems can occur if different shareholders seek 
different remedies for the loss of their shares or if the local company itself pursues 
domestic remedies.217 
 
The business practice of creating an investment by way of establishing a local 
company in a host state, in order to take advantage of favourable treaty terms, and 
thus the local company is simply used as a ‘conduit’ for the investment, has given 
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rise to the concept of ‘treaty shopping’.218 This action, albeit manipulative, has not 
been considered illegal. In Soufraki v UAE, under the Italy-United Arab Emirates 
BIT, the tribunal did not uphold the treaty shopping which had taken place. It 
concluded that the claimant did not hold Italian nationality and accordingly denied 
the claimant’s entitlement to invoke the BIT’s protection.219 It additionally stated, 
‘Had Mr. Soufraki contracted with the United Arab Emirates through a corporate 
vehicle incorporated in Italy, rather than contracting in his personal capacity, no 
problem of jurisdiction would now arise’.220 
 
States which are a party to international investments can choose between two 
methods in order to address the treaty-shopping problem. One is to require a ‘bond 
of economic substance between the corporation and the state’.221 The other is the 
use of a so-called ‘denial of benefits clause’ in treaty provisions on jurisdiction.222 
By having recourse to this clause, the state retains the right to deny the benefits of 
the treaty to a company that does not have an economic connection to the state 
whose nationality it claims.223 The economic connection can be determined either 
by looking at the national’s control in the state of nationality or by substantial 
business activity in that state.224 An important concern may arise in relation to the 
concept of an investment. Because the definition of an investment is very broad, 
there is a risk that this broad definition may be exploited to cover ‘international 
business in general’,225 thus expanding the scope of arbitral discretion to acquire 
jurisdiction over claims, as well as ‘state liability in public law’.226 This risk can 
result in an outcome in the increase of the extent of state exposure to arbitration and 
the number of regulatory expropriation claims. 
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1.2.2 Applicable Law and Interpretation Approaches 
 
For international investment agreements to be applied to a case, two fundamental 
questions arise: what is the applicable law that will establish the rules on issues, and 
how is the specific language in the relevant international investment agreements 
interpreted?227 In the case of international investment arbitration between a foreign 
investor and a host state, the applicable law will include the international investment 
agreement. This is because the foreign investor bases the claim on the protection 
accorded by the agreement and general international law.228 Rules on the applicable 
law can be found in Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention. It provides that: 
 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may 
be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall 
apply the law of the Contracting state party to the dispute (including its rules on 
the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.229 
 
Under Article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention, the failure to apply the appropriate 
law can be a valid ground on which to claim the annulment or non-recognition of an 
award. Investment treaty tribunals in general rely on Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in interpreting international investment 
agreements. This is either because both states are parties to the VCLT or because 
the rules of interpretation it sets out represent customary international law.230 Article 
31 stipulates a ‘general rule of interpretation’ by requiring that the interpretation be 
conducted ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty’ in consideration of their context, and the object and purpose of the treaty.231 
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Article 32 provides for a ‘supplementary means of interpretation’, such as the 
‘preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstance of its conclusion’.232 Travaux 
Préparatoires (preparatory work) are among such supplementary means. Reliance 
on travaux préparatoires is primarily determined by its availability.233 The drafting 
history of the ICSID Convention, specifically because of its detail, is used as a 
supplementary means of interpretation by ICSID tribunals.234 On the other hand, the 
negotiating history of BITs, which is not well documented, is rarely used.235 
 
While the basic principles for the interpretation of treaties are provided for by the 
VCLT, there are some supplementary principles or presumptions that international 
tribunals rely on to articulate the meanings of terms in international investment 
agreements.236 First, there is the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 
which means that the ‘specific mention of an item excludes others’. In National 
Grid Plc v Argentina, the tribunal, relying on this principle, concluded that owing to 
the BIT provision which provided for certain exceptions to the clause, dispute 
resolution was not included among the exceptions to the application of the clause.237 
Another principle is the ejusdem generis doctrine, meaning that ‘general words 
following or perhaps preceding special words are limited to the genus indicated by 
the special words’. 238  This principle originated from the fundamental rule of 
contract construction, being that the ‘meaning of a term is determined not in the 
abstract but in its context’.239 For instance, if there is a provision that enumerates a 
category of situations, including ‘war or other armed conflict, revolution, revolt, 
insurrection or riot, or state of national emergency’, the ‘state of national emergency’ 
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can be construed as referring to a type of civil disturbance.240 Also, owing to the 
existence of highly similar or identical language among the provisions of 
international investment agreements, tribunals are allowed to take a comparative 
approach between the BIT concerned and other BITs to which the host state is a 
party.241 When international tribunals interpret international investment agreements 
based on their object and purpose, tribunals usually rely on their titles and 
preambles.242 Also related to this interpretation approach is the principle of the 
effectiveness or effet utile of treaty provisions. It means that an interpretation that 
delivers practical content to a treaty provision may override one that removes such 
an effect.243 In relation to interpretation, it can be considered that precedents may be 
helpful in maintaining the uniformity and stability of law and, accordingly, can 
reinforce the predictability of decisions and improve their authority. 244  It is, 
however, well established that investment treaty arbitration tribunals are not bound 
by precedent. Even so, if tribunals, from a comparative perspective, find that they 
have common views to previous tribunals on a specific point of law they can freely 
follow their wisdom.245 
 
An independent factor can exist outside the principles of interpretation that may in 
turn control the interpretation of international investment agreements. State parties 
can opt to circumscribe themselves to arbitral interpretation, as can be observed in 
the role of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC). The NAFTA FTC is 
authorised to ‘resolve disputes that may arise regarding the Agreement’s 
interpretation and application’246 and its interpretation binds a NAFTA tribunal.247 
In 2001, the NAFTA FTC issued ‘Notes of Interpretation’ that provide certain 
guidance for the interpretation of NAFTA provisions relating to customary 
international law, as follows: 
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1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international minimum standard of 
aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of 
investors of another Party. 
2. The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and 
security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is 
required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment 
of aliens.248 
 
1.2.3 The Standard of Review 
 
The goal for reviewing standards, in the international legal system, is to strike a 
proper balance between sovereign autonomy and the state’s compliance with 
international obligations.249 Thus, in relation to expropriation, the standard of 
review concerns how much deference is accorded to a state’s exercise of its right to 
expropriate and how deeply it can interfere with this. If greater deference is to be 
granted by investment treaty arbitration tribunals, it will lead on the one hand to the 
state enjoying greater sovereign autonomy. On the other hand, if standards of review 
are applied with stricter scrutiny, it will result in narrower sovereign autonomy and 
a greater risk of state responsibility.250 There are varying ranges relating to the 
standards of review when state acts are internationally scrutinised, depending on the 
degree of deference to sovereign autonomy in enacting laws and regulations. Firstly, 
in relation to treaty obligations, the orthodox approach permits a state to interpret 
the obligation itself and confers mandatory jurisdiction in order to determine 
whether the interpretation is correct.251 Secondly, the procedural review is used to 
determine whether a state has complied with procedural, not substantive, 
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requirements when enacting its rules.252 Thirdly, the de novo review253 refers to an 
approach that allows a review to substitute a judgment in relation to the state’s 
national decision or acts. It is very unlikely that this review approach will be 
instigated in the field of international law. Fourthly, there is a review of facts, which 
can determine the correct nature of the facts established by a state.254 This may be 
the most comprehensive and intrusive review considered. In the context of the WTO 
agreement, WTO panels are not allowed to conduct a de novo review of what a state 
established as a fact.255 Those four methods generally show a range of possible 
standards for international legal scrutiny. 
 
Within these ranges of standards, there are more specific tests or principles that 
ICSID tribunals can rely upon for the arbitral scrutiny of state acts: (i) the least 
restrictive alternative test; (ii) the margin of appreciation principle, and (iii) the 
good faith test.  
 
The least restrictive alternative test emerges from the jurisprudence of GATT and 
WTO panels. Articles 20 and 21 of GATT provide states with exceptions to their 
obligations, which resemble the ‘non-precluded measures’ (NPM)256 of BITs. For 
instance, GATT Article 20 allows a state to take measures in compliance with the 
chapeau requirements, such as ‘necessary to protect public morals’ or ‘necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health’. In relation to these exceptions, GATT 
and WTO panels scrutinise whether a state has taken the least restrictive measure 
reasonably available under GATT Articles 20 or 21. This test, when compared with 
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the ‘only means available test’, employed by the early ICSID tribunals to judge 
against Argentina in cases such as CMS Gas Transmission Company, Enron, and 
Sempra,257 is a public law approach that encompasses the ideal of balancing the 
parties’ rights. 258 The least restrictive alternative test contains three stages of 
application. Three issues should be investigated: (i) whether a measure taken by a 
state is designed to fulfil objectives that are allowed under the treaty concerned; (ii) 
whether the measure is necessary on the basis of the balancing of three factors (the 
interests pursued by the state in taking the measure, the ‘contribution of the measure 
to the realization of the ends pursued by it’, and the ‘restrictive impact of the 
measure on international commerce’); and (iii) whether there was another measure 
reasonably available that would have been both less restrictive on international 
commerce and equally effective in fulfilling the objectives.259 
 
The ‘margin of appreciation’ principle emerged in the context of human rights 
protection. However, the principle is available for application in other fields, such as 
those that embrace a degree of respect for sovereign autonomy. This is because the 
margin of appreciation principle connotes deference to such autonomy, particularly 
in the areas of public objective. This principle was formulated by the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR that operates as a judicial organ under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). It is described in detail as follows: 
 
The margin of appreciation … permits the Court to show the proper degree of 
respect for the objectives that a Contracting Party may wish to pursue, and the 
trade-offs that it wants to make … while at the same time preventing 
                                                
257 William W Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Law 
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal of 
International Law 283, 297. Burke-White and Staden explain that the ‘only means available 
test’ derives from the customary law requirements of necessity. 
258 ibid 303. 
259 ibid 304. 
62 
 
unnecessary restrictions on the fullness of the protection which the Convention 
can provide.260  
 
The NAFTA tribunal’s position in the SD Myers case was supportive of the margin 
of appreciation principle. The tribunal based its judgment, concerning a breach of 
NAFTA protections, on a high respect for sovereign regulatory autonomy over 
domestic matters, ‘A breach of Article 1105 … That determination must be made in 
the light of the high measure of deference that international law generally extends to 
the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders’.261  
 
The ‘good faith’ standard adopts the approach of rational scrutiny. Good faith has 
traditionally been a key principle of international law. The 1949 Draft Declaration 
on Rights and Duties of States provides in Article 13 that ‘every state has the duty to 
carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law’.262 The International Law Commission clarified this principle in 
its commentary, by stating that it is a ‘re-instatement of the fundamental principle 
pacta sunt servanda’.263 This principle sets a basic threshold of compliance for 
states when considering their international obligations, and thus can function as a 
standard of review. This standard grants a high deference to a state’s regulatory 
autonomy, especially by granting the state the authority to balance competing rights 
and interests. Thereafter, the review task is merely a scrutiny as to whether the state 
has conducted the balancing exercise on a rational basis.264 The good faith standard 
of review exhibits a higher deference to regulatory autonomy than that of the margin 
of appreciation. This is because the former goes so far as to give the state the 
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authority to weigh private as well as public interests and rights, while the latter 
accords such an authority to an investment treaty arbitration tribunal. 
 




Prior to the commencement of the modern BIT era, which relied on investor-state 
arbitration after World War II, the protection of aliens and foreign property was 
primarily realised through inter-state claims of state responsibility based on 
diplomatic protection.265 With regard to state responsibility, the 1926 case of Neer 
underlines this concept at the time. The issue in this dispute was whether the failure 
of Mexican authorities could bring about ‘an international delinquency’ so as to 
involve the international responsibility of Mexico towards the United States.266 The 
Mexico-US Claims Commissioners stated that: 
 
The treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, 
should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an 
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that 
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognise its insufficiency.267  
 
The development failure of customary international law in investment protection 
and in the establishment of a multilateral investment agreement consequently led to 
a development of BITs. BITs have established missing standards and treaty rights, 
and have occupied the content of rights. BIT development has possibly replaced 
potential advances in other areas of international law.268 As international investment 
law only provides for a framework of principles, and given the absence of a 
multilateral investment treaty, individual states have been able to freely codify their 
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own lex specialis on matters of foreign investment through the creation of BITs.269 
For instance, one significant consequence has emerged from the development of 
BITs. Under customary international law, a breach of the international minimum 
standard of treatment could only establish an international delict, bringing about 
diplomatic protection if a foreign investor had first exhausted local remedies.270 
Article 26 of the ICSID Convention removes the necessity that local remedies must 
be exhausted by requiring that a state make express provision if it first requires the 
exhaustion of local remedies. In the absence of a jurisdictional requirement that 
local remedies be exhausted, a foreign investor can choose to bring a claim relating 
to various administrative treatments in circumstances where a home state could not 
claim diplomatic protection.271 Contemporary BITs generally provide for varying 
standards of treatment, such as compensation for expropriation, fair and equitable 
treatment, national treatment, the most-favoured-nation treatment, full protection 
and security, the prohibition of arbitrary and discriminatory measures, and the free 
transfer of funds.  
 
1.2.4.2 Expropriation and Compensation 
 
In deference to territorial sovereignty, the traditional rules of international law have 
accepted that a host state retains the right to expropriate foreign-owned property in 
its territory.272 International investment agreements usually only circumscribe this 
right by way of a small number of conditions, not requiring extra conditions beyond 
a few conditions for the lawfulness of the exercise of this right.273 In particular, 
international investment agreements normally state a host state’s obligation to pay 
compensation if it expropriates foreign-owned property. This requirement has also 
been recognised under customary international law.274 In addition to compensation, 
international investment law generally requires that foreign-owned property be not 
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expropriated or subject to governmental measures with an effect equivalent to 
expropriation unless three further conditions are met: 
 
(i) an expropriation must be pursued for a public purpose; 
(ii) it should be non-discriminatory; and 
(iii) it is taken in accordance with applicable law and due process.275 
 
The most common formulations of expropriation provided for by international 
investment agreements include nationalisation, expropriation through direct or 
indirect means, and governmental measures that have an effect ‘equivalent’ or 
‘tantamount’ to expropriation.276 Direct expropriation involves the actual taking of 
property by the host state by direct means. This requires the loss of all, or almost all, 
of the property, plus the loss of control of the property.277 The United States-
Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA) describes direct expropriation 
as a situation where ‘an investment is nationalised or otherwise directly 
expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure’.278 The key element 
is that property must be ‘taken’ by state authorities or the investor must be deprived 
of it by state authorities. This element appears in formulations as follows: 
 
In general, the term ‘expropriation’ carries with it the connotation of a ‘taking’ 
by a government-type authority of a person’s ‘property’ with a view to 
transferring ownership of that property to another person, usually the authority 
that exercised its de jure or de facto power to do the ‘taking’.279 
 
‘Taking’ is defined in the Restatement of the Law (Second) Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States as follows: 
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Conduct attributable to a state that is intended to, and does, effectively deprive 
an alien of substantially all benefit of his interest in property, constitutes a 
taking of the property … even though the state does not deprive him of his 
entire legal interest in the property.280 
 
The essential difference between direct and indirect expropriation lies in whether 
the legal title of the owner is affected by a host state’s authorities’ measures.281 
While the title is left intact, indirect expropriation has the effect of depriving a 
foreign investor of any meaningful utility of his investment.282 The UN Conference 
on Trade and Investment (UNCTAD) stated that ‘indirect expropriation occurs 
when the country takes an action that substantially impairs the value of an 
investment without necessarily assuming ownership of the investment’. 283  For 
instance, there are different types of indirect expropriation, such as ‘creeping’ or 
‘incidental expropriations’. An ICSID tribunal described ‘creeping expropriation’ as 
follows: 
 
It is clear, however, that a measure or series of measures can still eventually 
amount to a taking, though the individual steps in the process do not formally 
purport to amount to a taking or to a transfer of title. What has to be identified 
is the extent to which the measures taken have deprived the owner of the 
normal control of his property.284 
 
Furthermore, although there is no traditional ‘taking’ of an investment, if the state 
causes significant interference with the enjoyment of its use or its benefit, this may 
constitute an indirect expropriation, as found in the tribunal decision of Metalclad, 
that stated: 
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Covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect 
of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or 
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily 
to the obvious benefit of the host state.285 
 
A ‘taking’ can be distinguished from regulatory measures taken in pursuit of general 
welfare.286 In the US, such regulatory measures are referred to as ‘police power’.287 
One of the most vigorously debated issues is how to distinguish between a non-
compensable regulation and an indirect expropriation, where there is a 
compensation obligation when taking occurs. Under customary international law, 
not all deprivations of property are deemed to be expropriation. Property may be 
seized under a state’s criminal law provisions. Property can also be derived for the 
purpose of public health. General taxation is not expropriation. On these occasions, 
a state is not held responsible for the bona fide exercise of its sovereign police 
powers under specific commitments or a principle of proportionality and 
reasonableness.288 In general, three broad types of police power regulation exist 
which legitimise deprivation without compensation: (i) public order and morality, 
(ii) the protection of human health and the environment, and (iii) state taxation.289  
 
Besides expropriation and compensation, there are other standards of treatment, 
such as fair and equitable treatment (‘FET’), national treatment (‘NT’), most-
favoured nation treatment (‘MFN’), the prohibition of arbitrary and discriminatory 
measures, and the free transfer of funds. In international investment law, each 
standard of treatment respectively pursues different goals concerning investment 
protection. In particular, the prohibition of expropriation without compensation is 
aimed at addressing the loss of foreign-owned property or investments caused by a 
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state’s exercise of public authority. Thus, in order to clearly identify when to raise 
an expropriation claim and which standard of treatment other than the prohibition of 
expropriation without compensation is at issue, it is necessary to clearly understand 
what particular protections these standards of treatment are aimed at providing to 
foreign investors. 
 
1.2.4.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) 
 
Fair and equitable treatment is a central principle of international investment law on 
foreign-owned investment. This principle has been substantially shaped by 
customary international law.290 It provides for a fundamental level of protection and 
is based on the elements of fairness and equity.291 According to the Cambridge 
dictionary, fairness is ‘the quality of treating people equally or in a way that is right 
or reasonable’.292 Since what is right and reasonable does not involve a fixed 
concept, the notion of fairness exists as an evolutionary one.293 With regard to the 
meaning of equity, three characteristics have been identified in international law. 
First, equity is an autonomous source for legal rules, as recognised in Article 38(2) 
of the ICJ Statute. A judge may use it in order to resolve a dispute only if the parties 
have expressly requested a review of their case based on ‘ex aequo et bono’.294 
Second, the concept of equity is a general principle that demands an equitable 
application of the law for the purpose of avoiding absurd or unreasonable 
outcomes.295 Third, the term equity is construed as meaning equitable principles. 
International law on maritime delimitation and the distribution of natural resources 
has developed this concept.296 
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Historically, the term ‘just and equitable treatment’ first appeared in Article 11(2) of 
the Havana Charter of the International Trade Organisation of 1948.297 The 1959 
Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment Abroad stipulated at Article I the 
‘fair and equitable treatment to the property of the nationals of the other Parties’, 
and Article 1(a) of the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
Property of 1967 states that ‘each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable 
treatment to the property of the nationals of the other Parties’. The FET principle 
was also adopted in 1992 by NAFTA at Article 1105(1), plus the Energy Charter 
Treaty of 1994 at Article 10(1). In this regard, even though the FET principle has 
been formed under the influence of customary international law, it is possible owing 
to the development of international investment agreements and investment treaty 
arbitrations that the key concepts independently evolved in the system of 
international investment. An important issue arises as to whether the FET standard 
reflects the customary international law minimum standard, or sets forth an 
autonomous standard, that is additional to general international law. There are two 
predominant views in relation to the interpretation of the FET standard.  
 
Firstly, the FET standard can be recognised as constituting an independent treaty 
standard with an autonomous meaning.298 According to this view, an investment 
treaty arbitration tribunal is allowed to exercise substantial discretion in determining 
whether a state’s conduct has breached fairness and equity.299 The FET standard can 
be interpreted by focusing on the text and wording of a treaty with substantial 
consideration being given to the purpose provision of the treaty, which is usually to 
promote and protect investment.300 One argument supporting this view is that state 
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parties could have inserted the minimum standard of treatment in provisions if they 
intended to, but they have not.301 In this respect, the interpretation of the FET 
standard based on the ordinary meaning leads to the fact that the FET is an 
autonomous standard and cannot be equated with the minimum standard of 
treatment.302 
 
Secondly, the alternative view is that the FET standard reflects the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment. This standard was founded in the 
case of Neer v Mexico, in which the US-Mexico Claims Commissioners articulated 
the conditions with which the treatment of aliens would constitute an ‘international 
delinquency’.303 
 
Article 5 of the 2012 US Model BIT states that: 
 
1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance 
with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security.  
 
2. For greater certainty [the previous paragraph] prescribes the customary 
international minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum 
standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments.304 
 
An additional interpretative provision of the US FTAs defines ‘customary 
international law’ as: 
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The general and consistent practice of states that they follow from a sense of 
legal obligation … The customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens refers to all customary international law principles that 
protect the economic rights and interests of aliens.305 
 
The aforementioned provisions can be considered as verification that the FET 
standard may be a customary international law standard, but only as long as it 
reflects the international minimum standard.306 The NAFTA FTC has expressed this 
position by issuing ‘Notes of Interpretation’ in 2001, in which it equated the FET 
with the customary international law minimum standard of the treatment of 
aliens.307 The Mondev tribunal took this view and went a step further by upholding 
the evolution of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment. It 
rejected the standard as formed in the Neer case and held that ‘the content of the 
minimum standard today cannot be limited to the content of customary international 
law as recognised in arbitral decisions in 1920s’.308 
 
The CMS tribunal also held that: 
 
The Treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment and its connection with the 
required stability and predictability of the business environment, founded on 
solemn legal and contractual commitments, is not different from the 
international minimum standard and its evolution under customary law.309 
 
It may be proposed that the first view allows an investment treaty arbitral tribunal 
greater discretion than the second. On the other hand, the second view may risk a 
restriction to the ordinary meaning of the fair and equitable standard, based on the 
interpreted understanding of fairness and equity. The international minimum 
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standard represents a ‘minimum standard of treatment’ that frequently reaches 
higher than national treatment; however, the FET does not only concern a minimum 
standard.310 The FET is intended to guarantee that the ‘most adequate standard’ is 
accorded in light of the circumstances of a case.311 An alternative approach is to 
renew the perspective towards the FET. While acknowledging the customary 
character of the FET, it should also be viewed as an independent standard, which is 
not interlocked with the international minimum standard.312 
 
1.2.4.4 National Treatment  
 
The standard of national treatment is aimed at protecting a foreign investor from 
discrimination based on the nationality of the investor. 313  Under customary 
international law, a state has discretion to refuse the admission of a foreign investor 
into its territory, but must not discriminate against it once admitted. Some treaties, 
such as NAFTA and other US-modelled BITs, extend this protection by applying 
national treatment at the pre-establishment stage of investment.314 European BITs 
usually contain a national treatment clause stipulating that the foreign investor and 
his or her investments are ‘accorded treatment no less favourable than that which 
the host state accords to his own investors’.315  
 
There are two steps in the application of the standard of national treatment. The first 
step is to identify comparable entities: a foreign investor and a domestic investor are 
to be compared under the terms of the standard of national treatment. International 
investment agreements typically require that they be placed in ‘like situations’ or 
‘like circumstances’.316 A question arises here as to whether the phrases ‘like 
situations’ or ‘like circumstances’ indicate that those foreign and domestic investors 
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are in the same business or the same business or economic sector. In an effort to 
operate under a wide review of a relevant measure under the standard of national 
treatment, tribunals generally seek to interpret the phrase broadly.317 Thus, it 
appears that a wider concept than simply business is preferred in arbitral 
jurisprudence. For instance, the tribunal in SD Myers held as follows: 
 
The concept of ‘like circumstances’ invites an examination of whether a non-
national investor complaining of less favourable treatment is in the same ‘sector’ 
as the national investor. The Tribunal takes the view that the word ‘sector’ has a 
wide connotation that includes the concepts of ‘economic sector’ and ‘business 
sector’.318 
 
The next step is to determine whether treatment granted to a foreign investor is at 
least as favourable as the treatment of domestic investors. Most international 
investment agreements do not require identical treatment; they only require that the 
treatment is no less favourable.319 In this regard, there exists a scope of the notion 
‘no less favourable’ that does not necessarily mean ‘identical’. In undertaking this 
task it is necessary to answer two questions: (i) whether in the application of the 
standard of national treatment, the notion can cover de facto as well as de jure 
differentiations; and (ii) whether there is any justification for a differentiation in a 
certain case.320 There are certain cases in which tribunals rendered awards accepting 
a de facto differentiation; for instance, in the Feldman case.321 The Feldman tribunal 
held that ‘de facto difference in treatment is sufficient to establish a denial of 
national treatment’.322 As for the justification issue, the tribunal in SD Myers held 
that ‘the assessment of like circumstances’ must also take into account 
circumstances that would justify governmental regulations that treat them 
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differently in order to protect the public interest.323 According to the Pope Talbot 
tribunal, when interpreting the standard under Article 1102 of NAFTA, ‘no less 
favourable’ means equivalent to, not better or worse than, the best treatment granted 
to the comparator.324 It also made the following assertion:  
 
Differences in treatment will presumptively violate Article 1102(2), unless they 
have a reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do not 
distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic 
companies, and (2) do not otherwise unduly undermine the investment 
liberalising objectives of NAFTA.325 
 
1.2.4.5 Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment 
 
The MFN treatment clause has formed part of international economic treaties for 
centuries,326 but it is not required under customary law.327 With the goal of granting 
treatment to an investor of another state party to an international investment 
agreement, which is at least as favourable as the treatment that they accord to a 
foreign investor of the third state, the application of a MFN clause involves a 
consideration of the conduct of the host state in deciding its applicable scope.328 A 
MFN clause inserted in international investment agreements functions as a ‘potent 
ratchet’, by which the obligations or concessions of states established in treaty-
making processes can raise the stakes in the obligations of the host state under the 
BIT concerned.329 Article 1103 of NAFTA stipulates that the MFN treatment 
standard applies to investors or investment in ‘like circumstances’. Some investment 
agreements refer to ‘like situations’.330 
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In applying the MFN treatment standard to a dispute, investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals need to compare two elements. The first consideration is the treatment 
accorded to foreign investors and their investment under investment treaties made 
with a third state investor.331 For this comparison, an actual or potential competitive 
relationship between the investors or investments in question is not necessary to 
acquire the benefit of MFN treatment. In such cases, a foreign investor in like 
circumstances with a third state investor is entitled to MFN treatment.332 The second 
consideration is the treatment of foreign investors and their investments by domestic 
measures.333 In the application of the standard of MFN treatment, the issue is 
whether foreign investors or their investments are in like circumstances, and 
whether there are legitimate reasons for differentiating between investors and 
investments.334 In the case of Parkerings-Compagniet AS, the tribunal rejected the 
claim that there had been a MFN violation for the reason that the claimant’s 
investment was not in like circumstances. This was because of legitimate grounds, 
such as historical and archaeological preservation and environmental protection.335 
The tribunal also stated that ‘less favourable treatment is acceptable if a state’s 
legitimate objective justifies such different treatment in relation to the specificity of 
the investment’.336 
 
A preliminary question has been raised in relation to the application of this standard. 
Since a foreign investor invokes MFN treatment issues in order to claim the benefits 
that a state may accord to another foreign investor of a third state, the MFN clause 
has the potential to transfer the treaty rights of the third treaty to the basic treaty in a 
manner that can replace the agreed intentions of state parties to the new treaty 
without limitation.337 Therefore, the preliminary question is whether the standard of 
MFN treatment should fall within the scope of the basic treaty. For instance, the 
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tribunal in Maffezini admitted that the claimant who filed a claim under the basic 
treaty, the Argentine-Spain BIT, could enjoy the benefit of no requirement of resort 
to the domestic remedies accorded by the third treaty, the Chile-Spain BIT.338 The 
tribunal in Plama, however, did not accept the approach of the Maffezini tribunal, 
casting doubt on the applicability of the standard of MFN treatment to the basic 
treaty, as it was not sure whether the parties had really intended such applicability in 
the dispute settlement mechanism. 339  The scope of the subject matter in the 
application of the standard of MFN treatment is related to arbitral jurisdiction and 
jurisdiction in international law is only decided by consent.340 Consent is established 
by a combination of a state’s standing consent by treaty and a foreign investor’s 
consent via the submission of its claim to arbitration.341 Thus, it cannot be easily 
presumed that a foreign investor’s invocation of benefits, conferred by the third 
treaty, can interfere with the parties’ consents, which forms the scope of the subject 
matter of the basic treaty.342  
 
1.2.4.6 Full Protection and Security 
 
The traditional meaning of the ‘full protection and security’ standard was to protect 
a foreign investor from physical violence; for instance, from the invasion of the 
premises of the investment owned by the investor.343 In terms of traditional state 
responsibility, the standard does not impose on a state a duty of strict liability to 
prevent such violence;344 rather, it is generally construed as a state’s obligation to 
exercise ‘due diligence’ to take protective measures.345 In AMT v Zaire, the claimant 
raised such a claim in relation to the destruction of his property caused by Zaire 
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soldiers. The tribunal held that ‘The obligation incumbent upon Zaire is an 
obligation of vigilance, in the sense that Zaire as the receiving state … shall take all 
measures necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of protection and security’.346 
 
The protection of the standard today extends beyond physical protection to legal 
protection, including the safeguard against breaches of the investor’s rights by a 
host state through its enactment of laws and regulations.347 In the case of CME, the 
tribunal held that ‘The host state is obligated to ensure that neither by amendment of 
its laws nor by actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed and approved 
security and protection of the foreign investor’s investment withdrawn or 
devalued.’348 
 
1.2.4.7 The Prohibition of Arbitrary and Discriminatory Measures 
 
The term ‘arbitrary’ is frequently deemed interchangeable with ‘unjustified’ or 
‘unreasonable’.349 The tribunal in Lauder considered the definition of ‘arbitrary’ by 
reference to the explanation in Black’s Law Dictionary. This dictionary states that 
‘arbitrary’ suggests ‘depending on individual discretion’ or indicates action 
‘founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason of fact’.350 Additionally, 
the concept of arbitrary action was articulated, in contrast to the notion of the rule of 
law, in the ICJ case of ELSI, ‘Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a 
rule of law, as something opposed to the rule of law ... It is a wilful disregard of due 
process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical 
propriety’.351 
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The ordinary meaning of the term ‘discriminatory’ is wide and covers a number of 
concepts in relation to discrimination, such as: (i) discrimination in breach of 
international human rights, such as discrimination based on race or sex; (ii) 
unjustifiable or arbitrary differentiations in the regulation of entities that are alike; 
(iii) intentionally motivated targeting; (iv) the discriminatory application of 
domestic law; and (v) nationality-based discrimination.352 When a discriminatory 
measure is based on nationality, there may be an overlap with the standard of non-
discrimination treatment.353  
 
Because this type of protection concerns a measure that is arbitrary or 
discriminatory, it is different from other types of protection in that they concern 
‘treatment’. The Oxford English Dictionary refers generally to the term ‘treatment’ 
as ‘conduct, behaviour: action or behaviour towards a person’. In the context of the 
protection of investment, the tribunal in the case of Suez discussed the notion when 
considering MFN treatment, ‘The ordinary meaning of that term within the context 
of investment includes the rights and privileges granted and the obligations and 
burdens imposed by a Contracting state on investments made by investors covered 
by the treaty’.354 
 
The term ‘measure’, according to the ICJ definition in the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
case, ‘in its ordinary sense … is wide enough to cover any act, step or proceeding, 
and imposes no particular limit on their material content or on the aim pursued 
thereby’.355 The NAFTA tribunal in Ethyl v Canada referred to Article 202(1) of 
NAFTA, which stipulates that a ‘measure includes any law, regulation, procedure, 
requirement or practice’, and accepted that ‘something other than a ‘law’, even 
something in the nature of ‘practice’, which may not even amount to a legal stricture, 
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‘may qualify’.356 In this respect, the concepts of ‘treatment’ and ‘measure’ may 
connote a state’s common conduct in the general sense. In the context of investment 
protection, the terms may differ. It appears that ‘treatment’ represents the effect or 
result of the conduct directed at the investment or investor in question,357 while 
‘measure’ simply indicates conduct that is attributable to a state under the principle 
of state responsibility in international law.358 
 
1.2.4.8 The Free Transfer of Funds 
 
Conflicting interests exist between a foreign investor and a host state concerning the 
transfer of funds. A foreign investor needs to transfer funds into a host state in order 
to expand as well as to undertake investment. Additionally, the investor may need to 
transfer funds out of a host state in order to return profits or use funds for other 
business activities. 359 Further, it will be critical for the investor to withdraw 
investments out of the host state if the investor decides to cease business 
activities.360 However, in certain circumstances, the host state can justifiably restrict 
transfers, including when there are significant national interests at stake, such as a 
financial crisis, the need for the protection of a creditor’s rights, or the enforcement 
of anti-corruption regulations.361  
 
Under customary international law, a state can enjoy almost full monetary 
sovereignty; however, this is subject to the international legal regime, which mainly 
consists of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
two OECD Liberalisation Codes: the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements 
and the Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations, and the General 
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Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).362 Transfer provisions in international 
investment agreements play a supplementary role.363 According to the Articles of 
Agreement of the IMF, no state member can impose restrictions on the ‘making of 
payments and transfers for current international transactions’ without IMF 
approval.364 On the other hand, if the transfer is for capital movements, a state 
member can regulate it.365 The Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements is 
concerned with liberalisation: both the making of an investment and the proceeds 
earned from an investment. It plays the role of protector in relation to existing 
investments and liberalising the inflow of new investment. 366  The Code of 
Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations liberalises investment in the fields of 
major industries, such as transport, insurance, banking and finance, and tourism.367 
For the purpose of protecting market access for services, GATS provides that, 
except for addressing balance of payment problems, a state should not ‘apply 
restrictions on international transfers and payments for current transactions relating 
to its specific commitments’.368 
 




Traditionally, international law has not accorded a foreign investor with the right to 
have recourse to international remedies in order to challenge a state for the violation 
of his or her right. Only state-to-state dispute settlements were available. It is an 
elementary principle of international law that a state is entitled to protect its citizens 
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who have been injured by another state’s violation of international law.369 This 
principle of diplomatic protection is where a state exercises its own right when 
‘espousing’ the claim of its national.370 The principle is based on the premise that an 
injury to a state’s national is an injury to the state itself, for which it has the right to 
claim reparation from a responsible state.371 Rather than being obligated to exercise 
diplomatic protection, a state enjoys a discretionary power, deciding whether or not 
to exercise it.372 With the development of international investment agreements, a 
foreign investor could obtain the entitlement to claim directly against a state. In 
other words, there exists an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, which 
prevails over diplomatic protection and depends on a state’s political discretion to 
be initiated. The regime of investor-state arbitration is unlike international 
commercial arbitration, in that it is a procedure for ‘public law adjudication’373 
designed to settle ‘regulatory disputes’ 374  involving the claimant’s contention 
against a state’s regulatory measure. An investment dispute that involves 
expropriation, whether it is direct, indirect or regulatory, is a regulatory dispute. 
Under the investment treaty arbitration system, a foreign investor is entitled to raise 
an expropriation claim, whether it is direct, indirect, or regulatory, in order to 
contend whether a host state has breached its obligation regarding the expropriation 
provisions of international investment agreements. In particular, if access to 
arbitration is broad (extended to a wide range of disputes and unhindered by 
procedural preconditions) the extent of host state exposure to claims of regulatory 
expropriation correspondingly increases. By contrast, if access to investor-state 
arbitration is delimited, such as in cases where an investor has to exhaust domestic 
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remedies or abide by a waiting period, the extent of state exposure to investment 
arbitration can be controlled and the number of regulatory expropriation claims 
brought against it arguably stemmed. 
 
1.2.5.2 Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
 
1.2.5.2.1 Domestic Courts and the Fork-in-the-Road Clause 
 
As a resolution method for an investment dispute between a state and a foreign 
investor, domestic courts may present limitations, especially from a foreign 
investor’s perspective. The investor is unlikely to have high expectations for 
impartiality from a host state’s domestic court.375 However, any court other than the 
host state’s court, such as the home state’s court or the third state’s court, is likely to 
lack territorial jurisdiction over investments made in the host state.376 Furthermore, 
rules of state immunity will bar the foreign investor from raising a claim against the 
home state that is acting in a sovereign, rather than a commercial, capacity.377  
 
Unlike the situation in traditional international law, it is now no longer a 
requirement that local remedies must be exhausted if consent has already been given 
to investor-state arbitration.378 Article 26 of the ICSID Convention stipulates that a 
state may make the exhaustion of local remedies a condition of consent to 
arbitration.379 However, the resort to domestic remedies can be regarded not as a 
jurisdictional issue, but as a consideration to be taken into account in the finding of 
a violation of the relevant standards accorded by international investment 
agreements. For instance, the tribunal in the Waste Management case held that ‘in 
this context the notion of exhaustion of local remedies is incorporated into the 
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substantive standard and is not only a procedural prerequisite to an international 
claim’.380  
 
Another approach available, to clear up the exhaustion of local remedies issue, is 
that of the ‘Fork-in-the-Road’ clause. This clause allows a foreign investor to 
choose between the host state’s domestic courts and international arbitration; once 
made, that choice is irreversible. The ECT permits a foreign investor to choose any 
method to submit a dispute to a host state’s domestic court, to any previously agreed 
upon resolution mechanism, international arbitration or conciliation.381 Particularly, 
each party to a dispute must give its ‘unconditional consent’ to the dispute 
resolution of international arbitration.382 However, this does not apply when a 
foreign investor has already submitted the dispute to a host state’s domestic court or 
any other previously agreed upon mechanism for dispute resolution.383 The NAFTA 
does not provide for such a clause. Instead, it acquires a similar effect by requiring 
that there be a condition of consent to arbitration, and that a foreign investor 
claimant should submit a waiver to his or her right to recourse to a domestic court 
‘with respect to the measures of the disputing Party that is alleged to breach’.384 
 
1.2.5.2.2 Preliminary Procedures 
 
Many international investment agreements provide for a ‘cooling-off’ or a waiting 
period, which should expire before arbitration procedures begin. The period varies 
treaty-by-treaty, usually ranging from three months385 to six months386 or twelve 
months.387 During this period, the disputing parties usually seek to settle their 
dispute amicably through negotiation or consultation. The foreign investor and the 
host state in dispute should attempt to resolve the dispute amicably before the 
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385 Article 8(3) of the UK Model BIT (1991). 
386 Article 10(2) of the German Model BIT of 2008. 
387 Article 8(2) of the Lebanon-Slovakia BIT of 2009. 
84 
 
foreign investor claimant notifies the host state of his or her intention to submit a 
claim to arbitration.  
 
1.2.5.2.3 Investor-State Arbitration 
 
The basic requirement for a tribunal’s jurisdiction in investment treaty arbitration is 
the consent to arbitration by a foreign investor and a host state.388 Consent to 
arbitration can be established in three ways. Firstly, there may be a consent clause 
that provides an agreement to investor-state arbitration as a dispute settlement 
mechanism. This can be inserted into a contract made between a foreign investor 
and a host state.389 Secondly, a host state can enact legislation that includes a 
provision to the effect that it gives its consent to arbitration.390 When a state chooses 
this way, it is synonymous to an offer of consent to arbitration. The consent to 
arbitration may be established if a foreign investor claimant accepts the offer in 
writing while the legislation is valid or initiates arbitral proceedings.391 Thirdly, like 
most international investment agreements, a treaty can be made between the host 
state and the home state of a foreign investor claimant.392 In this scenario, the host 
state provides an offer of consent. The formation of the agreement to arbitrate is 
instigated by the foreign investor claimant’s acceptance of the offer.393 Article 25 of 
the ICSID Convention or Article II of the New York Convention requires a 
‘consent/agreement in writing’. The 2012 US Model BIT provides that the host 
state’s consent and the foreign investor claimant’s ‘submission of a claim to 
arbitration’ shall meet the requirement of ‘consent in writing’.394  
 
The jurisdiction of an investment treaty arbitration tribunal under the ICSID 
Convention is dependent on five conditions, as follows: 
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(1) a legal dispute; 
(2) arising directly out of an investment; 
(3) between a contracting state; and  
(4) the national of another contracting state; and 
(5) which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to ICSID.395 
 
If ICSID arbitration is chosen, other dispute resolution remedies, as well as 
diplomatic protection, are no longer available.396 Under the standard procedure for 
the appointment of arbitrators, arbitration tribunals usually consist of three 
arbitrators: one arbitrator is appointed by each party and the third arbitrator, who 
will take the position of president of the tribunal, will be appointed by agreement of 
the parties.397 
 
1.2.5.3 ICSID Arbitration and Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
1.2.5.3.1 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) 
 
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States was drafted using the framework of the World Bank and 
adopted on 18 March 1965. It came into force on 14 October 1966. It established the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Rather than 
resorting to local remedies, a host state’s ratification of the ICSID provides a 
guarantee to potential investors that this independent dispute settlement mechanism 
will always be available should a damage to their investment occur due to 
governmental acts.398 The jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre covers ‘any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any 
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constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by 
that State) and a national of another Contracting State’.399 ICSID arbitration is an 
exclusive option once consent to arbitration is given. According to Article 26 of the 
Convention, the consent of the parties to arbitration under the ICSID is construed as 
consent to such arbitration ‘to the exclusion of any other remedy.’400  ICSID 
investor-state arbitration is evaluated as having brought about a silent revolution in 
foreign investment law.401 
 
1.2.5.3.2 The ICSID Additional Facility 
 
The Administrative Council of the ICSID established the Additional Facility in 
1978. This Additional Facility provides an option for the dispute resolution of 
particular cases that are outside the ICSID’s jurisdiction. Recourse to the Additional 
Facility can be made in situations where only one side is either a party to the ICSID 
Convention or is a national of a party to the ICSID Convention. Arbitration under 
the Additional Facility is not governed by the ICSID Convention. Instead, the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of the Foreign Arbitral Award of 
1958 (the New York Convention) applies.  
 
1.2.5.3.3 Non-ICSID Investment Arbitration 
 
Some institutions designed primarily to address commercial disputes do not 
necessarily exclude investor-state arbitration. These include the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA). Such arbitrations are usually governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules of 1976 or by the ICC Arbitration Rules of 1998.402 
 
                                                
399 Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
400 Article 26 of the ICSID Convention stipulates that the ‘Consent of the parties to 
arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such 
arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy.’ 
401 Subedi (n 8) 32. 
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87 
 
1.2.5.4 Review of Arbitral Decisions 
 
Arbitral awards are ‘binding on the parties and not subject to any appeal or to any 
other remedy except those provided for in the ICSIS Convention’. Under limited 
circumstances, a review of an award is permissible. In non-ICSID arbitration, 
including arbitration under the ICSID Additional Facility, arbitral awards can be 
challenged in the court of the state where the tribunal sits or by the court 
empowered to enforce the award. There are several reasons enumerated by the New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
of 1958, for which the recognition and enforcement of non-ICSID arbitral awards 
may be declined at the request of a party:  
 
(i) The agreement that contains consent to arbitration is not valid; 
(ii) The proper notice of the appointment of arbitrator or the arbitration 
proceedings was not given; 
(iii) The award contains subject matter that reaches beyond the scope of 
submission; 
(iv) The arbitral tribunal or procedure was established in violation of the 
agreement or the law of the country where the arbitration occurred;  
(v) The subject matter is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the 
law of the state concerned; and 
(vi) the recognition or enforcement of the award runs counter to the public 
policy of that state.403 
 
ICSID awards can neither be annulled nor subject to any other type of scrutiny by 
domestic courts. However, under the ICSID Convention, an ad hoc committee may 
annul the award at the request of a party.404 Annulment is only concerned with the 
procedural legitimacy of an award, not its substantive legitimacy.405 An appeal is 
                                                
403 Article V of the UNCITRAL Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards. 




concerned with both procedural and substantive legitimacy, and can result in the 
replacement of the decision.406 This is different to an annulment situation when the 





Traditionally, the international investment law regime was represented by the rules 
of international law. These concerned a state’s responsibility for injuries to aliens 
and accorded protection to foreign investors and their investments through the 
exercise of diplomatic protection. This regime could have evolved continuously; 
however, there existed a significant clash concerning the acceptable level of 
treatment – national treatment versus an international minimum standard. BITs, 
accompanied by FTAs, provided a significant breakthrough. With the development 
of these international investment agreements, substantial changes occurred to the 
regime; particularly, the advent of investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. 
The vigorous influence of BITs and FTAs permitted a substantial advancement to 
take place in international investment law. Existing BITs and FTAs are facing a new 
threat situation in which they may be engulfed by the geographically more expanded 
FTAs, such as the TTP, the TTIP, and the RCEP. Additionally, in a few certain 
challenging circumstances, the credibility of investment treaty arbitration has been 
doubted. Firstly, it is an important and difficult task to balance a state’s regulatory 
interests and a foreign investor’s property interests, and to adequately draw a 
definite line between a state’s normal regulation and a state’s breach of foreign-
owned investment. It can hardly be said that the perfect solution to this has been 
created. Particularly in relation to expropriation and compensation issues, 
international investment law recognises other types of expropriation more readily 
than direct expropriation or nationalisation; namely, indirect expropriation. 
Furthermore, as recognised in international investment agreements and investment 





arbitral jurisprudence, the types of indirect expropriation have diversified; for 
instance, creeping and de facto, consequential expropriations (these types of indirect 
expropriation will be addressed in much more detail in the following chapters). It 
has become a trickier task to differentiate a state’s regulatory taking from a state’s 
expropriation that entails legitimate compensation not to breach investment 
protection. Another problem can occur with regard to achieving normative harmony 
or consistency between existing BITs and FTAs, and upcoming comprehensive 
regional FTAs. This is because these new comprehensive regional FTAs, if they are 
to materialise and develop, need to unify their own standards of treatment or 
protection, which additionally may be significantly different to those of existing 
BITs and FTAs. Furthermore, the two main sources of international law, 
international convention and customary international law, proceed in different ways 
as to the formation of international investment law: the former is based on a state’s 
agreement on a bilateral or regional basis, and the latter is based on state practice 
and opinio juris. In an investment dispute, a foreign investor claimant bears the 
burden of proving the evolution of customary international law, as can be seen in 
the recent case of Glamis Gold.408 This burden of proof is very heavy and it is likely 
to be extremely hard for a foreign investor claimant to prove a higher or more 
evolved level of customary standard than the customary international law standard, 
as verified in Neer.  
 
On the other hand, BITs and FTAs, competitively pursued by many states, can 
articulate rules of customary international law through codification and have the 
potential to lay the foundation for the formation of new rules of customary 
international law by inducing states to carry out treaty-complying acts. The 
appropriate interpretation and application of international investment agreements 
such as BITs and FTAs will invariably remain the most critical task in international 
investment law. In dealing with these challenges and the aforementioned critical 
task, the central question as to the extent to which a state can justifiably interfere 
with or expropriate foreign-owned investment within the legitimate boundaries of 
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international law can be approached by paying attention to certain secondary 
sources of international law, particularly, the general principles of law.409 This 
question will be attempted in the following chapters, focusing on expropriation, 
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Chapter 2: International Law on Expropriation 
 
 
2.0 Introduction on a State’s Right to Expropriate 
 
Sovereignty is founded on key concepts such as a state’s general independence and 
legal autonomy in inter-state relationships. It refers to the state’s exclusive right to 
exercise its jurisdiction and supreme regulatory powers over its territory and 
people.410 Once admitted into the state, a foreign investor’s investment is placed 
under the host state’s sovereign authority. According to Article 2 of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, a state has the right to exercise its regulatory 
power for public purposes, and, in particular, also enjoys the right to ‘nationalise, 
expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property’, which gives rise to the 
‘appropriate compensation’ obligation.411 It can be noticed here that the right to 
regulate for public purposes and the right to expropriate or nationalise, though both 
being placed under the sovereignty category, are conceptually distinguished in 
separate subparagraphs. Unlike the right to regulate, with regard to the right to 
expropriate, subparagraph (c) of Article 2 requires compensation, as follows: 
 
Each state has the right to … expropriate …, in which case appropriate 
compensation should be paid by the state adopting such measures, taking into 
account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State 
considers pertinent. 
 
Through the respect of a state’s territorial sovereignty, rules of international law 
have long endorsed the host state’s right to expropriate foreign-owned property. 
Treaty law in general only addresses the preconditions and consequences of an 
                                                
410 Tomer Broude and Yuval Shany, The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International 
Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity (1st edn, Hart Publishing 2008) 
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expropriation, without affecting the right to expropriate any further. 412 
Expropriation usually refers to the ‘taking or deprivation by a state of property right 
or interest owned by a foreign company or investor’.413 Further details relating to 
the concept of a state’s taking can be located by means of an observation of the 
1961 Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to 
Aliens, which was submitted by Louis B Sohn and RR Baxter: 
 
A taking of property includes not only an outright taking of property but also any 
such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property as 
to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy, or 
dispose of the property within a reasonable period of time after the inception of 
such interference.414  
 
The 1986 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
and the 2000 UNCTAD Issues Paper on Taking of Property have conceptualised the 
term ‘taking’ with a focus on its consequential influence on foreign-owned property. 
The Restatement provides that ‘a taking refers to actions that have the effect of 
“taking” the property, wholly or in large part, outright or in stages.’ 415 The 
UNCTAD Issues Paper states that ‘some measures short of physical takings may 
amount to takings in that they result in the effective loss of management, use or 
control, or a significant depreciation of the value, of the assets of a foreign 
investor’.416 
 
Expropriation in a direct form was the classical type of expropriation; 
nationalisation has been classified in such a form. Expropriation in this sense refers 
to an outright taking by a state, normally through the transfer of title or ownership of 
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foreign-owned property to the state or another state-designated party. In the 
twentieth century, expropriations and nationalisations were the dominant type of 
taking by the state.417 The first phase of mass expropriations (nationalisations) 
occurred during the revolutionary movements in Russia and Mexico. A second 
phase of expropriations ensued with the era of decolonisation, which took place 
after World War II.418  
 
As states have become increasingly reluctant to expropriate foreign-owned property, 
due to concerns as to their negative influence on foreign investment inducement, 
direct expropriation has become a rare phenomenon.419 However, expropriation can 
also occur through a state’s regulatory interference with the use of private property 
or with the utility of economic benefits, even when deprivation does not occur and 
the legal title to the property remains unaffected. This type of expropriation is 
broadly referred to as indirect expropriation. The concept of indirect expropriation 
encompasses ‘incidental’, ‘creeping’ or ‘de facto’ expropriation, or measures 
‘tantamount’ to expropriation. 420  For instance, the tribunal in Norwegian 
Shipowners’ Claims observed that ‘even though a state may not purpose to interfere 
with rights to property, it may, by its actions, render those rights so useless that it 
will be deemed to have expropriated them’.421  
 
Owing to the absence of a transfer of legal title or ownership of private property, 
indirect expropriation usually does not involve a tangible indication that legally and 
practically aids in the identification of a differentiation from direct expropriation. 
This feature renders it trickier to identify the existence of an indirect expropriation 
than that of a direct expropriation or to determine the legal consequences of it. This 
means, in investment cases, that it will be harder to identify and weigh the different 
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public and private interests involved, plus factually determine the most appropriate 
outcome between the disputing parties. 
 
Expropriation is prima facie not unlawful under international law because, in 
principle, it is a state’s sovereign right.422 The protection of private property has not 
been neglected in international law, especially in relation to the treatment of 
aliens.423 Thus, international law on expropriation should seek to consider the 
positions of both parties to an investment dispute and produce a balanced resolution. 
If necessary, both the state and the foreign investor should embrace restraints that 
can be imposed by international law on their respective interests. With regard to a 
state’s right to expropriate, it has been recognised that the right should be enjoyed 
under certain conditions, such as compensation and a specific public purpose. The 
Fourth Report on State Responsibility by the Special Rapporteur of the International 
Law Commission in 1959 concluded that an expropriation could give rise to an 
international responsibility for a state taking such a measure unless it was taken in 
accordance with certain requirements, such as ‘public utility’ or ‘public interest’, 
non-discrimination, and a ‘lack of arbitrariness’.424 The UN General Assembly 
resolutions verified the right to expropriate, stemming from the permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources. The 1962 UN General Assembly Resolution on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1803 in paragraph 4 provided as 
follows:425 
 
Nationalisation, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or 
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognised as 
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January 2015. 
423  A Reinish and others, Standards of Investment Protection 173 
<www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547432.001.0001/acprof-
9780199547432> accessed 15 January 2015. 
424 Fourth Report on State Responsibility by Mr FV Garcia-Amador, Special Rapporteur 
Document A/CN.4/119 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1959) (vol II). 
425 GA Res 1803 (XVII) UN GAOR, 17th Session, Agenda Item 39 para 4, UN Doc 
A/RES/1803 (XVII) (1962). 
95 
 
overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In 
such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with 
the rules in force in the state taking such measures in the exercise of its 
sovereignty and in accordance with international law. 
 
While customary international law is less reliable regarding the circumstances or 
conditions under which a state can lawfully exercise the right to expropriate, BITs 
and other international investment agreements are clearer in confirming the legal 
requirements for expropriation: (1) public purpose; (2) non-discrimination; (3) due 
process; and (4) compensation. For instance, the 1998 China/Poland BIT provides 
that:  
 
each contracting party may, for security reasons or a public purpose, nationalize, 
expropriate. In expropriating, a State should comply with the requirement that 
the expropriation measure(s) shall be non-discriminatory and shall be taken 
under due process of national law and against compensation.426  
 
Article 6 of the 2012 US Model BIT also provides: 
 
Neither Party may expropriate or nationalise a covered investment either directly 
or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalisation 
(expropriation), except: 
 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner; 
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and 
(d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 5 [Minimum Standard of 
Treatment] (1) through (3).427 
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Those requirements are also expressed in Article 1110(1) NAFTA428 and in Article 
13(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty.429 Among the legality requirements, the precise 
implication of the compensation requirement has long been debated. Relevant issues 
include, for example: 
 
i. When a state’s regulatory interference with private property may 
constitute an expropriation that may incur the compensation obligation. 
ii. Whether it is absolutely required to pay full compensation for 
expropriation under international law. 
iii. Whether in some occasion an expropriation can evade the obligation of 
compensation.  
iv. Whether it is necessary to differentiate the level of compensation to be 
applied to lawful and unlawful expropriations. 
 
 
2.1 Indirect Expropriation in International Law 
 
2.1.1 The Concept of Indirect Expropriation 
 
2.1.1.1 Direct Expropriation and Indirect Expropriation 
 
In the traditional sense, expropriation typically involves the transfer of title to or the 
governmental seizure of foreign-owned property or investment. With the 
                                                
428 Article 1110(1) NAFTA provides that ‘No party shall directly or indirectly nationalize or 
expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure 
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measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation except 
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discriminatory; (c) carried out under due process of law; and (d) accompanied by the 
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation’. 
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development of international investment law, the concept of expropriation has 
become broader. Against this backdrop, when a state expropriates property, it 
normally creates a considerably negative effect on the property rights or interests 
involved. Key terms that formulate expropriation include a ‘taking’, ‘interference’, 
‘deprivation’, and ‘appropriation’. Those terms are clarified with detailed 
commentaries in international legal instruments. The Harvard Draft Convention on 
the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens provides at Article 10 
3(a) A, that the: 
 
‘Taking of property’ includes not only an outright taking of property but also any 
such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property as 
to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy, or 
dispose of the property within a reasonable period of time after the inception of 
such interference.430 
 
The Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) further provides in Article 11(a)(ii) that it ‘may guarantee eligible 
investment against a loss resulting from’ expropriation, stipulating that: 
 
any legislative action or administrative action or omission attributable to the host 
government which has the effect of depriving the holder of a guarantee of his 
ownership or control of, or a substantial benefit from, his investment, with the 
exception of non-discriminatory measures of general application which 
governments normally take for the purpose of regulating economic activity in 
their territories.  
 
The 2012 US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty’s Annex B 2 provides that ‘an 
action or a series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an expropriation unless it 
                                                
430 Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to 
Aliens provides in Article 10(3)(a)A.  
98 
 
interferes with a tangible or intangible property right or property interest in an 
investment’. 
 
Therefore, a state’s expropriation is characterised as being intrusive upon and giving 
rise to considerable diminishing effect on the value of private property. 
 
The term ‘indirect’ expropriation may be roughly understood as capturing a range of 
expropriations other than direct expropriation. In practice, this term is used to cover 
the broad range of expropriations in addition to direct expropriation. Certain BITs, 
RTAs, and international investment jurisprudence have employed additional 
terminology, which have appeared consistently in similar wordings, with almost 
identical meanings. An example of the additional terminology used is ‘a measure or 
a series of measures having effect equivalent or tantamount431 to expropriation or 
nationalisation’. Even though it is generally recognised in international investment 
law that an expropriation can take place directly, indirectly, or through a measure or 
a series of measures having an effect which is equivalent to expropriation, certain 
international agreements do not provide any specific guidance that indicates which 
regulatory interference with foreign-owned property can fall within, for example, 
direct, indirect, or ‘tantamount’ expropriation.  
 
For instance, Article 1110(1) of the North Free Trade Agreement provides that ‘no 
Party may directly or indirectly nationalise or expropriate an investment of an 
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalisation or expropriation of such an investment’.432 Article 13(1) of the 
Energy Charter Treaty simply stipulates that ‘Investments of Investors of a 
                                                
431 SD Myers (n 261) para 286. The tribunal concluded that ‘tantamount’ was to be equated 
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432 The Negotiating Text of the Convention Establishing the Multinational Investment 
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Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting Party shall not be 
nationalised, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’. 433  Unlike Article 1110(1) of 
NAFTA, Article 13 of the ECT does not offer any language distinguishing between 
direct and indirect expropriation. The Multilateral Agreements on Investment of the 
OECD (MAI) shares almost the same language, except that it employs ‘equivalent’ 
instead of ‘tantamount’, both of which are of little difference in terms of practical 
meaning and are even interchangeable.  
 
NAFTA Article 1110(1) gives a clear indication that expropriation can occur 
directly, indirectly, or by taking a measure tantamount to expropriation. ECT Article 
13(1) seems to be less clear in this respect, since it may leave one to question 
whether indirect expropriation is implied in the term ‘expropriation’ or belongs to a 
measure or measures having an effect that is equivalent to expropriation. There is 
little doubt that those three types of expropriation may reflect their conceptual 
distinctions. It cannot, however, ultimately determine their substantive differences.  
 
There is no doubt that the distinction between direct and indirect expropriation is 
obvious in international investment law. The absence of a direct, physical taking is 
the very factor that differentiates indirect from direct expropriation. 434  Direct 
expropriation in effect creates a substantial loss by direct taking, including the 
transfer of title to property. In the landmark case of Chorzów Factory,435 the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) also indicated that these two 
concepts form their respective category by concluding that the expropriation of the 
Chorzów Factory also constituted an indirect expropriation of the patents and 
contracts of the company ‘Bayerische’. This conclusion shows that a direct 
                                                
433  Article VI of the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and the Protection of 
Investments (1987) shares almost the same language. It provides that ‘investments of 
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434 Schreuer (n 422) 5.  
435 Chorzów Factory (n 48). 
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expropriation of tangible property could constitute the indirect expropriation of an 
intangible property that exists independently of the expropriated property.  
 
Nonetheless, even though indirect expropriation is typically equated with direct 
expropriation in international investment law, indirect expropriation remains in 
great need of further aid in order to allow for more concrete formulations of the 
concept. Currently, it is neither tangible nor as definite a concept as direct 
expropriation. The consistent lack of a concrete definition in relation to indirect 
expropriation in international investment agreements has left considerable 
uncertainty in the interpretation and application of international law in indirect 
expropriation cases. Thus, accordingly, it is of little help in the consideration of the 
credibility and stability of investment treaty arbitration. In these circumstances, the 
notion of indirect expropriation raises two issues. First is the scope of indirect 
expropriation. In other words, how far can the concept reach in the scope of 
governmental regulatory measures under scrutiny? Second is how to distinguish 
indirect expropriation that provides for compensation from that of a normal 
regulatory measure that does not result in compensation.  
 
2.1.1.2 The Scope of Indirect Expropriation 
 
Basic clues for identifying indirect expropriation can be obtained by focusing on the 
main substantive aspects which occur in direct expropriation. Looking at these 
substantive aspects, two main elements can be extracted which are deemed to reflect 
the existence of indirect expropriation.  
 
Firstly, direct expropriation involves a governmental regulatory measure; more 
particularly, the transfer of the title to or the physical seizure of property, which 
gives rise to the consequence that a property owner loses their legal right to the 
property or the capability to enjoy all or at least substantial economic interest in the 
property. Direct expropriation also materialises through the state’s decision to deal 
with private property in pursuit of a certain purpose. These two elements – the 
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expropriatory consequence or effect, and the state’s decision – also establish the 
basic construction of indirect expropriation. If these elements are analysed in the 
context of indirect expropriation issues, it will shed light on the question of how 
indirect expropriation reflects them in practice in international investment law.  
 
It is necessary to delve into certain types of treaty language that formulate indirect 
expropriation, and to assess the approach of arbitral practice towards indirect 
expropriation in interpreting such treaty languages. An example of this is set out in 
Pope & Talbot. Pope & Talbot, Inc was a Delaware company that possessed a 
British Columbia company producing and exporting softwood lumber to the United 
States. Pope & Talbot, Inc claimed that Canada’s Export Control Regime, which 
was enacted following the implementation of a 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement 
between Canada and the United States, violated certain standards of treatment under 
NAFTA Chapter 11. It argued that the Export Control Regime impaired its 
Canadian corporation’s ‘ordinary ability’ to export softwood lumber to the United 
States and thus expropriated its investment.436 Article 1110(1) of NAFTA Chapter 
11 provides as follows: 
 
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalise or expropriate an investment of an 
investor of another Party in its territory, or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalisation or expropriation of such investment (‘expropriation’), except: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and 
(d) in payment of compensation in accordance with paragraph 2 through 6.437 
 
Article 1110(1) describes indirect expropriation by referring to the phrase: a 
‘measure tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation’. In construing the scope of 
protection under the Article 1110(1) expropriation provision, the claimant 
                                                
436 Pope & Talbot (n 135) para 81. 
437 NAFTA, ch 1 art 1110(1). 
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contended that Article 1110 ‘provides the broadest protection for the investments of 
foreign investors who may suffer harm by being deprived of their fundamental 
investment rights’438 and that Article 1110 produces a ‘lex specialis going beyond 
customary international law’. The phrase ‘measures tantamount to expropriation’ 
should be construed to encompass a ‘measure beyond an outright taking or creeping 
expropriation’.439 The tribunal rejected the contention and stated that the phrase 
‘measures tantamount to nationalization or expropriation’ in Article 1110 would not 
expand the ordinary concept of expropriation under international law,440 because 
‘tantamount’ could not mean more than ‘equivalent’.441  
 




It has been undoubtedly recognised that the effect of economic deprivation caused 
by a regulatory measure on a foreign-owned investment is the primary factor that 
determines the existence of an indirect expropriation. In finding an indirect 
expropriation, arbitral jurisprudence involving the indirect expropriation issue 
almost invariably does not deviate from its emphasis on the consequential effect that 
an indirect expropriation causes. The orthodox approach to identifying indirect 
expropriation has been the ‘sole effect’ doctrine that places the exclusive focus on 
the effect of a measure.442 Different approaches are also conceivable.  
 
Indirect expropriation has usually been found by determining that the economic 
effect of a regulatory measure went so far as to remove all usefulness of the 
property, irrespective of whether the state intended to do so or not. The tribunal in 
the Metalclad case provided that ‘covert or incidental interference’, which falls 
                                                
438 Pope & Talbot (n 135) para 83. 
439 ibid para 84. 
440 ibid para 96. 
441 ibid para 104. 
442 Newcombe (n 1) 8.  
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short of a direct taking, if it gives rise to the effect of the whole or substantial 
deprivation of the use or the economic benefit of the property, could constitute 
expropriation. Also, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in Starrett Housing Corporation v 
Iran confirmed the consequential effect as the prime consideration, as follows: 
 
It is recognised in international law that measures taken by a state can interfere 
with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless that 
they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the state does not 
purport to have expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally 
remains with the original owner.443  
 
While accepting that the economic effect is the primary concern, the tribunal in 
Pope & Talbot v Canada did not accept that an expropriation had occurred on the 
basis of an inadequate economic effect. It found that Canada’s measure of limiting 
softwood lumber exports, while reducing the claimant’s business profits, still did 
not completely bar it from maintaining its export business and obtaining profits 
from its exports.444 In Glamis Gold v United States, the tribunal declined the 
expropriation claim for the reason that the first condition, the effect, was not met 
sufficiently for there to have been the existence of indirect expropriation, since ‘The 
first factor in any expropriation analysis is not met: The complained measures did 
not cause a sufficient economic impact to the Imperial Project to effect an 
expropriation of the Claimant’s investment’.445 
 
In Chemtura Corporation v Canada,446 the tribunal also based its rejection of an 
expropriation claim on the lack of substantial deprivation. The claimant, Chemtura 
Corporation, was engaged in the production of canola that was used in a certain 
pesticide, so-called, lindane. Canada’s federal agency, in charge of controlling pest 
                                                
443 Starrett Housing Corporation v Iran (1983) 4 Iran-USCTR 219, 225–26; see Newcombe 
(n 1) 8. 
444 Pope & Talbot (n 135). 
445 Glamis Gold (n 408) 66. 
446 Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation) v Canada (Award) 2 August 
2010 Ad hoc NAFTA Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules. 
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control products for the protection of health and the environment, had terminated 
the registration of the claimant’s lindane products and refused to review its decision 
as requested by the claimant. The tribunal concluded that because no substantial 
deprivation resulted from the measures in issue, no expropriation had occurred, as 
follows: 
 
In assessing whether the Claimant has suffered an indirect expropriation or a 
measure tantamount to expropriation, the Tribunal must determine whether the 
measures challenged … amounted to a ‘substantial deprivation’ of the Claimant’s 
investment. … the sales from lindane products were a relatively small part of the 
overall sales of Chemtura Canada at all relevant times. Under these 
circumstances, the interference of the Respondent with the Claimant’s investment 
cannot be deemed ‘substantial’.447 
 
Looking more specifically at economic deprivation, the tribunal in CME v Czech 
Republic held that an economic deprivation would take place when a state takes 
measures ‘that effectively neutralise the benefit of the property for the foreign 
owner’.448 The tribunal in Telenor v Hungary decided that the determinants in the 
finding of expropriation are the ‘intensity and duration of the economic deprivation’ 
inflicted on the foreign investor’s investment.449 In Venezuela Holdings, BV et al v 
Venezuela,450 Venezuela Holdings, which was a corporation established under the 
laws of the Netherlands, held investments which were related to the right to develop 
and exploit oil reserves. Venezuela Holdings et al claimed that the four measures 
implemented by Venezuela ‘permanently deprived them of the benefit of their 
rights’.451 The four measures applied to their project were the imposition of a 
‘higher income-tax’ in relation to oil projects, an ‘extraction tax’, ‘unjustified and 
                                                
447 ibid paras 259, 263. 
448 CME (n 7). See UNCTAD 63. 
449 Telenor Mobile Communications AS v The Republic of Hungary (Award) 13 September 
2006 (ICSID Case No ARB/04/15) para 70. 
450 Venezuela Holdings, BV Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd v Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (Award) 30 September 2014 (ICSID Case No ARB/07/27). 
451 ibid para 282. 
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discriminatory production and export curtailments’, and the appointment of a ‘new 
operator’.452 The tribunal articulated that its primary task was to decide whether the 
measures in question had an ‘effect equivalent to expropriation within the meaning 
of Article 6 of the BIT453’454 and set out a criterion concerning the consequential 
effect of an indirect expropriation, as follows: 
 
The Tribunal considers that, under international law, a measure which does not 
have all the features of a formal expropriation may be equivalent to an 
expropriation if it gives rise to an effective deprivation of the investment as a 
whole. Such a deprivation requires either a total loss of the investment’s value or 
a total loss of control by the investor of its investment, both of a permanent 
nature.455 
 
On the other hand, some measures that give rise to a degree of deprivation or have 
some negative impact on property may be deemed as not causing a sufficient 
deprivation effect for an occurrence of indirect expropriation. The tribunal in PSEG 
v Turkey456 denied an indirect expropriation claim for this reason.457 The tribunal’s 
decision illustrates in detail some occasions where deprivation is neither whole nor 
substantial. In this case, the claimant PSEG made a concession contract with the 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources for the purpose of building a lignite-fired 
thermal power plant. Their dispute arose out of disagreements on certain 
commercial terms in the contract. The tribunal concluded that in relation to the 
measures at issue, the fair and equitable treatment standard was violated, but that the 
measures did not come close to expropriation or any type of taking. The measures 
taken by the Turkish administration, according to the tribunal, were categorised as 
                                                
452 ibid. 
453 Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Venezuela of 22 October 1991. 
454 Venezuela Holdings (n 450) para 286. 
455 ibid. 
456 PSEG Global Inc and Konya Ilgin Electrik Üretim Ve Ticaret Limited Șirketi v Republic 
of Turkey (Award) 4 June 2004 (ICSID Case No ARB/025).  
457 ibid para 245. 
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‘negligence’, ‘abuse of authority’, and ‘inconsistent acts’.458 These measures are 
good examples of some degree of negative effect being occasioned to PSEG’s 
enjoyment of its right or property; however, they were not adequate deprivation for 
the finding of an indirect expropriation. In the categorisation of ‘negligence’, the 
conduct of the administration during the negotiation of terms was considered, such 
as the lack of cooperation for narrowing down disagreements, disconnecting 
communications, and leaving the negotiation process abandoned.459 It was found 
that Turkey had committed an ‘abuse of authority’ by demanding renegotiation 
beyond its legally permissible scope.460 Among the ‘inconsistent administrative 
acts’, there included acts such as the administrative ignorance of the claimant’s legal 
rights as a policy and inharmonious decision-making.461  
 
It has been shown that the task of finding an indirect expropriation is primarily 
based on the consideration of the consequences that a regulatory measure is alleged 
to cause. The exclusive emphasis on the economic effect to which the orthodox 
approach adheres appears readily acceptable. Nonetheless, there is an approach that 
considers other significant factors in a decision relating to expropriation, as well as 
recognising the importance of effect. This approach considers that the economic 
effect factor can be outweighed by other important factors which can lead to a 
denial of indirect or regulatory expropriation and, accordingly, compensation. For 
instance, in Archer Daniels Midland Company v Mexico,462 Archer Daniels Midland 
(ADM), the claimant, was a United States company, whose investment was 
established under the laws of Mexico. The company was involved in the production 
and distribution of an alternative and cost-effective sweetener. The Mexican 
Congress enacted a measure requiring a 20 per cent excise tax to be applied to soft 
drinks and syrup that used sweeteners, including the sweetener produced by ADM’s 
investment in Mexico. The claimants argued that the excise tax measures amounted 
                                                




462 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc v Mexico 
(Award) 21 November 2007 (ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/04/05). 
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to an indirect expropriation of their investment within the meaning of Article 1110 
of NAFTA.463 The tribunal, in its indirect expropriation scrutiny, primarily relied on 
the ‘effect test’ and, in addition, took other things into consideration. It articulated 
its position, stating: 
 
Judicial practice indicates that the severity of the economic impact is the decisive 
criterion in deciding whether an indirect expropriation or a measure tantamount to 
expropriation has taken place. An expropriation occurs if the interference is 
substantial and deprives the investor of all or most of the benefits of the 
investment. … Other factors may be taken into account, … including whether the 
measure was proportionate or necessary for a legitimate purpose; whether it 
discriminated in law or in practice; whether it was not adopted in accordance with 
due process of law; or whether it interfered with the investor’s legitimate 
expectations when the investment was made.464 
 
Even when it may seem as if an indirect expropriation has occurred as a result of the 
effect of economic deprivation, there may exist other factors which could enable the 
property owner, while still retaining ownership or control of the property or its 
economic benefit, to restore its original economic status in full or substantially in 
due course; unless the economic deprivation becomes irreversible. In this regard, it 
may be worthwhile to look at other relevant factors. Furthermore, the existence of a 
grave deprivation of foreign-owned investment does not always guarantee the 
arbitral recognition of indirect expropriation. The tribunal in Feldman v Mexico did 
not accept a compensable expropriation claim, despite the existence of a whole 
deprivation of economic value, stating: 
 
Not all government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or impossible for an 
investor to carry out a particular business, change in the law or change in 
application of the existing laws that makes it uneconomical to continue a 
                                                
463 ibid para 104. 
464 ibid paras 240–41, 250.  
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particular business, is an expropriation under Article 1110. Governments, in their 
exercise of regulatory power, frequently change their laws and regulations in 
response to changing economic circumstances or change political, economic or 
social considerations. Those changes may well make certain activities less 
profitable or even uneconomic to continue.465  
 
In CMS v Argentina, the tribunal found that the suspension of the tariff adjustment 
regulation indeed caused a significant effect on the claimant’s business, but declined 
to accept the expropriation claim because the investor retained full ownership and 
control of the investment.466 In this respect, the economic effect of a government 
measure can be the primary determinant for the finding of an indirect or regulatory 
expropriation, but in certain circumstances the significance of the effect can be 
outweighed by the fact that the property owner maintains the ownership and control 
of the investment, despite government regulations that hinder the owner from 
carrying out a certain business. By reflecting a deviation from the sole effect 
doctrine, some international investment agreements contain explicit provisions that 
deny the doctrine of indirect expropriation. For instance, Annex B.13(1) of the 
Canada Model BIT of 2004 provides: 
 
The economic impact of the measure or series of measures, although the sole fact 
that a measure or series of measures of a Party has an adverse effect on the 
economic value of an investment does not establish that an indirect expropriation 
has occurred.467  
 
The 2012 United States Model BIT,468 the Colombia-India BIT of 2009469 and 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreements of 2009 470  exhibit similar 
                                                
465 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa (n 321) para 112. 
466 CMS (n 309) paras 262–63. 
467 Annex B.13(1)(b)(i) of the Canada Model BIT of 2004. 
468 Annex B.4(a)(i) of the United States Model BIT of 2012. 
469 Article 6 of Colombia-India BIT of 2009 provides that ‘the sole fact of a measure or 
series of measures having adverse effect on the economic value of an investment does not 
imply that an indirect expropriation has occurred’. 
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provisions indicating that the economic effect cannot solely establish an indirect 
expropriation. 
 
It can be observed in general that such consequences can be categorised into the 
deprivation of economic value of the property right or investment and the total or 
substantial loss of control, which de facto render the right or investment 
economically meaningless. These categories are not exhaustive, and may only 
reflect the primary focus that tribunals tend to rely on for the finding of an indirect 
expropriation.  
 
2.1.1.3.2 The Deprivation of the Economic Value of Right or 
Investment 
 
The most frequently cited and recognised case in this context is Chorzów 
Factory.471 In this case, the taking of a tangible property affected the patent rights of 
a company to which the property belonged. The tribunal articulated that the direct 
expropriation of some investment in practice created the effect of an indirect 
expropriation of the other investment by rendering it worthless. Several subsequent 
indirect expropriation cases demonstrate circumstances in which tribunals have 
found indirect expropriation on the basis of their recognition that a state’s measure 
caused the deprivation of the economic value of a property right or investment. In 
CME Czech Republic BV v Czech,472 the claimant, CME Czech Republic (CME), 
was a company established under the laws of the Netherlands. CME’s joint venture 
investment was involved in a television broadcasting business with a license issued 
by the Czech Media Council. CME claimed that its investment was ‘commercially 
destroyed by the actions and omission attributed to the Media Council, an organ of 
the Czech Republic’,473 in breach of Article 5 of the Netherlands and Czech 
                                                                                                                                    
470 Annex 2.3(a) of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement of 2009. 
471 Chorzów Factory (n 48).  
472 CME (n 7). 
473 ibid para 20. 
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Republic BIT.474 The tribunal accepted that an expropriation in a form other than 
direct expropriation could exist: 
 
The expropriation claim is sustained despite the fact that the Media Council did 
not expropriate CME by express measures of expropriation. De facto 
expropriations or indirect expropriations, i.e. measures that do not involve an 
overt taking but that effectively neutralise the benefit of the property of the 
foreign owner, are subject to expropriation claims. This is undisputed under 
international law.475 
 
In the case of Middle East Cement,476 the claimant Middle East Cement (MCE) 
argued that Egypt’s action, of prohibiting the import of cement, in effect revoked 
the license that allowed MCE to manage a cement business in a free zone. It was 
alleged that this action amounted to an indirect expropriation under Article 4 of the 
Greece and Egypt BIT.477 The tribunal found an indirect expropriation, which left 
the ownership intact, connected to the effect of the measure at issue on the 
economic value of the right. The tribunal stated that the: 
 
Claimant was deprived, by the Decree, of rights it had been granted under the 
License, …When measures are taken by a state the effect of which is to deprive 
the investor of the use and benefit of his investment even though he may retain 
nominal ownership of the respective rights being the investment, the measures are 
                                                
474  The Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic of 
1991 provides in Article 5 that ‘neither Contracting Party shall take any measures 
depriving, directly or indirectly, investors of the other Contracting party of their 
investments, unless the deprivation is taken in the public interest and under due process of 
law, is carried out non-discriminatorily, and is accompanied by just compensation.’ 
475 CME (n 7) para 604. 
476 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co SA v Arab Republic of Egypt (Award) 12 
April 2002 (ICSID Case No ARB/99/6). 
477 The 1993 Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
between Greece and Egypt. 
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often referred to as a ‘creeping’ or ‘indirect’ expropriation or, as in the BIT, as 
measures ‘the effect of which is tantamount to expropriation’.478 
 
The CME and MEC cases clearly illustrate that the existence of an indirect 
expropriation can be justifiably inferred from the effect of the state’s measures 
nullifying the benefit of economic value of the investment or right. The following 
case articulates the degree of effect which is required for the benefit to be nullified 
in order for an indirect expropriation to occur. In Perenco Ecuador Limited v 
Ecuador,479 the claimant Perenco Ecuador Limited (PEL) was a French national 
who explored and exploited hydrocarbon resources. PEL argued that the enactment 
and implementation by Ecuador of amending hydrocarbon legislation collectively 
brought about an expropriation of its assets in breach of Article 6 of the French and 
Ecuador BIT.480 In the tribunal’s investigation, it emphasised the required amount of 
deprivation through the citation of cases such as Techmed v Mexico,481 CME v 
Czech Republic,482 and EnCana v Ecuador.483 It stated: 
 
This Tribunal is mindful … that a distinction is to be drawn between a partial 
deprivation of value, which is not an expropriation, and a ‘complete or near 
complete deprivation of value’, which can constitute an expropriation. … These 
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formulations as to the amount of deprivation of value required to be shown before 
an indirect expropriation will be found to exist tend in the direction of positing a 
very substantial amount of deprivation. It needs not to be complete, but it must be 
very substantial.484 
 
In Sergei Paushok v Mongolia,485 the claimants owned an investment in Mongolia, 
which was a gold mining company. They claimed that the enactment and 
enforcement by Mongolia of a tax constituted an indirect expropriation. The tribunal 
rejected the claim because even though the tax resulted in a ‘significant drop in gold 
sales’ in the industry, the claimants maintained ownership of their investment and 
continued to conduct their business activities after the tax became effective.  
 
2.1.1.3.3 The Deprivation of Effective Control 
 
The expropriatory consequence or effect can occur in another way. Instead of 
depriving a foreign investor of the economic value of his or her investment, a state’s 
measure can impair a foreign investor’s capability to control his or her investment in 
the economic sense. Such a loss of control over an investment, if the loss is 
considerable, is usually likely to produce a destructive effect on the economic value 
of the property right or the investment. In relation to this kind of occasion, it is 
helpful to examine the case of Starrett Housing Corporation v Iran,486 a case 
reviewed by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. The claimants were engaged in 
developing a housing project in Iran. They argued that their property interests in the 
housing project had been expropriated by Iran because it had deprived them of the 
‘effective use, control and benefits of their property’ by implementing various 
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administrative acts and imposing certain conditions that hindered them from 
accomplishing the project.487 The tribunal accepted this claim and found an indirect 
expropriation.  
 
In Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH v Ukraine,488 the claimant 
Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH (IPS) ran a maritime tour 
service. As a result of a travel ban imposed by the Ukrainian government, IPS was 
unable to sustain its business. IPS claimed that the Ukraine’s actions expropriated 
its investment without payment of compensation, in breach of Article 4(2) of the 
BIT. 489  The tribunal concluded that the travel ban constituted an indirect 
expropriation by its deprivation of control of the claimant’s key property. It stated as 
follows: 
 
The continuation of the travel ban … the act deprived Claimants of access to and 
control over the essential asset for its investment … the withholding of a key asset 
could be viewed as an effective seizure of Claimant’s right to use that asset. At a 
minimum, the travel ban amounted to an indirect expropriation in that it destroyed 
the value of Claimants’ contractual rights and such diminution in value (due to the 
lasting damage to Claimants’ business) was for all intents and purposes, 
permanent.490  
 
In Tza Yap Shum v Peru,491 the claimant Tza Yap Shum (Tza) had an investment 
concerned with the contracting, financing, and purchasing of raw materials. Two 
                                                
487 ibid 2. 
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489  The Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Ukraine for the 
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types of governmental measure were claimed to constitute indirect expropriation. 
The tribunal accepted that only one of these amounted to an indirect expropriation. 
First of all, Peru’s taxing authority audited Tza’s investment and concluded that the 
investment produced a false report about the amount of sales. The authority 
accordingly imposed ‘back taxes’ on Tza’s investment.492 Secondly, subsequent to 
the audit, the taxing authority imposed interim measures, as empowered under 
Peruvian law, to ensure the payment of tax debts. All Peruvian banks were 
instructed to hold any funds transferred through them in connection with the 
transactions in which Tza’s investment was involved. As a result of the imposition 
of these interim measures, Tza was not able to use any Peruvian banks for its 
transactions and, as a consequence, Tza’s investment’s sales decreased substantially. 
The tribunal did not accept that the audit conducted by the Peruvian taxing authority 
could constitute an indirect expropriation of Tza’s investment as the tribunal gave 
deference to the ‘state’s regulatory and administrative powers’.493 However, it did 
conclude that the interim measures imposed by Peru on Tza’s investment 
constituted an indirect expropriation, because the measures ‘significantly interfered 
with’ the operations of Tza’s investment and caused a substantial fall in sales.494 
 
In Tidewater v Venezuela,495 the claimants, including Tidewater, were engaged in a 
maritime support service for state-owned companies. They claimed that Venezuela’s 
legislative and administrative acts caused the effect of expropriating their property. 
The parties in the dispute agreed on the existence of expropriation, but disagreed 
over the scope of the expropriated investment. This case is noteworthy given the 
approach that was taken by the tribunal in the scrutiny of indirect expropriation. The 
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approach suggested four considerations to be made when determining the 
expropriatory effect, which were adopted by the Pope & Talbot tribunal:496 
 
In reaching an assessment of whether the measures had an effect equivalent to 
expropriation, the Tribunal finds it useful to consider the factors relied upon by 
the tribunal in Pope & Talbot as relevant in the determination of whether a state 
measure has such an effect, namely whether: 
 
(a) The investment has been nationalised or the measure is confiscatory; 
(b) The investor remains in control of the investment and directs its day-to-day 
operations, or whether the state has taken over such management and 
control; 
(c) The state now supervises the work of employees of the investment; and, 
(d) The state takes the proceeds of the company’s sales.497 
 
As can be seen above, the effective control on a daily basis is a factor which can be 
taken into account for the finding of an indirect expropriation. The cases reviewed 
so far demonstrate that the deprivation of the de facto effective control of an 
investment can constitute an indirect expropriation.  
 
In addition, there exists case law that demonstrates that tribunals can base a 
rejection of an expropriation claim on the fact that the investor has retained control 
of his or her property. This type of decision is exhibited in the case of Suez and 
Vivendi Universal v Argentina.498 The tribunal here admitted that the ‘economic 
impact caused by a regulatory measure’ is a significant factor in determining the 
existence of expropriation.499 The claimants who were engaged in water and sewage 
services expected to obtain the tariff income under the concession they had with 
                                                
496 Pope & Talbot (n 135). 
497 ibid; Tidewater v Venezuela (n 495) para 105. 
498 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and Vivendi Universal SA v The 
Argentine Republic (Award) 26 March 2015 (ICSID Case No ARB/03/19).  
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Argentina. In this case, Argentina refused to confer such benefits to the claimants. 
The tribunal accepted that an indirect expropriation could be established by means 
of the existence of the substantial deprivation of an investment. However, the claim 
for expropriation was denied as the claimants had retained control of the concession 
and their power to operate the water and sewage system.500  
 
2.1.1.3.4 Deprivation Not Qualified as Indirect Expropriation 
 
Indirect expropriation typically involves the deprivation of the economic value of a 
right or an investment. However, not all types of deprivation can be deemed as 
indirect expropriation. By means of an examination of additional case law (below) it 
will be shown when indirect expropriation claims can be declined, even though a 
state’s measure may have diminished the economic value of a right or an 
investment.  
 
2.1.1.3.4.1 Termination of Contract and Expropriation 
 
Firstly, there are certain occasions where the relationship between a state and a 
foreign investor is shaped by both a concession contract and the applicable 
international investment agreements, simultaneously. Such a concession contract 
can be made when a state’s government allows a foreign investor or a locally 
incorporated company owned by the investor to join other domestic partners or to be 
assigned the development of a public utility project or infrastructure, and so on. 
Under a concession contract, a foreign investor is granted certain contractual rights. 
It has been recognised in international law that contractual rights can be 
expropriated since the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case, in which the tribunal 
admitted that contractual rights and obligations had been taken, and, similarly, since 
the Chorzów Factory case, in which the tribunal concluded that the expropriation of 
tangible property resulted in the expropriation of intangible property rights. That a 
                                                
500 ibid para 145. In conducting the expropriation scrutiny, the tribunal advocated that a 
governmental inaction or omission is less likely to constitute an expropriation than a 
governmental positive measure in para 144. 
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taking of contractual rights can constitute an expropriation of part or all of the 
investment has been confirmed by several tribunal awards, for instance, those 
rendered by the LIAMCO tribunal and the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in the Starrett 
and Phillips Petroleum cases.501 Basically, contractual rights fall within the scope of 
investment as stipulated in the provisions of modern international investment 
agreements.502 If a state’s government terminates a contract, it usually results in a 
loss or deprivation of the contractual rights possessed by the foreign investor. 
Considering that contractual rights can be expropriated, the question can be asked as 
to whether it can constitute an indirect expropriation beyond a mere matter of a 
contract. This question can arise because a state which enters into a concession 
contract with a foreign investor holds double status as a sovereign entity exercising 
regulatory power and as a party to a contract. In this regard, the question can be 
rephrased as to whether an issue of the breach or termination of a contract can be an 
issue of violation of the expropriation provision in international investment law. The 
Suez tribunal has clarified the basic difference that exists between a contract issue 
and a treaty issue, and explains when an expropriation could occur out of such a 
termination, relying on part of the Siemens tribunal’s award: 
 
In investor-state arbitration involving the breaches of contracts, which have been 
concluded between a claimant and a host government, tribunals have made a 
distinction between acta iure imperii and acta iure gestionis, that is to say, 
actions by state in exercise of its sovereign powers and actions of a state as a 
contracting party. It is the use by a state of its sovereign powers that gives rise to 
                                                
501 Libyan American Oil Co (LIAMCO) v Government of the Libyan Arab Republic 62 ILR 
140 (1980). The tribunal acknowledged that concession rights could constitute ‘property’ as 
long as those rights had a monetary value. In Starrett Housing, the tribunal stated that the 
property interest might comprise a right to manage a project (Starrett Housing Corporation 
(n 443); S Ripinsky and K Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (BIICL 
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expropriated, and included intangible property such as contract rights (Phillips Petroleum 
Co Iran v Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 Iran-USCTR 79 <www.trans-lex.org/232300> 
accessed 1 August 2015); McLachlan and others (n 4) 308. 
502 Article 1(6)(f) of the ECT and Article 1139 of NAFTA; UNCTAD, ‘Taking of Property’ 
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements (2000); Dolzer and Schreuer (n 
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treaty breaches, while actions as a contracting party merely give rise to contract 
claims not ordinarily covered by an international investment treaty As pointed 
out in Siemens v Argentina, ‘… for the behaviour of the state as a party to a 
contract to be considered a breach of an investment treaty, such behaviour must 
be beyond that which an ordinary contracting party could adopt and involve state 
interference with the operation of the contract’. In Siemens, the tribunal found 
that Argentina took a series of measures based not on its contract with the 
Siemens subsidiary but on the exercise of its public authority, one of which was 
a governmental decree not based on contract but which terminated the contract. 
It therefore found that Argentina had expropriated Siemens’ contractual rights.503  
 
The tribunal articulated that two conditions must be met for a state’s conduct in the 
context of a contract to constitute a breach of an investment treaty: a state’s conduct 
that deviated from an ordinary contract party’s behaviour and the exercise of a 
state’s public authority. In Suez, the claimant’s company and Argentina entered into 
a concession contract that covered rights and responsibilities regarding the 
management of water and waste water systems. 504  Argentina terminated the 
concession contract and secured the possession of the water distribution and waste 
water systems that were governed by the contract. The tribunal did not accept the 
claimant’s expropriation claim because the termination was an act in the exercise of 
contractual rights, as follows: 
 
This Tribunal views the dispute between the Claimants and Argentina concerning 
the termination of the Concession as essentially contractual in nature. Indeed, 
Argentina’s action in terminating the Concession purportedly in accordance with 
the Concession’s terms was not an act of expropriation but rather the exercise of 
its alleged contractual rights. … its assessment of the existence of a treaty breach, 
the Tribunal has taken into account, insofar as relevant, the contractual conduct of 
Argentina. It concludes, however, that measures taken by Argentina to terminate 
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the Concession were ostensibly an exercise of its contractual rights but not 
measures of expropriation.505 
 
In Siemens,506 the claimant ‘Siemens’ concluded a contract with Argentina with 
regard to the provision of an integral service for the implementation of immigration 
control, personal identification and an information system. Its investment included 
contractual rights and the right to complete the project. The contract was terminated 
by a decree under terms of emergency legislation. The tribunal noted that the 
decree, which was not based on the contract, but on the legislation, was a permanent 
measure and resulted in the termination of the contract.507 It concluded that it was an 
expropriation.508 Also, in Occidental Petroleum Corporation,509 the tribunal found 
an indirect expropriation on the basis of an act in the exercise of public authority. 
The dispute concerned the termination of a 1999 Participation Contract concluded 
between the claimants and Ecuador for the exploration and exploitation of 
hydrocarbons in a certain location. Ecuador terminated the contract by declaring a 
decree in the exercise of its authority under Hydrocarbons Law. The tribunal found 
an indirect expropriation, concluding that the ‘taking by the Respondent of the 
Claimant’s investment by means of this administrative sanction was a measure 
tantamount to expropriation’.510 
 
It follows that if a state terminates a contract in the exercise of its contractual right, 
causing a deprivation of the right, this does not constitute indirect expropriation. On 
the other hand, if such a termination is an act in the exercise of public powers or 
authority, a tribunal will continue to conduct an inquiry into the existence of indirect 
expropriation. Nonetheless, in relation to the exercise of public authority, there is a 
further factor that can prevent certain governmental deprivations of a right or an 
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investment from the inquiry into indirect expropriation. It is the so-called doctrine 
of police power.  
 
2.1.1.3.4.2 The Doctrine of Police Power 
 
The doctrine of police power refers to a general rule that a state is not responsible 
for an economic injury suffered by a foreign investor when the injury results from 
the state’s exercise of its regulatory power that falls within its police power. In Tza 
Yap Shum v Peru,511 the tribunal briefly described the basic characteristic of the 
doctrine of police power: 
 
The Tribunal recognised the deference given to a state’s regulatory and 
administrative powers and noted the general rule that a state is not liable for any 
losses resulting from the good faith application of general taxes and 
regulations.512  
 
Likewise, in Renée Rose Levy De Levi v Peru,513 the tribunal based its denial of a 
claim of indirect expropriation on the doctrine of police power. In this case, the 
claimant, Renée Rose Levy De Levi, was a shareholder of a bank company. He 
argued that the financial supervisory organ of the state had taken expropriatory 
measures, impairing the value and right of the investment. The tribunal accepted 
that the supervisory organ deprived the shareholder’s legal and economic rights, 
plus hindered the shareholders from operating their company. Even so, the tribunal 
noted that it was the bank’s own violation of the banking regulation that had caused 
the supervisor’s interfering measures.514 Fundamentally, the tribunal concluded that 
owing to the violation, the financial supervisory organ had taken the measures in the 
exercise of the police power, which did not constitute an indirect expropriation. It 
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emphasised the clear distinction between acts of police power and expropriation, as 
follows: 
 
In evaluating a claim of expropriation it is important to recognise a state’s 
legitimate right to regulate and to exercise its police power in the interests of 
public welfare and not to confuse measures of that nature with expropriation. … 
These were legitimate acts of ‘police power’ characteristic of bank officials …515 
 
In general, the complete or substantial deprivation of an investment by a state’s 
measure will be regarded as constituting indirect expropriation. Any other 
deprivation that falls short of the deprivation threshold will not constitute an indirect 
expropriation. In addition, there exist certain factors that tribunals consider in 
determining whether an indirect expropriation has occurred, such as the valid 
termination of a concession contract between a state and a foreign investor, and the 
exercise of police power.  
 
2.1.1.4 The Intent of Indirect Expropriation: Less or Not Important  
 
In addition to the contemplation of the consequence of indirect expropriation, there 
exists a subjective aspect to be considered by tribunals when determining the 
existence of an indirect expropriation: the intent of the state when taking the 
expropriatory measures. Arbitral jurisprudence has never deviated from its primary 
emphasis on the consequential effect of a state’s measure in conducting the task of 
finding indirect expropriation. However, this does not mean that the intent of 
indirect expropriation is completely excluded from the scrutiny of indirect 
expropriation in general. Instead, it means that the significance of intent does not 
usually outweigh that of the consequential effect of indirect expropriation in the 
arbitral process. The aforementioned status of intent can be observed in the 
commentary of a number of tribunal decisions. In Techmed v Mexico, 516  the 
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tribunal, conducting its arbitral scrutiny in the context of indirect or de facto 
expropriation, cited the tribunal decisions of Tippetts and Phelps Dodge Corp, 
stating: 
 
The government’s intention is less important than the effects of the measures on 
the owner of the assets or on the benefits arising from such assets affected by the 
measures; and the form of the deprivation measure is less important than its actual 
effects.517  
 
In Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH v Ukraine,518 the tribunal 
articulated the role of the intent factor in relation to the determination of indirect 
expropriation, citing the award of Vivendi II, stating: 
 
While intent will weigh in favour of showing a measure to be expropriatory, it is 
not a requirement, because the effect of the measure on the investor, not the 
state’s intent, is the critical factor. … a state may expropriate property where it 
interferes with it even though the state expressly disclaims such intention. Indeed, 
international tribunals, jurists and scholars have consistently appreciated that 
states may accomplish expropriations in ways other than by formal decree; often 
in ways that may seek to cloak expropriative conduct with a veneer of 
legitimacy.519 
 
Thus far, this thesis has discussed and observed how investment treaty arbitration 
tribunals can approach the identification of an occurrence of indirect expropriation 
in an investment dispute case in the absence of concrete guidance concerning 
indirect expropriation other than the term ‘indirect expropriation’ itself. The 
consequential effect that an alleged expropriatory measure gives rise to an 
investment in terms of the right and control is obviously the primary concern. In 
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general, arbitral scrutiny of indirect expropriation is conducted in the context of a 
measure vis-à-vis an investment. However, there exists a situation where the 
relationship between a state and a foreign investor is formed gradually, with a 
foreign-owned investment being affected by more than one measure of a state. It is 
recognised that a series of measures can cumulatively produce a de facto 
expropriatory effect on an investment. This is called ‘creeping expropriation’. 
Before moving to the issue of distinguishing compensable expropriation from an 
ordinary regulation that does not incur the obligation of compensation, it is 
important to look into creeping expropriation.  
 
2.1.1.5 Creeping expropriation 
 
A range of different types of indirect expropriation exists, such as incidental, 
consequential, de facto, and creeping expropriation. Arbitral practice supports that 
cumulated stages forming a ‘de facto dispossession’ are to be construed as 
‘measures equivalent to expropriation’.520 Except for creeping expropriation, the 
terms indicating the other types of indirect expropriation are interchangeable. The 
other types of indirect expropriation involve the expropriatory consequence which 
typically occurs when a direct form of expropriation takes place. The terms 
‘incidental’, ‘consequential’, and ‘de facto’ all indicate expropriations that occur in 
different ways from that of direct expropriation. What differentiates creeping 
expropriation from other types of indirect expropriation is that it occurs through a 
gradual process, comprising more than a single governmental measure. Creeping 
expropriation is formed through a series of governmental measures, each of which 
does not necessarily constitute an internationally wrongful act. It is their cumulative 
effect that matters. For instance, in Perenco Ecuador Limited v Ecuador,521 the 
claimant contended that the cumulative effect of a series of measures taken by 
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Ecuador resulted in a complete taking.522 Even though the tribunal concluded that 
no cumulative expropriatory effect had occurred, it took the approach of examining 
whether each measure constituted expropriation, and even after it concluded that no 
single measure amounted to expropriation, it examined whether the group of 
measures collectively produced an expropriatory effect on the claimant’s 
investment. In Tradex v Albania, the tribunal recognised the potential impact of a 
series of measures which do not individually constitute an expropriation, but 
collectively amount to a creeping expropriation: 
 
While the above examination … has come to the conclusion that none of the 
single decisions and events alleged by Tradex to constitute an expropriation can 
indeed be qualified by the Tribunal as expropriation, it might still be possible that, 
and the Tribunal, therefore, has to examine and evaluate hereafter whether the 
combination of the decisions and events can be qualified as expropriation of 
Tradex’s foreign investment in a long, step-by-step process by Albania.523  
 
According to UNCTAD’s 2003 World Investment Report, creeping expropriation is 
as follows: 
 
Indirect takings include creeping expropriations, involving an incremental but 
cumulative encroachment on one or more of the range of recognised ownership 
rights until the measures involved lead to the effective negation of the owner’s 
interest in the property.524 
 
2.1.2 Drawing The Line Between Indirect Expropriation and Ordinary 
Regulatory Measures 
 
                                                
522 ibid para 256. 
523 Tradex (n 159) para 191. 




With the emergence of the concept of indirect expropriation in international 
investment law, the scope of arbitral scrutiny has extended, beyond direct 
expropriation, to encompass a range of indirect forms of the taking of a foreign-
owned investment by a measure attributable to a state. In order to avoid covering the 
whole range of measures under scrutiny, it becomes necessary to establish new 
criteria which tribunals can rely on to decide whether to afford foreign investors 
with compensation. Previously, the most common formulations of indirect, 
expropriatory deprivation could be observed through an arbitral case review. It was 
also noted that even though there may have been some deprivations, there could be 
occasions where these deprivations were not accepted as qualified indirect 
expropriations. Such deprivations, as will be shown, are captured by the doctrines 
with a view of identifying indirect expropriation among them. There exist mainly 
two doctrines that tribunals have recourse to: the ‘sole effect’ doctrine and the 
‘multifactor’ doctrine. They do not differ from each other in recognising that the 
economic effect of a regulatory measure is far more relevant and determinative than 
other factors in the finding of an indirect expropriation. However, their approaches 
differ in relation to other considerations. 
 
First of all, the sole effect doctrine only concerns the effect of the measure in issue. 
As noted earlier, there exist two parts for there to be an occurrence of an indirect 
expropriation, which may mirror the substantive aspects of direct expropriation: the 
consequential effect of a measure, and the decision, formed through certain 
processes by the state, to take the measure. The consequent effect of indirect 
expropriation is the deprivation by the state of a foreign-owned investment. It does 
not, however, cover all governmental measures that affect the economic value of or 
the foreign investor’s capability to enjoy an investment. Governmental measures 
that qualify as expropriatory deprivations should fulfil certain criteria in terms of 
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magnitude, degree, or intensity.525 The Metalclad tribunal summarised the criteria as 
follows: 
 
Thus, expropriation under NAFTA includes … covert or incidental interference 
with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or 
in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state.526 
 
According to the tribunal, the degree of deprivation required for governmental 
measures to be qualified as indirect expropriation should be full or substantial. 
Furthermore, the sole effect doctrine regards the effect of the measure as the core 
identity of an indirect expropriation. The effect is, therefore, not simply the primary, 
but the exclusive or absolute factor in determining the existence of indirect 
expropriation. It means that the effect can outweigh any other factors that may be 
involved in the occurrence of indirect expropriation. Under the sole effect doctrine, 
the intent or purpose of a state is not a meaningful concern for the finding of indirect 
expropriation. The Metalclad tribunal recognised that indirect expropriation could 
take place, in the absence of the definite intention to expropriate, as a result of a 
‘covert or incidental interference with the use of property’. This was also clarified in 
the award of Santa Elena v Costa Rica. The tribunal maintained that the ‘purpose of 
protecting the environment for which the property was taken does not alter the legal 
character of the taking for which adequate compensation must be paid’.527 Also, the 
tribunal in Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and Others v 
Ukraine asserted that an improper motive or intent would not be required for a 
finding of expropriation.528 
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Secondly, the multifactor doctrine, unlike the sole effect doctrine, involves the 
consideration of various factors, including effect. For instance, the Feldman tribunal 
under NAFTA did not define indirect expropriation solely based on the depriving 
effect of a governmental measure at issue; in particular, it embraced the deferential 
consideration of a state’s right to regulate in a flexible way in addressing changing 
economic situations. It stated as follows: 
 
 Not all governmental regulatory activity, that makes it difficult or impossible for 
an investor to carry out a particular business, or change in the law and / or 
application of existing laws that makes it uneconomical to continue a particular 
business, is an expropriation under Article 1110. Governments, in their exercise 
of their regulatory power, frequently change laws and regulations in a response 
to changing economic circumstances or changing political, economic or social 
considerations. Those changes may well cause certain activities to be less 
profitable or even too uneconomical to continue.529 
 
It is significant to see how the tribunal in Feldman v Mexico approached the 
identification of an indirect expropriation. While the tribunal admitted the primary 
importance of effect, in order to determine the occurrence of an indirect 
expropriation, it additionally took into account factors such as the reasonableness of 
the measure at issue, legitimate expectations, proportionality (which also involves 
the consideration of a degree of burden borne by a foreign investor), and the 
purpose or aim of the measure at hand. It asserted that the tribunal would need to 
determine the following: 
 
Whether such measures are reasonable with respect to their goals, the deprivation 
of economic rights and the legitimate expectations of who suffered such 
deprivation. There must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between 
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the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be 
realised by any expropriatory measure.530  
 
It can be observed that a multifactor doctrine is reflected in some Model BITs such 
as the US and Canadian Model BITs and the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement (ASEAN CIA) of 2009. For instance, the Canadian Model BIT of 2004 
describes the finding of indirect expropriation as a ‘case-by-case, fact-based 
inquiry’ and provides that the tribunal should consider ‘among other factors, the 
economic impact of the government action, the extent of the government action’s 
interference with the legitimate expectation, and the character of the government 
actions’.531 
 
There is some academic interest in the multifactors doctrine. For example, Andrew 
Newcombe takes the position that the sole effect doctrine is incapable of providing 
precise criteria for a finding of expropriation.532 In seeking useful clearer guidance 
for a finding of expropriation,533 he considers the ‘character of the government 
action’ and a ‘distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectation’, besides ‘the 
economic impact of the government action’.534 Also, Suzy H Nikièma maintains 
that any ‘legitimate objective of the measure’ taken by a government should be 
considered in identifying indirect expropriation.535 
 
The difference that is immediately observable between the sole effect doctrine and 
the multifactor doctrine is the number of factors taken into account. The advent of 
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the multifactor doctrine suggests that the nature of identifying indirect expropriation 
has changed from a mere economic analysis to a normative balancing task. 
Moreover, the multifactor doctrine broadens the view from which to analyse an 
investment dispute by extending the scope of scrutiny, beyond the effect, to cover 
contextual details, including regulatory and private interests. However, what appears 
common in both doctrines is that they are directed at identifying certain elements 
that can construct an indirect expropriation. In this regard, it can be said that 
because they simply function to explain the character of indirect expropriation, 
rather than how to differentiate indirect expropriation from an ordinary regulation, 
they may be limited in terms of functionality in drawing the line between indirect 
expropriation that entails compensation and an ordinary regulation that does not. It 
will be more desirable for international investment law to be equipped with a 
doctrine that is more apt at serving the purpose of drawing this line more clearly. 
This possibility will be explored further in the next chapter.  
 
 
2.2 The Lawfulness of Expropriation 
 
2.2.1 The State’s Right to Expropriate Subject to an International 
Standard  
 
A state has the sovereign right to expropriate. Thus, external disciplines cannot bar a 
state from enjoying this right, but can only impose some restrictions on it. Under the 
rules of international law, a state’s regulatory expropriation of foreign-owned 
property cannot be exercised without limit. The lawfulness of expropriation is 
governed by the rules of international law. In general, international investment 
agreements and customary international law require that a foreign-owned property 
can be expropriated for the purpose of public interest, in a non-discriminatory way, 
in accordance with due process, and with the payment of compensation. This list of 
requirements is not concerned with determining what may constitute an 
expropriation, but provides the criteria by which to determine the legality of an 
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expropriation. Examples of these conditions can be observed in certain BITs, as 
illustrated by the following. 
 
Article VI of the Canada-Slovakia BIT: 
 
Investments or returns of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be 
nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having an effect equivalent 
to nationalisation or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as ‘expropriation’) in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party, except for a public purpose, under 
due process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner and provided that such 
expropriation is accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.536 
 
Article 1110(1) of NAFTA: 
 
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalise or expropriate an investment of 
an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalisation or expropriation of such an investment (expropriation), except: 
 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 11105(1); and 
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.537 
 
Article 13(1) of the ECT: 
 
Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other 
Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to a 
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measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Expropriation’) except where such Expropriation is: 
 
(a) for a public purpose which is in the public interest; 
(b) not discriminatory; 
(c) carried out under due process of law; and 
(d) accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.538 
 
It can be observed that these provisions exhibit almost the same language in relation 
to the four expropriation conditions. Their similarity may also indicate a similarity 
in their meanings or at least little deviation from their shared basic concepts.  
 
2.2.2 The Four Requirements for Lawful Expropriation  
 
2.2.2.1 Public Purpose 
 
As a requirement for lawful expropriation, public purpose can be expressed through 
different terminology, such as public interest, public benefit, or national interest.539 
In other words, public purpose is a broad concept that represents the public welfare 
interests that a state pursues, including the protection of human health and the 
environment, national security, and any other interests that a state may recognise as 
public. A state can enjoy a wide discretion in deciding what is in the public interest, 
because it is basically a matter of sovereignty. For instance, the European Court of 
Human Rights has employed the doctrine of a ‘margin of appreciation’, embracing 
that a state’s discretion to determine what is in the public interest is fully 
respected.540 In James and Others v United Kingdom, the court concluded that the 
state’s determination should be respected unless made in a definitively unreasonable 
way: 
                                                
538 Article 13(1) of the ECT. 
539 Newcombe (n 1) 370. 
540 Reinish and others (n 423) 182. 
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The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the 
legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, 
will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in the public interest’ unless 
that judgment be manifestly without reasonable foundation.541 
 
International tribunals in general have been reluctant to review a state’s sovereign 
conduct of a public purpose, not only because the concept is wide-ranging, but also 
because it cannot be effectively available to another state’s review.542 It does not 
mean, however, that a state’s determination of public purpose is free from an 
international standard. In some cases, the hidden private objectives behind a 
superficial public cause and a politically-motivated, retaliatory intention have been 
recognised as the very factors that have rendered public purpose expropriations 
unlawful.543 The public purpose is required to be of a ‘genuine’ nature. In ADC v 
Hungary, the tribunal found that the public interest requirement requires some 
genuine interest for the public and rejected the argument that states have the free 
discretion to determine what is a public purpose or interest. It also de facto reversed 
the burden of proof by requiring the expropriating state to demonstrate such a 




It is recognised in customary international law, as well as in international 
investment agreements, that non-discrimination is required for lawful 
expropriation.545 The non-discrimination condition is breached when a state has 
expropriated the property of a foreign investor in a discriminatory way on the basis 
                                                
541 James and Others v The United Kingdom App no 8793/79 (ECtHR, 21 February 1986).  
542 Reinish and others (n 423) 178. 
543 Walter Fletcher Smith Claim case (private objective) and British Petroleum v Libya 
(politically-motivated retaliatory act) in Reinisch and others (n 423). 
544 ADC (n 97) para 432. See Reinisch and others (n 423) 185. 
545  AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of Non-
Discrimination in International Law of Foreign Investment: An Overview’ (1998) 8 Journal 
of Transnational Law & Policy 57, 61 in Reinisch and others (n 423) 186. 
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of nationality.546 In the application of the non-discrimination condition, a strict 
approach is employed when distinguishing ostensible discrimination from practical 
discrimination. The European Court of Justice held, in Italian Government v EEC 
Commission, that: 
 
The different treatment of non-comparable situation does not lead automatically 
to the conclusion that there is discrimination. An appearance of formal 
discrimination may therefore correspond in fact to an absence of material 
discrimination. Material discrimination would consist in treating either similar 
situations differently or different situations identically.547  
 
Differential treatment will not be readily regarded as discriminatory. A judgment as 
to discrimination should be made on a reasonable basis. Different treatment on 
justifiable or reasonable grounds is permissible.548 In the case of Aminoil,549 the 
claimant argued that the nationalisation of the company under Decree Law 
constituted a discriminatory act because a foreign oil company (the Arabian Oil 
Company) was not nationalised under the law. The tribunal rejected the argument 
on the ground that there were adequate reasons for not nationalising the Arabian Oil 
Company. This case was concerned with the differential treatment between foreign-
owned properties. The American Law Institute stated that takings that single out the 
property of a foreign investor of a certain nationality would be unreasonable 
discrimination.550 Such a differentiation, however, while based on nationality, might 
not be unreasonable if rationally related to the state’s security and economic 
policies.551  
 
2.2.2.3 Due Process of Law 
                                                
546 UNCTAD (n 417) 34. 
547 Italian Government v EEC Commission (Judgment) 17 July 1963 (ECJ Case 13/63). 
548 Maniruzzaman (n 545) 61. 
549 The Government of Kuwait v The American Independent Oil Company (Award) 24 
March 1982, Ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal (1984) 66 ILR 518. 




The requirement of due process of law is a procedural condition for lawful 
expropriation. While it is disputable whether customary international law has played 
a role in establishing the due process requirement, many BITs and international 
investment agreements expressly require due process. The due process of law in an 
expropriation case is largely construed as either requiring that an expropriation be 
made in accordance with domestic law552 or providing for the availability of a 
prompt review by a host state’s authority of the expropriation.553 For instance, 
according to Article 5(3) of the Austria-Georgia BIT: 
 
Due process of law includes the right of an investor of a Contracting Party which 
claims to be affected by expropriation by the other Contracting Party to prompt 
review of its case, including the valuation of its investment and the payment of 
compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Article by a judicial 
authority or another competent and independent authority of the latter Contracting 
Party.  
 
Furthermore, as a procedural control of expropriation, the due process of law may 
impose further procedural requirements on expropriation. In ADC, the tribunal 
provided that due process of law requires: 
 
Some basic legal mechanisms, such as reasonable advance notice, a fair hearing 
and an unbiased and impartial adjudicator to assess the actions in dispute, are 
expected to be readily available and accessible to the investor to make such legal 
procedure meaningful. 
 
Due process of law can make it available for a foreign investor to have the 
procedural opportunity to contest the existence of a legitimate public purpose, 
discriminatory expropriation, and compensation. 
 
                                                
552 Article 6(1) US Model BIT (2004); Article 13(1) Canadian Model BIT (2004).. 
553 Article 5(1) UK Model BIT (1991); Article 13(4) Canadian Model BIT (2004); Article 





When a breach by a state of an international obligation owed to a foreign investor 
constitutes an internationally wrongful act,554 the state becomes responsible555 and 
will be ‘under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act’. 556  Full reparation includes ‘an obligation to 
compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made 
good by restitution.’557 Thus, if a state’s expropriatory taking of foreign-owned 
property failed to either pursue a public purpose, was discriminatory, was in 
violation of the due process of law, or was in breach of any other legal obligations, 
it would give rise to an obligation to compensate.  
 
The Chorzów Factory case has been generally accepted as illuminating the 
fundamental principle of compensation in international law. The Permanent Court 
of International Justice in this case provided as follows: 
 
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act – a principle 
which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the 
decisions of arbitral tribunals – is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out 
all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, 
in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in 
kind, or if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which 
a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss 
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place 
                                                
554 Draft Articles on State Responsibility Article 2. 
555 ibid art 1. 
556 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art 31. ‘Responsibilities of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts: Text of the Draft Article with Commentaries thereto’ 
(Crawford, Special Rapporteur) in Report of the International Law Commission on its Fifty-




of it – such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of 
compensation due for an act contrary to international law.558  
 
Accordingly, the fundamental remedy objective in a circumstance of expropriated 
property is to restore the original situation that would have existed if the unlawful 
expropriation had not occurred. If restitution in kind is not an available remedy, then 
payment of compensation in the same value shall be made. 
 
Today, a number of BITs, RTAs and FTAs commonly carry compensation 
provisions. However, there is no universally accepted standard of compensation. 
Treaty terminology describes the standard of compensation as fair, just, 559 
appropriate, and full, albeit that their meanings are not confirmed as being identical, 
and the extent to which they vary is unclear when regarding the terminology itself. 
With regard to the standard of compensation, there has been historic controversy 
between two positions advocating between the Hull formula and the national 
standard (or the standard of less-than-full fair market value).560 The Hull formula 
articulates a small number of fundamental features of compensation, requiring that 
compensation be ‘prompt, adequate and effective’. Compensation is regarded as 
prompt if accorded without delay; adequate, if it has a reasonable bearing on the 
market value of the expropriated investment; and effective, if paid in convertible 
currency.561 This formula was employed by the tribunal in the Chorzów Factory 
case.562 The formula, however, lacks clarity and thus is unreliable in providing 
definite guidance as to compensation. Previously, it was accepted that the Hull rule 
represented customary international law standards. However, the status of the rule 
has been weakened by twentieth century sizeable nationalisations in developing 
countries and expropriation in Eastern Europe’s communist countries, as well as 
through the efforts to establish a New International Economic Order based on the 
                                                
558 Chorzów Factory (n 48) para 125.  
559 Reinisch and others (n 423), citing Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (n 421) 338. 
560 Newcombe (n 1) 377. 
561 UNCTAD (n 417) 40. 
562 Chorzów Factory (n 48) 32–33. 
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UN General Assembly resolution.563 In this respect, the Hull rule fails to reach the 
threshold where state practice assures the existing rule. 564  This standard was 
transformed in the Restatement, which provides that an expropriation requires the 
payment of ‘just compensation’.565 It is construed as ‘in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, an amount equivalent to the value of the property taken … paid at 
the time of taking … and in a form economically usable by foreign national’.566 On 
the other hand, the 1962 UN General Assembly Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources567 asserted at paragraph 4 that ‘appropriate 
compensation’ shall be paid for expropriation.  
 
Another significant issue is whether the standard of compensation can vary 
depending on whether an expropriation is lawful or unlawful. The PCIJ 
distinguished between an unlawful expropriation, which calls for reparation to re-
establish the status quo ante, and lawful expropriation, requiring fair and just 
compensation equal to the ‘value of the undertaking at the moment of 
dispossession’,568 as it would be an unjust consequence if lawful liquidation and 
unlawful dispossession became indistinguishable.569 In ADC, the tribunal stated that 
the BIT only stipulated the standard of compensation applicable to a lawful 
expropriation, and that this standard ‘cannot be used to determine the issue of 
damage payable in the case of an unlawful expropriation since this would be to 
conflate compensation for a lawful expropriation with damages for an unlawful 
expropriation’.570  
 
2.2.2.5 Implications of the Four Requirements in Relation to the 
Lawfulness of Expropriation 
                                                
563 Reinisch and others (n 423) 194. 
564 Rudolf Dolzer, ‘New Foundation of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property’ (1981) 
75 American Journal of International Law 553, 561–62. 
565 Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §712. 
566 ibid. 
567 GA Res 1803, 14 Dec 1962, reprinted in (1963) 2 ILM 223 in Newcombe (n 1) 377, 26. 
568 Chorzów Factory (n 48) para 125. 
569 ibid para 124. 
570 Newcombe (n 1) 382, citing ADC (n 97). 
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A state has the sovereign right to expropriate foreign-owned property in 
international law; the exercise of this right involves a deprivation of a property right 
or interest owned by a foreign investor. In general, the four conditions that are 
required by international investment agreements and customary international law 
are intended, through the exertion of some constraints based on principles of law, to 
guide the appropriate ways in which a state exercises the right to expropriate under 
international law. Three of the four conditions can be differentiated from 
compensation and have a bearing on the expropriation measure at issue. The public 
interest condition reflects what a state can justifiably pursue in exercising its 
sovereign authority. If a state creates a normal regulation, the regulation is usually 
aimed at performing objectives of public interest. The non-discrimination condition 
intends to remove the risk that a foreign investor’s property is targeted and injured 
on the basis of nationality. It requires a state to accord to a foreign investor 
equivalent treatment or otherwise reasonably differential treatment. This condition 
demands that a state exercises extra prudence, more than simply complying with its 
domestic law in exercising the right to expropriate. The due process of law exerts 
control over the procedural aspect of expropriation. On the other hand, even though 
compensation is triggered by the occurrence of an expropriation, it has no closer 
bearing on the expropriation measure at issue than the other conditions do. Instead, 
the standard of compensation has higher relevance to the financial value of an 
expropriated property. It means that compensation is a condition that more deeply 
concerns the consequence of an expropriation. Such a differentiation may lead to a 
divergence in evaluations of the lawfulness of expropriation, depending on which 
condition has been breached. For instance, in a regional context, the approach taken 
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in relation to the legality of 
expropriation, is to distinguish between ‘inherent illegality of an expropriation’, 
which is in violation of one or more of the three conditions except for 
compensation, and the illegality of an expropriation that would otherwise only be 
lawful if accompanied by compensation.571 Only the former is subject to a higher 
standard of compensation.572  
                                                
571 UNCTAD (n 417) 44, citing Former King of Greece v Greece App no 25701/94 
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Even though expropriation causes a substantial, injurious effect on property, it 
results from the exercise of a state’s sovereign right, permitted under international 
law. Given that in the case of expropriation both the protection of investment and a 
state’s sovereign regulatory power deserve legitimacy under international law, the 
arbitral task of judging private and public interests involving these two 
considerations cannot usually be simplified by merely choosing one over the other, 
but instead may come down to a careful balancing act between the two. It is thus 
tenable that the standard of compensation can deviate from the full financial value 
or even vary in degrees of reliance in which a foreign investor’s investment is 
entitled to be protected when it is weighed against a state’s sovereign exercise of 
expropriation. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) takes the position 
that compensation for a lawful expropriation must be ‘reasonably related to its 
value’ and that ‘legitimate objectives of public interest’ may incur ‘less than 
reimbursement of the full market value’,573 by according a higher deference to a 
state’s sovereign authorities in the exercise of the right to expropriate than to the 
protection of investment. In view of this, extra prudence is required in the case of 
regulatory expropriation for determining the standard of compensation, because this 
type of indirect expropriation involves a higher degree of sovereign autonomy and 
regulatory nature than any other type of indirect expropriation. Other than 
compensation, the three conditions are likely to apply to regulatory expropriation in 
the same way as other types of expropriation; however, further conditions, 




The exercise by a state of the right to regulate matters within its territory is not 
usually barred by any international legal regulation. A state is entitled to expropriate 
                                                                                                                                    
(ECtHR, 28 November 2002) para 78, Yagtzilar and Others v Greece App No 41727/98 
(ECtHR, 15 January 2004) para 25, and Scordino v Italy (No 1) (Judgment) 29 March 2006, 
para 255. 
572 ibid. 
573 Pincova and Pinc v The Czech Republic (Judgment) App no 36548/97 (ECtHR, 5 
November 2002) para 53; UNCTAD (n 417) 41. 
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foreign-owned investment in the exercise of its right to regulate. However, within 
this permissibility, international legal regulation on expropriation, formed 
customarily and through international investment agreements, is activated when the 
exercise of this right is deemed to be direct or indirect expropriation. As a result of 
the application of international legal regulations, as observed, some deprivations of 
the economic value of a right or an investment, and that of the effective control of 
an investment, can constitute indirect expropriation. Also, there are other cases of 
deprivation that could exclude the qualification of indirect expropriation.  
 
The underlying implications of the international legal regulation of expropriation 
are, firstly, that without paying compensation, a state cannot take expropriation 
measures, and secondly, when a state expropriates a foreign-owned investment 
without paying compensation, it should immediately restore the monetary damage 
suffered by the investor through compensation. Regulation exerts some restraining 
influence in a way that warns a state to mind its international obligations towards a 
foreign investor when it takes measures interfering with a foreign-owned 
investment. With the policy goal of properly and legitimately weighing public and 
private interests, international investment law should help a state make an informed 
and appropriate decision as to whether to expropriate in exercising the right to 
regulate. The advent of the notion of ‘creeping expropriation’ suggests that 
international investment law is facing the challenge of dealing with regulatory 
measures in a wider scope of context than ever before. Accordingly, the task of 
balancing public and private interests in international investment law is becoming 
more complicated.  
 
As for the task of finding indirect expropriation, the deviation from the sole effect 
doctrine reflects that the nature of the task of establishing indirect expropriation is 
shifting from a simple economic calculation to the exercise of normative and 
flexible prudence. In this direction, the concept of regulatory expropriation and the 
principles of international law can be valuable resources when considering whether 
an indirect expropriation has occurred.  
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2.2.4 The Principles of Necessity in International Law, the Necessity 





A state has the right to expropriate a foreign-owned investment under certain 
conditions that have been recognised by customary international law and codified in 
many international investment agreements: public interest, the due process of law, 
non-discrimination, and the payment of compensation. Also, it is unquestionable 
that a state is placed under relevant treaty constraints when exercising this right. If a 
state fails to meet any of these conditions or to comply with the relevant terms of 
international investment agreements in the taking of an expropriatory measure, it 
will constitute an unlawful expropriation. As a consequence, the state is held 
responsible for its unlawful act. In other words, an investment dispute concerning 
whether a lawful or unlawful expropriation has occurred can arise out of a state’s 
alleged violation of its international obligations regarding expropriation under 
customary international law and international investment agreements. Besides the 
four conditions and terms of international investment agreements, there are also 
three types of rules, directly applicable to or offering legal guidance to, investment 
disputes relating to whether a lawful or unlawful expropriation has occurred: (i) the 
rules of international law on state responsibility, in particular, the customary 
principle of necessity; (ii) the so-called Non-Precluded Measures (‘NPM’) clause 
provided for by international investment agreements; and (iii) the necessity 
exception test of the WTO General Exceptions. 
 
Given that a state can expropriate a foreign-owned investment in the exercise of its 
right to regulate for public purpose, the customary principle of necessity and the 
NPM clause are directly applicable to investment cases involving expropriation, 
including regulatory ones, because they especially concern a state’s right to regulate 
its key domestic interests. The WTO general exceptions necessity test, although it 
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concerns a trade case, has a strong potential to provide for useful guidance because 
the necessity test is also related to a state’s exercise of its right to pursue public 
interests. If are used by tribunals or expressly included in treaty texts, WTO-type 
exceptions can provide a useful defence mechanism to protect a host state’s 
regulatory freedom. 
 
First of all, the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (the ILC Draft Articles) provide for rules of international law on 
state responsibility; rules that govern the legal consequences of a state’s breach of 
international obligations. These rules deal with state-to-state disputes and 
investment treaty disputes arising out of a violation of international obligations that 
a state owes other states. In investment treaty arbitration, a foreign investor can refer 
a dispute to an arbitral tribunal in the exercise of the right that is derived from its 
home state’s right under international investment law. In this regard, the ILC Draft 
Articles are directly available as applicable rules to investment treaty arbitration. 
Otherwise, they can provide an adjudicatory body with legal guidance when seeking 
to justify a state’s right to regulate or expropriate under certain circumstances, by 
providing conditions precluding wrongfulness. Among these rules, the Draft 
Articles include the provision concerning necessity, reflecting the customary 
principle of necessity. The NPM clause is also called the ‘essential interest’ 
clause,574 which can be found in Article XI of the US-Argentine BIT and in Article 
18 of the US Model BIT. This type of clause functions by excluding the application 
of BIT provisions to certain measures, which are taken in pursuit of a specific 
designated public interest, such as public order or essential security interests.  
 
The customary principle of necessity and the NPM clause were invoked by 
Argentina in investment disputes that arose in the context of the Argentine 
economic crisis of 2001. In relation to several investment disputes, in which 
                                                
574 Giorgio Sacerdoti, ‘BIT Protection and Economic Crises: Limits to Their Coverage, the 
Impact of Multilateral Financial Regulation and the Defence of Necessity’ (2013) 28(2) 
ICSID Review 351, 356. 
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Argentina defended as the respondent, Argentina pleaded both the principle of 
necessity and the NPM clause. 
 
Also, the notion of ‘necessity’ appears in WTO law, particularly in the WTO 
General Exceptions (GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV). GATT Article XX 
and GATS Article XIV use the necessity exception test in the protection of certain 
public purposes. The necessity exception can be invoked by a state in order to 
justify or defend its violation of international obligations under the WTO law. The 
necessity exception test, which belongs to the WTO regime which regulates 
international trade, may not have an immediate application to investment cases, as 
trade and investment basically fall within different categories and accordingly 
because rules of international trade and rules of international investment cannot be 
equated with each other. Nonetheless, the potential utility of the necessity defence 
for the operation of international investment law demands careful reconsideration 
because it is possible that the necessity exception test can provide useful legal 
guidance in scrutinising a state’s necessity plea under the principles of necessity. In 
the following, the customary principle of necessity and the NPM clause will be 
explored with a view to clarifying their applicability. Also, the necessity exception 
test will be reviewed in order to see its possible utility. 
 
2.2.4.2 The Customary Principle of Necessity and the NPM Clause 
 
The customary principle of necessity is effectively codified in Article 25 of the ILC 
Draft Articles:  
 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a state as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation 
of that State unless the act: 
 
(a) is the only way for the state to safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril; and 
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(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the state or states 
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community 
as a whole. 
 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a state as a ground for 
precluding wrongfulness if: 
 
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of 
invoking necessity; or  
(b) the state has contributed to the situation of necessity.575 
 
According to Article 25, the customary principle of necessity functions to remove 
the unlawfulness of a state’s act by providing for a justifying reason on a limited 
basis. Specifically, the necessity defence serves a certain purpose of protecting an 
essential interest. The notion necessity characterises the relationship between the 
means, a state’s act or measure, and the end, the protection of an essential interest. 
Additionally, the situation (or state) of necessity576 that shapes the relationship has 
evolved through customary international law, covering a range of concepts such as 
military, humanitarian, environmental, and economic necessity. For instance, in the 
Anglo-Portuguese dispute of 1832, property possessed by British subjects was 
confiscated by the Portuguese government in violation of treaty obligations for the 
purpose of providing subsistence for troops engaged in subduing internal 
disturbances.577 It was mutually recognised between the two parties in dispute that: 
 
The treaty could not be so stubborn and unbending a nature … their stipulations 
ought to be so strictly adhered to, as to deprive the Government of Portugal of the 
                                                
575 Article 25 of the UN Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries (2001) Report of the ILC on the Work of its fifty-third 
session. 
576 Article 25(2)(b) of the ILC Draft Articles. 
577 The ILC Draft Articles; Sarah F Hill, ‘The “Necessity Defense” and the Emerging 
Arbitral Conflict in Its Application to the U.S.-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty’ 
(2007) 13 Law & Business Review of the Americas 547, 551.  
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right of using those means, which may be absolutely and indispensably necessary 
to the safety, and even to the very existence of the state.578 
 
State practice acknowledged the doctrine of necessity as inherent, and the principle 
has since been extensively employed in other fields of international law where 
imminent harm entails the suspension of a legal obligation.579 As for humanitarian 
necessity, in the Neptune case, the arbitral tribunal, while having recognised the 
principle of necessity in international law, rejected the British necessity defence for 
justifying its act of confiscation of food owned by Americans in order to supply a 
food shortage in its country. The rejection was based on the reason that the British 
government had failed to exhaust all other alternatives for self-preservation as 
required by the principle. The High Seas Convention permits member states to take 
measures in cases of environmental necessity by providing that: 
 
Parties to the present Convention may take such measures on the high seas as may 
be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their 
coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, 
following upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may 
reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.580 
 
The High Seas Convention codified the customary defence of necessity and 
represents a pre-Draft Articles international agreement regarding the concept of the 
necessity.581 Also, economic necessity is covered by the principle of necessity. For 
example, in Société Commerciale de Belgique, in response to the Greek 
government’s necessity defence based on its refusal to pay the debt owed to a 
Belgian company, action could be justified due to the country’s serious budgetary 
                                                
578 ibid. 
579 ibid. The necessity was also invoked in the Caroline case; ILC Draft Articles, 81; Hill (n 
577) 552. 
580 Article 1(1) of the International Convention relating to Intervention on High Seas in 
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties of 1969; Hill (n 577) 554. 
581 Hill (n 577) 554. 
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and monetary situation.582 The PCIJ implicitly endorsed the principle of necessity. 
Additional cases, related to the Argentine economic crisis of 2001, will be explored 
in order to scrutinise the applicability of the principle to economic emergencies and 
to clarify the relationship between the customary necessity defence and the NPM 
necessity clause.  
 
The NPM clause represents the BIT-based necessity principle. The most frequently 
cited example in relation to the clause is Article XI of the US-Argentine BIT: 
 
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures 
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment of its obligations 
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, 
or the protection of its own essential security interests.583 
 
Also, Article 18(2) of the US Model BIT provides for such a clause for essential 
security: 
 
Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to preclude a Party from applying 
measures that it considers necessary for the fulfilment of its obligations with 
respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the 
protection of its own essential security interests.584 
 
The basic function of the clause is to exclude the application of a treaty from certain 
measures taken in pursuit of the protection of public order or security interests. In 
this regard, the customary principle of necessity and the NPM clause of necessity 
work to relieve a state of responsibility for violations against international 
obligations. 
 
                                                
582 The ILC Draft Articles 82. 
583 Article XI of the US-Argentine BIT (1991). 
584 Article 18(2) of the US Model BIT of 2012. 
147 
 
As previously noted, the necessity defence, whether based on customary 
international law or treaty law, serves to protect certain limited interests. 
Furthermore, the invocation of the necessity defence is limited by several 
conditions. The relationship between the customary principle of necessity and the 
NPM necessity clause should be given close attention because they are different in 
terms of nature and application. It can be observed that arbitral approaches have 
diverged over the understanding of the relationship. Specific conditions and their 
relationships can be more clearly observed by comparatively reviewing the 
Argentine investment cases, in particular, the cases of CMS and LG&E, in which the 
tribunals provided diverging approaches and contrasting conclusions in their 
awards.  
 
Since the beginning of the Argentine economic crisis in around 1982, the Argentine 
government took reform measures, including the privatisation of the public utilities 
sector. Since then, a certain gas tariff regime has existed, under the system of 
government-issued licenses and Argentine regulations, and operated as regulated by 
the Convertibility Law.585 Under the gas tariff regime, tariffs were calculated in 
dollars and adjusted every six months in accordance with the US Producer Price 
Index (US PPI). The Convertibility Law applied a fixed exchange rate with the US 
dollar, setting the value of one peso at one dollar.586 On 6 January 2002, the 
Argentine government enacted the Public Emergency and Exchange Regime 
Reform Act (Public Emergency Act).587 The Public Emergency Act declared a state 
of emergency and accorded certain economic, administrative, financial and 
exchange, and social powers to the Executive, including the authority to renegotiate 
government contracts.588 Under the Act, the gas tariff regime and the Convertibility 
Law ceased to operate, which resulted in a series of arbitration claims at the 
                                                
585 August Reinisch, ‘Necessity in International Investment Arbitration: An Unnecessary 
Split of Opinion in Recent ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. 
Argentina’ (2007) 8 Journal of World Investment & Trade 191, 192–93. 
586 ibid. 




ICSID.589 Among the several cases involving claims against Argentina, the cases of 
CMS and LG&E will be analysed. The tribunals in these cases reached diverging 
conclusions in dealing with the Argentine necessity defence. CMS Gas 
Transmission Company (‘CMS’) had invested in the gas transportation sector that 
conducted business with government-guaranteed licenses, and LG&E owned equity 
interests in various Argentine gas distribution companies. Both claimants contended 
that Argentine emergency measures violated the US-Argentina BIT provisions. In 
its defence, Argentina invoked the necessity principle under customary international 
law and under Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT. The CMS tribunal rejected the 
necessity plea, but the LG&E tribunal accepted it.  
 
In determining whether Argentina was entitled to invoke the necessity defence, the 
CMS and LG&E tribunals took different approaches in defining and applying the 
customary principle of necessity and the US-Argentina BIT necessity clause. There 
are three perspectives concerning the relationship: (i) the confluence; (ii) the treaty-
based necessity as lex specialis; and (iii) the separation of primary and secondary 
applications.590 From the perspective of the CMS tribunal, the customary principle 
of necessity and the BIT necessity were conflated. Article 25(2)(a) of the ILC Draft 
Articles provides that when the ‘international obligation in question excludes the 
possibility of invoking necessity’, it renders the necessity defence unavailable.591 
The ILC Commentary stated that this would concern, in particular, treaties 
excluding either ‘explicitly or implicitly’ reliance on necessity.592 The CMS tribunal 
admitted that the US-Argentina BIT may constitute such a treaty excluding the 
possibility of invoking necessity and that such exclusion need not be explicit but can 
be evidenced implicitly ‘by the very object and purpose of the treaty’.593 This 
indicates the confluent relationship between the customary principle of necessity 
                                                
589 Reinisch (n 585) 193. 
590 Jürgen Kurtz, ‘Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law: Security, 
Public Order and Financial Crisis’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
325. 
591 Article 25(2)(a) of the ILC Draft Articles with commentary. 
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and the BIT necessity.594 The second perspective is to view and prioritise the treaty-
based necessity as lex specialis, which establishes a specific advancement or 
updating of the general customary law.595 Taking this perspective, the LG&E 
tribunal provided that it would consider the BIT first and, in the ‘absence of explicit 
provisions’, general international law.596 The tribunal primarily relied on Article XI 
of the US-Argentina BIT in finding the validity of the necessity defence and then 
had recourse to Article 25 of the Draft Articles merely in confirming its 
conclusion.597 The third perspective relates to the treaty provisions at issue, whether 
they concern an obligation or exception, as primary legal standards that determine 
whether a state has committed an internationally wrongful act.598 Once any breach is 
determined by the treaty law, then the secondary scrutiny starts to determine 
whether the customary defence of necessity could justify the wrongful act.599 In fact, 
the difference between the second and the third perspectives is small, but the latter 
has the advantage of clarifying the treaty law as a ‘first-order primary norm’.600 
Although the CMS and LG&E tribunals took different perspectives as to the 
relationship, they agreed that they could extend the potential invocation of a state of 
necessity to situations of economic emergency. 601  Nonetheless, they reached 
contrasting conclusions. The former tribunal did not accept the necessity plea 
because, even though the situation was severe, it was not sufficient for a finding of 
necessity.602 The latter tribunal accepted the plea because Argentina’s essential 
                                                
594 Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic (Award) 9 September 2007 (ICSID 
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interests were threatened.603 In reaching their own specific conclusions, they were 
confronted with certain issues: (i) whether the state’s act was the only course of 
action it could have taken604 (the only way test); (ii) whether Article XI of the BIT is 
a self-judging clause; (iii) whether Argentina contributed to the crisis;605 and (iv) 
whether the necessity defence can exclude the obligation to pay compensation. 
 
On the first issue, the tribunals clearly reached different conclusions. The CMS 
tribunal applied the test strictly and concluded that Argentina failed to meet the test 
because of the availability of other means, ‘even if they may be more costly or less 
convenient’, indicating that the measures in question were not the only ones 
available.606 On the other hand, the LG&E tribunal, although admitting that there 
might be other ways available to respond to the economic crisis, concluded that the 
measure taken was necessary according to the evidence presented to it.607 In relation 
to the question of whether Article XI of the BIT is a self-judging clause, the CMS 
tribunal recognised that such a self-judging clause could have been created by state 
parties expressly if they intended to do so.608 A good example is Article XXI(b) of 
the GATT, which provides that ‘Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed … to 
prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests’. 
 
The CMS tribunal noted that in the absence of the expressed intention to create a 
self-judging clause, an adjudicator and not the state concerned would retain the 
jurisdiction to judge, and concluded that Article XI of the BIT was not a self-
judging clause.609 The LG&E tribunal also concluded that it was not self-judging, on 
the basis of the consideration of the intent of the parties.610  
 
                                                
603 LG&E (n 596) para 257. 
604 Article 25(1)(a) of the ILC Draft Articles. 
605 Article 25(2)(b) of the ILC Draft Articles. 
606 CMS (n 309) para 324. 
607 LG&E (n 596) para 257. 
608 CMS (n 309) para 370. 
609 ibid paras 371–72. 
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The two tribunals had a common understanding that contribution could exclude the 
possibility of the necessity invocation. However, the CMS tribunal found that 
Argentina ‘significantly contributed’ to the crisis,611 whereas the LG&E tribunal 
found no evidence indicating that Argentina contributed to the crisis.612 The ILC 
Draft Articles Commentary requires that ‘the contribution to the situation of 
necessity must be sufficiently substantial and not merely incidental or peripheral’.613 
In this regard, the CMS tribunal more closely reflected the ILC Draft Articles’ 
‘substantial contribution’ test. The remaining issue is whether the necessity defence 
can exclude the obligation to pay compensation. Article 27(b) of the ILC Articles 
provides that the invocation of necessity is ‘without prejudice to the question of 
compensation for any material loss caused by the act in question’. The ILC 
commentary clarifies that the ‘compensation’ included in subparagraph (b) of 
Article 27 is different from the ‘compensation within the framework of reparation 
for wrongful conduct, which is the subject of Article 34’.614 It supported the 
characterisation by explaining that: 
 
It is concerned with the question whether a state relying on a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness should nonetheless be expected to make good any 
material loss suffered by any state directly affected. The reference to ‘material 
loss’ is narrower than the concept of damage elsewhere in the articles: Article 27 
concerns only the adjustment of losses that may occur when a party relies on a 
circumstance covered by Chapter 5.615 
 
The court in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case made a supportive statement that the 
invocation of necessity could not remove the binding force of treaty obligations 
and concluded that the invocation would not exempt Hungary from its obligation 
                                                
611 CMS (n 309) para 329. 
612 LG&E (n 596) para 257. 
613 The ILC Draft Articles Commentaries, 205; CMS (n 309) para 328. 
614 The ILC Draft Articles Commentary, 86. 
615 ibid.  
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to compensate.616 The CMS tribunal took the position that the invocation of the 
necessity could not affect the obligation, ‘The plea of state of necessity may 
preclude the wrongfulness of an act, but it does not exclude the duty to compensate 
the owner of the right which had to be sacrificed’.617 
 
The LG&E tribunal, however, drew a different interpretation from Article 27(b) of 
the ILC Draft Articles. It provided that: 
 
Article 27 of the ILC’s Draft Articles, as well as Article XI of the Treaty, does not 
specify if any compensation is payable to the party affected by losses during the 
state of necessity. … this Tribunal had decided that the damages suffered during 
the state of necessity should be borne by the investor.618 
 
The necessity defence can be relied on by a state temporarily, as long as the 
situation of necessity lasts. When such a situation ceases to exist, the original 
obligation will be restored. In this regard, it is more acceptable to understand that a 
state invoking the plea of necessity is still obliged to pay compensation for loss that 
resulted from the suspension of the fulfilment of international obligations. It seems 
that the CMS tribunal’s position is more persuasive.  
 
Thus far, it has been observed how the principle of necessity in international law 
can operate. The customary principle of necessity and the treaty-based necessity 
defence can apply to a case involving the violation of an international obligation in 
combination or otherwise. As a general principle of law, if the NPM clause is not 
available, only the former can apply. Setting aside the direct application of the 
principles of necessity, it can be questioned whether the principles, which play the 
role of justifying a state’s act in international law, may offer certain implications on 
occasions where a state, in response to an economic emergency, expropriates a 
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foreign-owned investment in the exercise of its regulatory power or, in so doing, 
abuses its police power authority. The same question can be cast with regard to the 
necessity exception in WTO law. In the following, the WTO General Exceptions 
will be reviewed to seek the relevant implications. 
 
2.2.4.3 The Necessity Defence Based on the WTO General 
Exceptions 
 
The WTO General Exceptions indicate GATT Article XX, which allows member 
states to exceptionally evade GATT obligations in limited circumstances. GATT 
Article XX in particular provides for the necessity test for certain purposes, as 
follows: 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; … and 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement …619 
 
GATT Article XX consists of the chapeau that prescribes the basic conditions and 
specific exceptions, such as public morals and human health. This structure reflects 
that the Article XX analysis is two-tiered. Firstly, the measure at issue must meet 
the criteria of each specific exception and, secondly, the measure at issue must fulfil 
the requirements provided by the chapeau. GATS Article XIV is modelled on 
                                                




GATT Article XX and it shares the same chapeau with GATT Article XX, but 
shows slight differences: GATS Article XIV provides: 
 
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement …620 
 
It contains the additional exception ‘necessary to maintain public order’ in 
subparagraph (a). The necessity exception test, which is based on WTO law, 
obviously concerns trade, not investment. Both are not equitable. Accordingly, it 
does not constitute a directly applicable rule for investment disputes. Even so, it 
should be noted that trade and investment are deeply interrelated. Furthermore, 
GATS can in fact affect an investment. GATS covers trade in services and one of 
the modes of supply of trade in services is ‘commercial presence’.621 Commercial 
presence is defined as ‘any type of business or professional establishment, including 
through (i) the constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person, or (ii) 
the creation or maintenance of a branch or a representative office’.622 Thus, the 
notion of commercial presence falls within the concept of investment. In this regard, 
WTO law and international investment law share common subject matter, namely, 
investment, and the WTO General Exceptions or GATS Article XIV can influence 
measures that affect an investment. Besides this connection between ‘trade in 
services’ and investment, the necessity exception test can potentially shed light on 
the extent to which a state can justifiably exercise the right to expropriate in pursuit 
of public interests. 
 
As touched upon above, the operation of the necessity exception test is two-tiered. 
To explain this more specifically, in the first stage, the task is to identify whether a 
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(1995). 
621 Article I(2)(c) Scope and Definition of GATS. 
622 Article XXVIII Definitions of GATS. 
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measure at issue falls within any specific exception. It should be noted that under 
WTO law, WTO member states can enjoy the discretion to determine their own 
regulatory objectives and the level at which they wish to seek to fulfil them.623 In 
other words, WTO members have the right to determine the level of protection of a 
certain purpose that they consider proper in a given circumstance.624 Subsequent to 
identifying the regulatory objectives, such as public morals, human life, and health, 
a weighing and balancing analysis must be conducted. The factors to be weighed 
and balanced are the contribution of the measure at issue to the regulatory purpose 
and the restrictive impact of the measure on international trade.625 This is the so-
called ‘minimum derogation principle’.626 This principle inquires whether there are 
alternative measures available that would be as effective as the one taken, being 
either WTO consistent or, if not WTO consistent, are less trade restrictive than the 
measure taken.627 This can be called the ‘less-restrictive measure test’. In the next 
stage, the chapeau analysis seeks to find out whether a state invoking the necessity 
exception meets the two preconditions laid out in the chapeau. First, the state must 
demonstrate that the measure taken is not applied in a manner that constitutes a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail.628 Secondly, any such measure should not constitute a disguised 
restriction on trade.629  
 
                                                
623 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines 
WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, para 7.120; Benn McGrady, ‘Necessity 
Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory 
Measures’ (2009) 12(1) Journal of International Economic Law 153, 156. 
624 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para 168. 
McGrady (n 625) 156. 
625 McGrady (n 623) 160. 
626  Kevin C Kennedy, International Trade Regulation: Readings, Cases, Notes, and 
Problems (Aspen 2009) 270. 
627 ibid. 




A good example case is the case concerning Brazil’s import ban of tyres.630 This 
was when Brazil placed a ban on the importation of used and remoulded tyres, for 
the purpose of the protection of human health. The EU filed a complaint against 
Brazil and the Panel found that the Brazilian measure was justifiable under Article 
XX(b), but that it failed to meet the terms of the Article XX chapeau. In conducting 
its analysis of the necessity of the import ban, the Panel first examined the 
contribution of the ban to the fulfilment of the objective. It observed that the 
objective of the ban was the reduction of the ‘exposure to the risks to human, animal 
or plant life or health arising from the accumulation of waste tyres’631 and also that 
‘Brazil’s chosen level of protection was the reduction of the risks of waste tyre 
accumulation to the maximum extent possible’.632 It concluded that in consideration 
of the significance of the interests protected by the objective of the ban, the 
contribution of the ban to the fulfilment of its objective outweighed its trade 
restrictiveness. The Panel then analysed possible alternatives to the ban. It found no 
other alternatives. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion. 
 
There is an important area in which the WTO necessity exception test may prove 
useful. In the application of the principle of necessity, one of the reasons that the 
CMS and LG&E tribunals reached different conclusions was that they diverged on 
how strictly the only way test should apply. The CMS tribunal, having taken a strict 
approach, reasoned that if other means existed, the measures at issue could not meet 
the only way test, no matter how much they cost or the inconvenience caused. On 
the other hand, the LG&E tribunal, taking a rather lenient approach, concluded that 
despite the availability of other means, it could decide that the measures at issue 
were necessary. In the former case, the CMS tribunal applied the test very strictly 
and, in the latter case, the LG&E tribunal left the criterion of the only way test 
unclear.  
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If ‘trade restrictive’ can be replaced with ‘investment restrictive’, and if the less 
investment restrictive measure test can be incorporated into the only way test, the 
less restrictive measure test can supplement the application of the only way test by 
mediating the CMS tribunal’s strict application of the test and the LG&E tribunal’s 
ambiguous application of the test. Therefore, if the arbitral tribunal had employed 
this elaborated test in applying the principle of necessity, and there was a less 
restrictive investment measure as an alternative to Argentina’s emergency measures, 




Along with the four conditions that are required for lawful expropriation, the 
principles of necessity can be invoked in order to justify the lawfulness of the 
expropriation when the fact of expropriation has been established. As noted, the 
interpretation and application of the principles of necessity are based on an 
appropriate understanding of the relationship between the customary principle of 
necessity and the BIT-based necessity principle. Because key constituents of the 
principles of necessity include such protections as the protection of public order and 
the protection of essential interests, the principles of necessity are very likely to be 
contested in investment cases involving issues of regulatory expropriation that also 
include regulatory power and public purpose as key elements. Regulatory 
expropriation will be explored in the following chapter in detail. The WTO 
necessity exception test, being the least restrictive measure test, can for now pave 
the way to developing a more elaborated manner of interpreting and applying the 
principle of necessity. It is expected that further subsequent research will reveal the 







Chapter 3: Regulatory Expropriation 
 
 




A governmental taking of private property can be an issue in the domestic legal 
arena as well as in the field of international law. Even though a governmental taking 
of its own citizen’s private property and a governmental taking of foreign-owned 
property cannot be simply equated, both events share the inherent feature of a 
government’s regulatory interference with property rights. There is a paucity of 
clarity in customary international law and international investment agreements 
concerning how to establish and evaluate the notion of expropriation. Because 
similar principles or rules of law exist, a close analysis of the domestic legal regime 
regarding expropriation can be a useful way to enlighten legal understanding of 
expropriation; in particular, in terms of the relationship between sovereignty and 
private property. The advent of the concept ‘regulatory expropriation’ represents the 
tension that occurs in the relationship between sovereignty and private property, 
which raises a critical question as to when a state’s sovereign regulation can 
justifiably interfere with private property. The same question arises in the domestic 
legal system. Regulatory expropriation originates from indirect expropriation, which 
is equated with direct expropriation in international investment law.  
 
The concept of expropriation has evolved beyond the original and traditional form 
of expropriation, which is direct expropriation or nationalisation, to encompass a 
certain range of indirect expropriation, such as incidental, creeping, consequential, 
or de facto expropriations, which are characterised as exerting a depriving economic 
effect in the absence of direct taking. Two basic elements take a central place in 
articulating the underlying framework of international law on both direct and 
indirect expropriation. These are the ‘property’ to be protected against expropriation 
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under international law and ‘a taking’ or ‘an expropriation’ that denotes a 
deprivation of foreign-owned property. There exist many principles and rules that 
arbitral tribunals and domestic courts have employed in relation to these two key 
elements. Among them, focus will be placed on the 5th Amendment of the US 
Constitution (the so-called US Takings Clause), the NAFTA rules on expropriation, 
and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR regarding expropriation. Immediately 
observable is that these provisions exhibit the use of similar terminology regarding 
expropriation.  
 
The 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution, the so-called US Takings 
Clause, provides that ‘nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation’.633 NAFTA, at Article 1110(1), provides provisions dealing with 
expropriation and compensation: 
 
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalise or expropriate an investment of 
an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment (expropriation), except: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and 
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraph 2 through 6. 
 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention (Article 1 of Protocol No 
1) sets out specific regulation on the protection of property: 
 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
                                                
633 The 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.634 
 
It can be observed that the US Takings Clause and NAFTA Article 1110 share key 
concepts, even though they may be slightly different in relation to prescription, and 
retain shared core notions that can be grouped, such as a ‘property’ (the 5th 
Amendment) and an ‘investment’ (Article 1110), a ‘taking’ (the 5th Amendment) 
and an ‘expropriation’ (Article 1110), ‘public use’ (the 5th Amendment) and a 
‘public purpose’ (Article 1110), and ‘just compensation’ (the 5th Amendment) and 
‘compensation’ (Article 1110). Unlike the 5th Amendment and Article 1110, Article 
1 of Protocol No 1 includes terms which in effect share common key notions, such 
as deprivation, possession, and public interest, but do not explicitly call for 
compensation. US law on expropriation is of long standing and has the potential to 
enlighten on principles concerning a state’s regulatory taking of an individual’s 
property. The practice of the European Convention system regarding expropriation 
deserves close attention because it contains provisions that exhibit relatively 
detailed formulations describing expropriation and other types of a state’s 
interferences with a property. An individual and comparative review of those 
provisions, rules, and principles will reveal whether they indicate shared ideas or 
principles behind their language, and, if they do, whether they can provide some 
useful guidance and contribution in the development of ideas concerning 
international law on expropriation in general and regulatory expropriation in 
particular.  
 
3.0.2 US Takings Clause Doctrine 
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The 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution (the US Takings Clause) 
provides that ‘nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation’.635 The basic spirit of the Amendment is directed at restraining the 
government from taking private property without affording a fair reward and, by so 
doing, safeguarding personal liberty.636 In the United States, the Supreme Court has 
played a major role in shaping rules on governmental takings and compensation. 
The relevant jurisprudence and theories have accordingly developed as the court’s 
jurisprudence evolved regarding the scope of protected property and what 
constitutes a taking under the 5th Amendment.  
 
The earlier approaches taken to distinguish a taking from the police power 
regulation were the ‘physical invasion test’ and subsequently the ‘diminution of 
economic value test’. Firstly, the physical invasion test was put forward by Justice 
Harlan in Mugler v Kansas.637 This test drew on the conception of property as 
‘things-property’, which indicated a thing that is subject to the owner’s rights of 
‘free use, enjoyment, and disposal’.638 In this case, Justice Harlan concluded that the 
regulation concerned did not constitute a taking because no deprivation of property 
for the public interest occurred and it only imposed a limitation on the use of the 
property owner.639 The weakness of the physical invasion test has been revealed in 
the face of Wesley Hohfeld’s criticism that property cannot be things; property can 
only be ‘rights over things’.640 The term ‘property’ can only denote the claims, 
                                                
635 The 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
636 Molly S McUsic, ‘Redistribution and the Takings Clause: A Progressive Critique’ in 
David Kairys (ed), The Politics of Law (3rd edn, Basic Books 1998) 617. 
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Reasoning (Greenwood Press 1978). See Wenar (n 638) 1926. 
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privileges, powers, and immunities, which people retain, affording them control 
over ‘objects and spaces’.641  
 
The approach that subsequently emerged was the ‘diminution of economic value’ 
test, which materialised from the judgment of Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal 
Co v Mahon. In this case, the court held that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting all 
coal mining would drive the town atop the mines out of business.642 The test 
prescribed that the government could lawfully regulate a private property insofar as 
the regulation did not ‘go too far’ in diminishing the value of the property.643 
However, if the regulation went too far, it would be regarded as a taking.644 The test 
seeks to balance a wide range of factors in determining whether the action went too 
far or ‘unfairly singled out an owner’.645 The test relied neither on the property as 
things nor on the property as rights notion, and instead put primary focus on the loss 
of economic value sustained by the property owner in distinguishing compensable 
takings from uncompensable regulations.646 
 
With regard to takings claims, two US Supreme Court decisions left diverging 
precedents in the cases of Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City (1978) 
and Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992). In Penn Central, New 
York City denied the claimant the Grand Central development scheme pursuant to 
the Landmark Preservation Law that prohibited the construction of a large building 
above Grand Central Terminal for the purpose of the protection of architectural 
structures.647 The court took three factors into account in deciding in favour of the 
city: (i) the economic impact of the measure; (ii) the reasonable investment-backed 
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expectation; and (iii) the character of the measure.648 On the other hand, in Lucas v 
South Carolina Coastal Council, the court advocated the rule that a regulation 
constitutes a compensable taking if it deprived a property owner of ‘all 
economically beneficial uses’.649 
 
Subsequently, US jurisprudence on takings, while not fully giving up the balancing 
method, has substituted it for a new doctrinal test, which is less favourable to 
governmental regulation. Along with the change, the court focused on two key 
considerations: (i) whether the regulation impinges on ‘essential’ or ‘fundamental’ 
property rights, and (ii) whether the regulation ‘substantially advances’ public 
interests.650 Firstly, the ‘essential’ or ‘core’ of property rights has been the so-called 
dominion interest in land-interests based on the right to control real property.651  
 
In Loretta v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp,652 the court denied the validity of 
a New York statute requiring that a landlord endure the installation of cable 
television facilities on his or her property for the reason that if a law deprived the 
whole bundle of dominion interests by prohibiting a property owner from 
possessing, using, or disposing of a part of his or her property, it was a per se 
taking.653 The primary dominion interest to be afforded almost full compensation in 
response to the government’s regulation was ‘possession’.654 In the two cases of 
Nollan v California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v City of Tigard, the 
government issued a development permit for an expanded building on condition that 
the property owners provided a public easement. The court held that the loss of the 
right to exclude an outgrowth of the government’s public easement requirement 
made that requirement unconstitutional.655 The court extended its attention from 
                                                
648 ibid. 
649 505 US 10003 (1992). The Lucas case is recognised as undermining Penn Central 
jurisprudence. Kahn (n 647) 409. 
650 McUsic (n 636) 625. 
651 ibid. 
652 458 US 419. 





possession and began to take into account all economically valuable uses of 
property.  
 
In Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, the court, in addressing South 
Carolina’s law inhibiting the build-up of any habitable object in a designated 
‘critical area’ along its coastline, as gauged by annual erosion rates, found a taking, 
stating that the regulation cannot interfere with all the economically valuable uses of 
property, except in rare cases. The jurisprudence on the finding of a taking 
expanded the scope of essential property rights, encompassing such rights as the 
owner’s right to leave a rental business and the right to control a disposition of 
land;656 nevertheless, it did not accept the finding of a taking where the regulation 
merely restrained profits or prices, or diminished the market value of property.657  
 
The ‘substantially advance test’ was adopted as the court took a stricter stance than 
the ‘rational basis’ scrutiny in analysing the relation between the owner, the 
regulation, and public interests.658 Since the late 1930s, property rights have been 
subject to a ‘rational basis test’, a test required for the law concerned to be valid. 
This requires that a rational basis be established between the government’s end and 
the means taken by it.659 On the other hand, the ‘substantially advance test’, a more 
strictly modified test, was adopted in the analysis of takings cases since Nollan in 
1987. In this case, the California Coastal Commission, as the California Coastal 
Act660 required, prohibited the Nollans from constructing a family residence on their 
beachfront land unless they provided, on their land, for a public access easement to 
the beach.661 The court nullified the requirement of an easement for public access to 
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the beach on the ground that the permit requirement did not ‘substantially advance a 
legitimate state interest’.662 The ‘substantially advance test’ is based on two sub-
tests: a means-end test and a cause-effect test. The court prescribed that the 
‘substantially advance test’ consists of a means-end sub-test that scrutinises whether 
the regulation in practice accomplishes its stated purpose by the means of its 
choosing, and a cause-effect sub-test that examines whether there exists a 
proportionate basis between the amount of public harm caused by the owner and the 
burden that the regulation imposed.663  
 
5th Amendment jurisprudence was supplemented by the court’s decision in Lingle v 
Chevron USA, Inc.664 In this case, the claimant complained of a Hawaiian statute 
prescribing the limit of rent that oil companies could obtain from their dealers. The 
lower courts held that the statute ‘fails to substantially advance a legitimate State 
interest, and as such, effects an unconstitutional taking’. 665  The higher court 
reversed this decision, concluding that the purpose and efficacy of a certain 
regulation is not to be taken into account under the Takings Clause.666 After Lingle, 
jurisprudence rendered the consideration of the purpose and efficacy of government 
acts irrelevant in deciding whether to compensate.667 The Takings Clause postulates 
that the government takes a measure for a legitimate public purpose.668  
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The US Takings Clause doctrine has its root in the principle that the need for 
property protection can impose a certain degree of limits on a regulatory action. It 
evolved in a way that expanded the scope of property rights to be protected by 
redefining the definition of property, from things to rights, and encompassing the 
focus on the economically valuable use of property. The doctrine also refined the 
analysis of the connection between property rights, the government regulation’s 
public purpose and means, and the regulatory burden on the owner. There exists a 
basic difference in the respective spirits of the US Takings Clause doctrine and 
international law on expropriation. The latter seeks to afford investment protection, 
whereas the US takings law intends to protect individual liberty and rights from 
unfair governmental regulation. Nonetheless, it will be shown, by way of the 
following analysis, that there exists an indication of kinship between the US 
Takings Clause doctrine and NAFTA and European expropriation rules, in light of 
the underlying balancing principle and the framework of the ends-means and the 
cause-effect test. 
 
3.0.3 The NAFTA Expropriation Rule 
 
As is true of other arbitral tribunals, the NAFTA tribunal normally confronts two 
key questions: (i) whether an interest concerned falls within the definition of 
investment, and (ii) whether the regulatory measure in question constitutes a taking; 
both under NAFTA Article 1110. Thus, the primary task is to construe the definition 
of the investment to be protected under NAFTA. For instance, in a case involving 
cigarette packaging, Philip Morris International claimed that Canadian legislation 
requiring plain packaging constituted an expropriation under NAFTA.669 Carla 
Hills, a former US trade representative who joined NAFTA negotiations, supported 
this claim, maintaining that the company’s interests fell within the scope of the 
definition of investment in NAFTA provisions: an investment is ‘real estate or other 
property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose 
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Canada’ (1996) 46 University of Toronto Law Journal 499, 525.  
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of economic benefit or other business purposes’670 and that the plain packaging 
requirement would constitute a taking of the company’s registered trademark, 
entailing the obligation of compensation for the company. In Pope & Talbot, the 
tribunal accepted Pope & Talbot’s claim that its market access is a property interest 
that is afforded protection by NAFTA Article 1110.671 In SD Myers, beyond market 
access, market share was recognised as a property interest to be protected by Article 
1110.  
 
The second issue is what constitutes a taking under NAFTA. In Glamis Gold, 
Glamis Gold argued that the United States unduly delayed approval of its gold-
mining project and that the state of California made the project economically 
unviable by employing an obligatory backfilling requirement for the reason of 
protecting a Native American area, alleging that all actions constituted a violation of 
Article 1110. The tribunal rejected Glamis Gold’s claim, stating that neither the 
backfilling requirement nor the interim denial of the project in 2001 constituted 
direct or indirect expropriation.672 The tribunal stated that an expropriation would 
consist of an ‘action that is confiscatory or that unreasonably interferes with, or 
unduly delays, effective enjoyment of the property’, 673  and that an indirect 
expropriation could occur when the state’s interference with a property right is 
eternal and ‘renders almost without value the rights remaining with the investor’, 
while not involving the transfer of title.674 The tribunal considered that the claimant 
formally owned its mining rights and could perform its mining work, and that the 
denial of the project was temporary and the backfilling requirement did not remove 
the project’s economic value.675 The case of DESONA involved the claim that a 
regulatory act constituted both direct expropriation and indirect expropriation. In 
DESONA, the claimant alleged that the nullification of DESONA’s fifteen-year 
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concession contract to provide waste-related services to the city of Naucalpan 
constituted the direct expropriation of DESONA’s contractual rights and the indirect 
expropriation of DESONA itself.676 The tribunal found that the contract was duly 
invalidated by the Mexican courts on the basis of DESONA’s grave ‘irregularities’ 
and failure of compliance; thus DESONA’s claim was rejected.677  
 
As highlighted in Glamis Gold and DESONA, both direct and indirect 
expropriations can exist. Furthermore, NAFTA Article 1110 provides for additional 
language besides direct or indirect nationalisation or expropriation. It is ‘a measure 
tantamount to nationalisation or expropriation’.678 In relation to this, an issue arises 
as to whether the language is intended to create a new treaty-based expropriation or 
simply reflects what would exist within a broad concept of indirect expropriation as 
recognised by customary international law. The United States, Mexico, and Canada 
have all agreed that this language did not create a new type of expropriation beyond 
what would be prescribed by customary international law.679 In relation to the 
finding of an expropriation, the prime and unavoidable issue is how to distinguish 
an expropriation and a lawful regulatory interference with private property that does 
not incur compensation. NAFTA tribunals have shown some differences. The SD 
Myers tribunal definitively drew a clear line between expropriation and non-
discriminatory regulatory acts, depending on whether the regulatory acts concerned 
involved the deprivation of ownership or only amounted to a lesser interference.680 
The Pope & Talbot tribunal, while admitting the probability that regulatory acts 
falling within the concept of police powers per se would not amount to 
expropriation, stated that ‘regulations can indeed be exercised in a way that would 
constitute a creeping expropriation’.681 The Metalclad tribunal also noted that 
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‘covert or incidental interference’ with the use of property could constitute 
expropriation.682 The SD Myers tribunal took a rather simple approach by relying on 
the different degrees of interference with property, recognising that a deprivation of 
property constitutes an expropriation, whereas the tribunals in Pope & Talbot and 
Metalclad accepted that what began as a normal regulatory interference which fell 
short of a deprivation had the potential of developing into an expropriation.  
 
Once it is concluded that the investment at issue is entitled to protection under 
NAFTA Article 1110, it will be appropriate for investment arbitral tribunals to 
become involved in embarking upon further in-depth analysis. The NAFTA tribunal 
employs the approach, similar to that taken by the US Penn Central Court, of 
considering three main factors: (1) the economic impact of a regulation; (2) the 
claimant’s expectation; and (3) the character of a government action.683 However, 
NAFTA and US jurisprudences are different in dealing with the second factor.  
 
First of all, the NAFTA tribunals evaluate the economic impact of a regulation, just 
as the US Takings Clause doctrine does. They require a substantial economic impact 
in order to find whether a regulatory action violates Article 1110. For instance, in 
Metalclad v Mexico, the tribunal held that an Ecological Decree, issued by a 
Mexican state governor, had the effect of permanently preventing the operation of 
the landfill property owned by the claimant, and ‘effectively and permanently 
prevented the use by Metalclad of its investment’.684 In Pope & Talbot, the tribunal 
declined the claimant’s argument that Canada’s limitation on softwood lumber 
exports constituted an Article 1110 expropriation for the reason that it merely 
caused insubstantial economic impact.685  
 
The second factor to be considered by arbitral tribunals is ‘the investor’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectations’ – also the starting point for the US courts in 
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analysing the investor’s expectation.686 This consideration is derived from the 
NAFTA preamble prescribing that states parties ‘ensure a predictable commercial 
framework for business planning and investment’. 687  The expectation enquiry 
begins with a question as to the level of regulation; it is whether the claimant 
conducts business in a ‘highly regulated industry’.688 In Mathanex, the tribunal did 
not accept the claim of a Canadian manufacturer of the prime MTBE ingredient, 
methanol, that California’s prohibition of the gasoline additive MEBE violated 
Article 1110. The reason for this was that even though the prohibition undermined 
the economic value of the claimant’s investment, the actual business environment of 
the industry was ‘highly regulated’ and should be taken into account in the enquiry 
in relation to the investor’s expectation.689 In the second phase of the investment 
expectation enquiry, NAFTA tribunals and the US Takings Clause doctrine diverge 
in relation to their respective focus. NAFTA tribunals verify whether the investor 
indeed obtained ‘specific assurances’, so much so that it could proceed with its 
operation that was nullified by a regulatory measure.690 However, the US Takings 
Clause doctrine asks whether the challenged regulatory act was ‘foreseeable’ or 
could have been ‘reasonably anticipated’ in view of the ‘regulatory environment’.691 
The Methanex tribunal required that specific commitments be provided for by the 
government for a regulation to be neither expropriatory nor compensable.692  
 
With regard to the final factor, NAFTA tribunals, and the US courts that act under 
the Takings Clause doctrine, both consider the character of governmental acts. 
However, it has become rather unclear as to whether the Takings Clause doctrine 
has modified the approach to the character factor subsequent to the Lingle decision. 
On the other hand, NAFTA tribunals seem to have departed from their traditional 
position in considering the character of governmental acts, as shown in the cases of 
                                                
686 ibid 424. 
687 NAFTA preamble. 
688 ibid; see Kahn (n 647) 424. 
689 Kahn (n 647). 
690 ibid 425. 




Fireman’s Fund, Corn Products and Glamis Gold. Even though the US court in 
Penn Central Transportation took into account the character of governmental acts, 
along with two additional factors,693 as in the Lingle case, it did not further accept 
that the purpose and the effectiveness of governmental acts would be relevant under 
the doctrine. It put forward that the doctrine would presuppose that the government 
acted in pursuit of a legitimate public purpose.694 Under Article 1110 of NAFTA, 
the tribunal in SD Myers accepted that ‘it is appropriate to examine the purpose and 
effect of governmental measures’.695 According to the tribunal, the purpose and 
effect of government regulations are considered for the finding of an 
expropriation.696 However, the Fireman’s Fund tribunal took the position that ‘the 
effects of the host State’s measures are dispositive, not the underlying intent, for 
determining whether there is expropriation’.697 This position was subsequently 
accepted by the Corn Products International tribunal.698 The tribunal in Glamis 
Gold also considered the character of government regulation, but in a different way. 
In the finding of an expropriation, the tribunal placed its primary emphasis on a 
‘sufficient economic impact to effect an expropriation’;699 however, it did not 
explore the character at this stage. Instead, it acknowledged that the character – for 
instance, a non-discriminatory ‘bona fide regulation’700 – could be a determining 
factor, which requires consideration in order for a state to be exempt from 
responsibility. Quoting from the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, the 
tribunal held that ‘a state is not responsible … for loss of property or for other 
economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide … regulation if it is not 
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discriminatory’.701 In this respect, NAFTA expropriation jurisprudence seems to 
move away from the position set out in SD Myers. One question thus remains as to 
whether the purpose or character of a governmental act, even though it may not 
serve for finding an expropriation, functions only as an exemption justification; this 
will be reviewed later in relation to regulatory expropriation. 
 
It can be inferred that in the context of NAFTA, NAFTA Article 1110 could be 
broadly construed in a way that expands the scope of application beyond the reach 
of the US Takings Clause doctrine. This inference can be drawn by focusing on the 
two key elements factored into arbitral award-making: (1) the scope of takings, and 
(2) the level of compensation. The first question in identifying the scope of takings 
is the definition of the property to be protected. The US Takings Clause doctrine 
concentrates on real property, namely, land and the benefits stemming from the use 
of land.702 Thus, the US Takings Clause doctrine has mainly been concerned with 
certain questions, such as where the borderline of the land affected by the regulation 
can be drawn and whether the right affected by the regulation is so fundamental to 
ownership that the nullification of the right has the equivalent effect of a physical 
deprivation of the land.703 The US Supreme Court employed a narrower scope to 
property that it deems to be worthy of protection than that adopted by NAFTA 
tribunals. In Andrus v Allard, the court dealt with a claim that a ban on the 
transaction of specific goods amounted to a taking. This claim was rejected, and the 
court stated that the property could be economically used in alternative ways.704 The 
conclusion was premised on the opinion that a mere deprivation of one ‘strand’ 
from a full bundle of rights would not constitute a taking.705 On the other hand, 
some NAFTA tribunal have shown that it does not deny the entitlement to 
protection for a specific right stemming from a bundle of property rights. In the case 
of Pope & Talbot, the tribunal did not accept the expropriation claims. However, it 
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did embrace the claimant’s claim that the right to sell its product in a certain 
market,706 namely, the right to market access, can constitute an investment that is 
subject to the protection against expropriation provision under NAFTA, and thus it 
demonstrated that it would construe the definition of property subject to protection 
more expansively than the US Takings Clause doctrine.  
 
As for compensation, the NAFTA expropriation rule and the US Takings Clause 
doctrine can show stark differences when dealing with the compensation 
requirement, especially as to whether a judicial act can constitute a taking and thus 
incur the obligation of compensation. US courts have not accepted that a claim for a 
judicial taking may be established. For instance, in Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav 
Co v Hill, the court held that the  
 
mere fact that a state court has rendered an erroneous decision on a question of 
state law, or has overruled principles or doctrines established by previous 
decisions on which a party relied, does not give rise to a claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment,707  
 
Whereas, NAFTA tribunals have accepted the possibility that a judicial act could 
constitute an expropriation in violation of NAFTA Article 1110. For instance, in the 
Loewen case, Loewen claimed that a series of judicial decisions made unfavourably 
to Loewen constituted an expropriation in violation of NAFTA Article 1110. The 
defending United States opposed the arbitration’s jurisdiction, on the ground that a 
judicial decision cannot fall within the concept of a ‘measure’ in NAFTA Article 
1110. The tribunal held that the term ‘measures’ in Chapter 11 does not exclude 
judicial acts.708 In this regard, the takings doctrine of NAFTA more readily accepts 
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an expropriation claim concerning a judicial taking than the US Takings Clause 
doctrine.  
 
3.0.4 The European Convention on Human Rights Expropriation Rule 
 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) provides provisions for expropriation and 
several rules and principles that are relied upon by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in determining whether a regulatory act constitutes an expropriation 
or is deemed to be a lesser regulatory interference. With a focus on expropriation, 
these rules and principles will be termed the European Convention expropriation 
rule.  
 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR provides for the rule on the protection of 
property, as follows: 
 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.709  
 
Article 1 can be summarised as follows: (i) the general guarantee of the peaceful 
enjoyment of the owner’s property; (ii) no deprivation of property rights can be 
allowed unless certain conditions are met; and (iii) a state is entitled to enact 
legislation designed to control the use of property in pursuit of the general 
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interest. 710 In this regard, under the ECHR, a state can exercise its right to 
expropriate private property in pursuit of the general interest. Several rules and 
principles are drawn from Article 1 that may operate in governing expropriation and 
lesser regulatory interferences. 
 
Firstly, under the ECHR, a state is entitled to exercise its sovereign discretion to 
serve the essential interests of a democratic society.711 Articles 8 to 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights share a common structure that consists of 
two paragraphs. The first paragraph prescribes private rights, and the second 
prescribes a state’s right to interfere with the rights, pursuant to the law, when a 
democratic society demands it in the public interest. 712  Here, the European 
Convention on Human Rights adopts the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine to 
determine the extent to which a state can interfere with private rights without being 
subject to international scrutiny by the organs of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.713 The ECtHR manages the scope of the margin of appreciation by 
considering three factors. It first assesses how fundamental a right is, which 
indicates how strictly it should be protected.714 This evaluation produces a ‘rights 
hierarchy’ by scrutinising whether the right in question is expressed in broad terms, 
or whether the relevant language permits a state to restrain the right in question. In 
the former case, a state can enjoy very limited discretion and, in the latter case, a 
state can exercise wider discretion.715 Next, the court views it as significant if there 
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is any common standard among the Convention’s signatories in regard to when such 
an interference with a right is justified.716 If there is little consensus, the defendant 
state is entitled to a wide margin of appreciation.717 Thirdly, the court creates a 
public ‘interests hierarchy’ based on the public interest advocated by the state 
defendant for restraining a right.718 These three factors are usually considered on the 
basis of the strong presumption that a state validly restrains property rights in 
pursuit of public interests. 719  Accordingly, the court defers the legislature’s 
determination as to what is in the public interest, unless the determination clearly 
lacks a reasonable basis.720  
 
The ECHR employs the ‘fair balance’ test. It refers to a principle where, even in the 
case where a state is acting properly, ‘a fair balance should be struck between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights’ so that the individual does not 
bear an unreasonably heavy burden.721 Compensation is a factor to be taken into 
account in judging whether a regulatory act in issue conforms to the fair balancing 
test and whether it causes an undue burden to the claimant.722 In this respect, it is 
very likely that a deprivation of property cannot be justified without adequate 
compensation. On the other hand, when a regulator interferes with the control of a 
property’s use and the burden of interference is heavy, then the interference will not 
be justified without due compensation.723 Such regulatory interferences are deemed 
to be deprivations under the European Convention.724 As long as the property owner 
does not suffer a heavy burden due to the interference, it will not entail 
compensation.  




719  Freeman (n 714) 198; Monroe Leigh, ‘European Human Rights Convention – 
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Under Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR, the notion of property or 
‘possession’ is broadly construed as a range of economic interests. 725  The 
deprivation of possession connotes a wide range of expropriations in that it 
implicitly encompasses the removal of the peaceful enjoyment of private property or 
one’s possession. In this regard, the deprivation indicates not only a formal transfer 
of ownership but also an indirect or de facto expropriation. The ECtHR recognises 
that indirect expropriation can take place. The court has accepted that an 
expropriation could take place even though it did not take the form of an ordinary 
expropriation. It stated in Sporrong that ‘in the absence of a formal expropriation … 
the Court considers that it must look behind the appearances and investigate the 
realities of the situation complained of’.726 Thus, when can an indirect expropriation 
occur from the perspective of the ECtHR? The court, in Papamichalopolous, 
recognised that if an interference, other than a formal expropriation, were too 
burdensome, then a de facto expropriation would take place. In this case, Greek 
nationals had been deprived of their property by a dictatorship. After the end of the 
dictatorship, the nationals received neither alterative land nor fair compensation. 
The court held that ‘the physical occupation of land was so extensive and the 
possibility of dealing with it in any useful way so remote that there was a de facto 
expropriation’.727 
 
The scope of the control on the use of property may vary and it is not always clear 
as to whether it can constitute an expropriation. If a property consists of a 
conventional ‘bundle of rights’, the removal of one right is not usually regarded as 
an expropriation; rather, such interference would simply constitute a ‘control of use’ 
of the property.728 Any measure that imposes limits on private property, but falls 
short of constituting an expropriation, will be recognised as a control of use. Such 
measures may be, for example, ‘planning controls, environmental order, rent 
control, import and export laws, economic regulation of professions, the seizure of 
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property for legal proceedings or inheritance laws’.729 Whether the control of use of 
the property can constitute an expropriation is determined by the application of the 
fair balance test. When a regulatory interference is deemed to be a control of use, 
then as long as it does not cause undue burden, it does not entail compensation.730 
However, if the control of use causes the property owner to suffer a heavy burden 
due to regulatory interference, the interference cannot be justified without adequate 
compensation. 731  Such interferences are regarded as deprivations under the 
European Convention.732 In addition, some regulatory interferences, which are 
neither classified as a deprivation nor a control of use, may entail compensation if 
the interference causes the property owner to bear a disproportionate burden under 
the fair balance test.733 
 
3.0.5 A Comparative Review of the US Takings Clause Doctrine, the 
NAFTA Expropriation Rule and the European Convention on Human 
Rights Expropriation Rule 
 
When considering the US Takings Clause doctrine, the NAFTA expropriation rule 
and the European Convention on Human Rights expropriation rule, it may be 
difficult to find exactly the same elements in their doctrines and rules. Nonetheless, 
it may be viable to draw from this comparative analysis certain rules or principles 
that share similar or common ideas running through the respective legal systems.  
 
The noticeable feature that is most commonly observable among the US Takings 
Clause doctrine, the NAFTA expropriation rule, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights expropriation rule is that the purpose of the governmental measure in 
question is not a determinant for the finding of an expropriation. In US Takings 
Clause jurisprudence, subsequent to the Lingle case, the purpose became an 
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irrelevant factor. Similarly, NAFTA tribunals have shown in recent cases that they 
do not recognise the character or purpose of a regulatory act as being determinative 
for the finding of an expropriation. Additionally, the European Convention 
expropriation rule is not concerned with the character of a measure in finding 
expropriation. 
 
When conducting a comparison, it is apparent that the primary concern of all is the 
economic effect that a government measure causes to a property. A finding of 
expropriation does not necessarily rely completely on the degree of interference 
with property, but does so to a significant extent. Since US Takings Clause 
jurisprudence adopted the physical invasion test, and afterwards replaced it with the 
diminution of economic value test, the impact of the measure in question has 
consistently been the major consideration. The same is true of NAFTA arbitral 
jurisprudence, as shown in arbitral cases. For example, the SD Myers tribunal 
distinguished between deprivation of ownership and lesser interference in finding 
expropriation, and the Glamis Gold tribunal admitted the occurrence of an indirect 
expropriation when a state’s interference renders property rights almost valueless. 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention essentially distinguishes 
between the deprivation of an owner’s possession and the control of the use of the 
property when considering expropriation. It relies on the notion of deprivation and 
the proportionality principle, requiring a balancing exercise between the demands of 
the public interest and the requirement to protect fundamental rights. 
 
On the basis of this comparative analysis, it can be observed that when conducting 
the task of finding expropriation, the US Takings Clause doctrine, the NAFTA 
expropriation rule, and the European Convention on Human Rights expropriation 
rule operate within the framework of the ends-means and cause-effect, as can be 






3.1 The Concept and Conditions of Regulatory Expropriation 
 
3.1.1 Introduction: Indirect Expropriation versus Regulatory Expropriation 
 
Regulatory expropriation is recognised as a type of indirect expropriation. Indirect 
expropriation is a concept that is primarily relied upon to categorise a range of 
forms of expropriation other than direct expropriation as, although it does not 
involve a definite seizure of foreign-owned property, or any physical transfer of 
occupation or ownership of property, it still interferes with the use of or the 
economic benefit of property. Because the concept of indirect expropriation has not 
been concretely defined in international legal instruments, its meaning has been 
contested and still remains an open-ended question. There are several formulations 
that reflect varying forms of indirect expropriation, such as equivalent, tantamount, 
de facto, creeping, constructive, disguised, consequential, and regulatory 
expropriations.734 All these formulations share a common feature in that they 
involve the effect-based criterion. They can, however, possibly differ in 
characterising a legal link between a regulatory measure and the effect of the 
economic deprivation. The definition of indirect expropriation is effectively 
summarised by the tribunal in Starrett: 
 
It is recognised in international law that measures taken by a State can interfere 
with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless 
that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the state does 
not purport to have expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally 
remains with the original owner.735 
 
Additionally, the Restatement (Third) describes creeping expropriation as a situation 
where a state obtains the ‘same result (as with formal expropriation) by taxation and 
                                                
734 Newcombe (n 1) 325. 
735 Starrett Housing Corporation (n 443) 154. 
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regulatory measures designed to make continued operation of a project 
uneconomical so that it is abandoned’.736 
 
Both the tribunal’s award and the Restatement’s description accept ‘negative 
economic effect’ as the central factor in reaching the conclusion that an indirect 
expropriation has occurred. The NAFTA tribunals in Pope & Talbot v Canada and 
SD Myers held that the phrase ‘measure tantamount to nationalisation or 
expropriation’ in NAFTA Article 1110, which indicates an indirect expropriation, 
does not broaden the ordinary concept of expropriation; tantamount means 
‘equivalent’ and does not expand the meaning of expropriation. The Waste-
management tribunal held that the meaning does not extend beyond what would be 
recognised by customary international law. Nonetheless, as in Glamis Gold, 
customary international law is not static and may evolve. Thus, the definition of the 
concept can change if customary international law evolves.  
 
Indirect expropriation is a broad concept that conceptually encompasses all ranges 
of non-direct forms of expropriation. From the perspective of functionality, the 
notion itself may be neither effective nor precise enough for arbitral tribunals to 
depend on in finding such a type of expropriation. Furthermore, it may not 
effectively distinguish compensable indirect expropriation from an ordinary 
regulation that does not incur the obligation to compensate. In response to this 
challenge, it may be a viable solution to reconceptualise regulatory expropriation in 
such a way that the scope of the concept can be narrower and more specific than the 
term ‘indirect expropriation’, that encompasses the broad range of non-direct 
expropriation.  
 
The reconceptualisation of regulatory expropriation will be able to promote or 
encourage an arbitral tribunal to give well-balanced and proper care to the public 
and private interests that are involved in investment disputes. Nevertheless, 
                                                
736 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations of the United States 
(1987) vol 1, s 712, comment g. 
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regulatory expropriation cannot be defined with perfect definitiveness and arbitral 
tribunals are still left with a wide discretion in conducting a case-by-case analysis 
during the inquiry in relation to expropriation. Even so, it is likely that the 
reconceptualisation will bring about a more elaborated and prudent analysis than the 
case of the mere reliance on indirect expropriation.  
 
Regulatory expropriation can be reconceptualised and newly established on the 
basis of a simple analysis of the central elements that constitute regulatory 
expropriation and with certain conditions for establishing regulatory expropriation. 
Particularly, the conditions, which will be identified, will serve, along with the use 
of the doctrine of police power, to find regulatory expropriation.  
 
3.1.2 Key Constituents and Bona Fide Regulatory Expropriation 
 
3.1.2.1 The State’s Regulatory Autonomy and the State’s Regulatory 
Interference with Property 
 
Regulatory expropriation mainly consists of two key elements: a state’s regulatory 
autonomy and a state’s regulatory act of interfering with foreign-owned property 
that is regarded as expropriation. A state’s regulatory autonomy can be defined as 
the exclusive authority that a state can exercise within its territory under its 
sovereignty. Sovereignty is the core basis of principles and rules of international 
law. The basic premise underlying international legal supervision on state conduct is 
based on a degree of deference to sovereignty. In examining breaches of investment 
treaty violations, tribunals maintain some measure of deference to a state’s authority 
to regulate. Tribunals recognise a considerable degree of deference. For instance, 
the tribunal in SD Myers stated, in determining the breach of fair and equitable 
treatment, as follows: 
 
The Tribunal considers that a breach of Article 1105 occurs only when it is 
shown that an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner 
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that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the international 
perspective. That determination must be made in light of the high measure of 
deference that international law generally extends to the right of domestic 
authorities to regulate matters within their own borders.737  
 
Also, in examining the conditions for lawful expropriation, a tribunal gives 
deference to a state in its determination of public interest.738 Under NAFTA Chapter 
11, a tribunal should not substitute its own judgments for those of the legislature or 
administration, and it is limitedly allowed to determine the occurrence of violations 
of international law.739 Even so, deference may not be limitless. For instance, this is 
demonstrated in Tza Yap Shum v Peru,740 where a claim was raised against the 
Peruvian tax authorities’ taxes and interim measures on the claimant’s investment, 
which was involved in the management of the purchase of raw materials. The 
tribunal emphasised that the deference to a state’s regulatory power would be 
governed by the ‘principle of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness’, reflected in 
international as well as in domestic law, and concluded that the Peruvian measures 
at issue were arbitrary and unjustified because, in taking interim measures, the tax 
authorities failed to base those measures on a reasonable and non-arbitrary basis.741  
 
Sovereignty and, in particular, a state’s regulatory autonomy to regulate economic 
affairs are well articulated in Articles 1 and 2(1) of the Charter of Economic Rights 




Every state has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic 
system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the 
                                                
737 SD Myers (n 261) para 63. 
738 Siemens (n 230) para 273. 
739 Schill, ‘International Decision’ (n 672) 257. 
740 Tza Yap Shum (n 491). 
741 ibid 6–7. 
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Every state has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including 
possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic 
activities.742 
 
According to the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, a 
state has the ‘sovereign right to deprive’ a foreigner of property located within its 
territory ‘in the pursuit of its political, social or economic ends’.743 Also, Article 
1114 of NAFTA provides that a state has the right to take any measure that ‘it 
considers appropriate’ to regulate a private investment for the consideration of 
environmental concerns.  
 
A state’s regulatory autonomy can be expressed in another way; for instance, by the 
so-called ‘margin of appreciation’. The margin of appreciation is a doctrine of 
deference adopted by the ECtHR for determining whether a state has complied with 
its obligations under the ECHR. It refers to a ‘space for manoeuvre’, within which 
state conduct is exempt from ‘fully fledged review’ by an international judicial 
body.744 While it has been developed to discern the distinction between ‘primary 
national discretion’ and ‘subsidiary international supervision’, the ECHR affords 
greater deference to the exercise of regulatory autonomy by employing the 
presumption in support of the legitimacy of a state’s interference with private 
                                                
742  The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States is UN General Assembly 
Resolution 3281 of 1974. 
743 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 18.  
744 Stephan W Schill, ‘Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Reconceptualizing the 
Standard of Review Through Comparative Public Law’ National University of Singapore 
Working Paper No 2012/33, 6. 
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property.745 The court endorses the legislature’s determination of what is ‘in the 
public interest’, unless the determination lacks reasonable basis.746  
 
Regulatory autonomy forms a core concept of police power. Police power refers to a 
state’s regulatory autonomous power which it can exercise without international 
legal interference, in pursuit of public purposes, such as health, safety, national 
security, and so on. When a state exercises its police power, it does not incur state 
liability under international law. The Methanex tribunal held as follows: ‘It is a 
principle of customary international law that, where economic injury results from a 
bona fide regulation within the police powers of a state, compensation is not 
required’.747 
 
In spite of the international legal recognition of a state’s sovereign regulatory 
autonomy, a state’s economic right to take measures in pursuit of public objectives, 
in conflict with private interests, has been the subject of legal contention. For 
instance, recently, a state’s ‘plain’ or ‘standardized’ tobacco packaging measures for 
health has been in issue, not only in the international investment law regime, but 
also in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) mechanism. Philip Morris Asia 
Limited (Philip Morris) was engaged in the production and distribution of tobacco 
products in Australia. Australia enacted a plain packaging legislation in 2011, which 
controlled the size, appearance, and shape of packaging. Philip Morris initiated 
arbitral proceedings against Australia under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and 
claimed that the legislation would expropriate Philip Morris’ investments by causing 
the substantial deprivation of intellectual property and goodwill, and the destructive 
reduction in economic value of the relevant investment.748 Also, the Dominican 
Republic challenged the legislation for its violation of WTO obligations under 
                                                
745 Freeman (n 714) 197. 
746 ibid 198–99. 
747 Methanex Corporation v United States of America (Final Award on Jurisdiction and 
Merits) 3 August 2005 NAFTA, p IV, para 410. 
748 Notice of Claim under the Australia-Hong Kong Agreement for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, para 10(a); ‘Philip Morris Launches Legal Battle Over 
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Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which covers 
trademarks.749  
 
The second key component of regulatory expropriation is a regulatory act or 
measure interfering with foreign-owned property. In an ordinary sense, a measure 
refers to a governmental act, and can usually be regarded to mean any law, 
regulation, procedure, requirement or practice.750 If a governmental measure is 
considered to directly seize a foreign-owned property or deprives the owner of a 
substantial part of it, it is readily recognised as direct expropriation. If a measure, 
while not taking the form of direct expropriation, is evaluated as amounting to 
expropriation, it is an indirect expropriation. Nationalisation or direct expropriation 
has been recognised as the traditional form of the governmental taking of property, 
whereas indirect expropriation reflects the advent of non-traditional types of 
expropriation. When a state’s regulatory act or measure constitutes an indirect 
expropriation has been observed in the previous chapter, in terms of the deprivation 
of a foreign-owned investment. Therefore, how can a bona fide regulatory 
expropriation be described or characterised?  
 
3.1.2.2 Bona Fide Regulatory Expropriation  
 
The main focus of this thesis is directed at bona fide regulatory expropriation. Bona 
fide in a simplistic sense means ‘with sincere intentions’,751 or ‘made in good 
faith’752 or ‘without fraud’.753 Even though the term bona fide has a simple meaning, 
the frequent reference to the term in international legal instruments concerning the 
determination of expropriation appears to indicate that it may function as a decisive 
element in the task of this determination. It can be observed that the term bona fide 
appears in conjunction with the term ‘police power’ in treaty languages and arbitral 
                                                
749 ibid. 
750 NAFTA, art 201. 
751 Cambridge Dictionary. 




awards. Both terms play the role of disqualifying a type of regulatory measure from 
an indirect expropriation. First of all, the tribunal in the Sedco, Inc case provided 
that ‘An accepted principle of international law that a State is not liable for 
economic injury which is a consequence of a bona fide regulation within the 
accepted police power of states’.754 Also, the tribunal in Emmanuel Too provided 
that ‘A state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic 
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation or any other action that is 
commonly accepted as within the police power of states’.755 
 
The Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area has 
recourse to bona fide and the principle of police power in differentiating an ordinary 
regulatory measure from an indirect expropriation: 
 
Consistent with the right of states to regulate and the customary international 
law principles on police powers, bona fide regulatory measures taken by a 
member state that are designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate 
public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, 
shall not constitute an indirect expropriation under this Article.756 
 
According to the United States Third Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations, 
bona fide regulation and ‘other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as 
within the police power of state’ are permissible regulatory measures. 757  In 
summary, when a regulatory measure is taken bona fide and in the exercise of the 
police power, it does not constitute an indirect expropriation. From the conceptual 
perspective, bona fide regulatory expropriation, which is clearly a type of 
expropriation, may be positioned at a certain point on the spectrum ranging from 
bona fide regulation, conducted within the accepted police power, to a type of 
                                                
754 Sedco, Inc v National Iranian Oil Co (1985) 9 Iran-USCTR 248, 275. 
755  Emmanuel Too v Greater Modesto Insurance Associates and the United States of 
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indirect expropriation. In this regard, the concept may demand a careful observation 
when evaluating it. 
 
On the other hand, the opposite concept is ‘bad faith’. In the case of Neer, the 
Mexico-US Claims Commissioners referred to the notion of ‘bad faith’ in 
identifying when the treatment of an alien could constitute international 
delinquency, as follows: 
 
The treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, 
should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or an 
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that 
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognise its insufficiency.758  
 
As shown, bad faith is an element to be taken into account in deciding an 
international delinquency in terms of the treatment of alien. In this respect, the 
concept of bona fide can be understood as a legal element that may demonstrate a 
definite distance from an international delinquency. Bona fide is a significant, not 
necessarily absolute, consideration for exempting a regulatory measure from 
indirect expropriation scrutiny.  
 




According to international investment agreements and customary international law, 
an expropriation should be made for a public purpose in accordance with the 
principles of due process, in a non-discriminatory way, and with the award of 
adequate compensation. These conditions serve to determine the lawfulness of 
expropriation, but do not help to articulate the definition of expropriation. They 
should be distinguished from the conditions that are used to establish indirect 
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expropriation. The conditions for establishing indirect expropriation have in prior 
periods been absent, with only the four conditions for lawful expropriation being in 
existence. However, conditions began to appear in the US and Canada Model BITs 
and subsequently with the US BITs with other countries. These Model BITs and 
other BITs share common elements with the three-part Penn Central test. This test 
was created by the US Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co v New 
York City and subsequent cases, which examined the following three factors: 
 
(a) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; 
(b) the extent of interference with the property owner’s reasonable investment-
backed expectations; and 
(c) the character of the government action.759 
 
The 2012 United States Model BIT at Annex B.4(a) provides that the determination 
of an indirect expropriation should consider the following factors: 
 
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that 
an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the 
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish 
that an indirect expropriation occurred; 
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, 
reasonable investment-backed expectations; and 
(iii) the character of the government action.760 
 
The 2004 Canada Model BIT also contains similar rules in Annex B.13(1), and 
subsequent BITs or FTAs do as well, such as the United States’ FTAs with 
Australia (2004), CAFTA-DR (2004), Morocco (2004) and Peru (2006); Canada’s 
BITs with Peru (2007), and Romania (2009); Australia-Chile (2008), and India-
                                                
759 Gary H Sampliner, ‘Arbitration of Expropriation Cases Under U.S. Investment Treaties – 
A Threat to Democracy or the Dog That Didn’t Bark?’ (2011) 14 ICSID Review 11. 
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Republic of Korea (2009).761 Most provisions concerning indirect expropriation that 
are found in recent FTAs and BITs are based on the United States and Canadian 
Model BITs. 762  In particular, the 2008 China-New Zealand FTA recognises 
additional conditions for scrutinising a state’s conduct, including proportionality, 
discrimination, and the breach of the state’s previous written commitments to the 
investor.763 
 
These three conditions, set out above, are taken into account generally for the 
finding of an indirect expropriation. With regard to regulatory expropriation, 
additional conditions can be sought in order to aid with the finding of such an 
expropriation. This is possible because certain distinctive features can be observed 
when a regulatory expropriation occurs. Thus, for regulatory expropriation, along 
with the above three conditions, a further examination needs to be conducted 
regarding the intention and motive of governmental conduct, proportionality, and 
the exercise of the police power. The tribunal in Fireman’s Fund Ins Co v Mexico, 
for instance, enumerated the conditions to be taken into account for the finding of a 
compensable expropriation, as follows: 
 
To distinguish between a compensable expropriation and a non-compensable 
regulation by a host state, the following factors (usually in combination) may be 
taken into account: whether the measure is within the recognised police powers 
of the host state; the (public) purpose and effect of the measure; whether the 
measure is discriminatory; the proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be realised; and the bona fide nature of the measure.764  
 
The conditions which may be selected when considering whether regulatory 
expropriation has occurred can vary case-by-case or tribunal-by-tribunal. Even so, 
                                                
761 Annex B.13(1) of the Canada Model BIT of 2004; UNCTAD, ‘Expropriation: a Sequel’ 
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some conditions can be derived from scholarly discussions and the review of 
investment cases that exhibit shared concerns with regard to indirect and regulatory 
expropriation. In the following pages, certain conditions will be explored, derived 
from analysing relevant elements of regulatory expropriation. 
 
3.1.3.2 Factors that can be Considered as Conditions for Establishing 
Regulatory Expropriation 
 
3.1.3.2.1 Intention and Motive 
 
In the finding of regulatory expropriation, the intent of a government taking a 
regulatory measure receives relatively less attention than the effect of an act of 
expropriation in international investment law.765 This is because the effect of an act 
is the strongest indicator that a regulatory interference with a foreign-owned 
property has caused an indirect expropriation. In international law, malice or dolus, 
namely an intention to cause harm, has no relevance in state responsibility.766 Mens 
rea has never been relied upon to oblige a state to make an award of compensation 
for expropriation.767 
 
For instance, in the case of Phillips, the tribunal held that a government’s liability to 
compensate for the expropriation of foreign-owned property is not decided by 
whether expropriatory intent was involved.768 Instead, rather than serving as a 
condition for state responsibility, the intention or motive of a government retains 
effective evidentiary value. It can establish ‘imputability’ when it is proven that 
dolus existed on the part of a government organ, and it can provide clues as to the 
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remoteness of damage and the breach of duty.769 It can also help to establish 
causality between a state’s regulatory measure and the deprivation of a foreign-
owned investment.770 As for the intention to expropriate in the simple sense, the fact 
that the expropriation was intended does not affect the issue of state responsibility. 
On the other hand, when such an intention, which did not exist at the beginning of a 
regulatory measure, surfaces at a later stage, it can assist tribunals to verify the 
emergence of an expropriation and choose the moment of valuation for 
compensation.771 
 
3.1.3.2.2 The Depriving Effect of a Regulatory Measure 
 
Regulatory expropriation is a concept that originates from the broad notion of 
indirect expropriation. The former is a concept that is intended to shed light on the 
aspect of a state’s exercise of regulatory power in conducting indirect expropriation 
scrutiny. The former and the latter concepts both share a fundamental factor, 
namely, the depriving effect that a regulatory measure at issue gives rise to. A range 
of formulations of economic deprivation that is involved in the occurrence of 
indirect expropriation have been observed in the preceding chapter. There are also 
certain deprivations that cannot be qualified as indirect expropriation. The same 
principles apply when dealing with regulatory expropriation. 
 
3.1.3.2.3 Legitimate Expectation 
 
A foreign investor’s legitimate expectation concerns the regulatory framework at the 
time when an investment was made, which induced the investor to initiate its 
investment in the host state. With regard to usage, legitimate expectation is not only 
observed as a notion connoted within the fair and equitable treatment standard but 
also in the context of the standard of compensation.772 However, it also plays a 
                                                
769 Brownlie (n 238). 
770 Baughen (n 768) 207, 210. 
771 Reisman and Sloane (n 104) 130–31. 
772 Tudor (n 52) 163. 
193 
 
significant role in establishing indirect expropriation. Legitimate expectation does 
not constitute a property interest or an investment; thus, it is not an object protected 
by international investment agreements. It instead constitutes a factor taken into 
account in finding an indirect expropriation. For instance, the tribunal in Metalclad 
held: 
 
Expropriation under NAFTA includes … also covert or incidental interference 
with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or 
in significant part, of the use or ‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property’ even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state.773 
 
A foreign investor’s legitimate expectation is directed at a certain economic benefit 
of the property. The ‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property’ is 
what is to be deprived in the occurrence of an indirect expropriation.  
 
A more specific formulation of legitimate expectation can be found in the award of 
the tribunal in Thunderbird v Mexico, which stated that: 
 
The concept of ‘legitimate expectation’ relates, within the context of the 
NAFTA framework, to a situation where a Contracting Party’s conduct creates 
reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or investment) 
to act in reliance on said conduct, such that a failure by the NAFTA Party to 
honour those expectations could cause the investor (or investment) to suffer 
damages.774 
 
In view of this formulation, the role of the concept of legitimate expectation is to 
refine the process of finding the causality between a state’s regulatory measure and 
the damages suffered by a foreign investor. The process takes two stages. Firstly, 
the state’s regulatory measure that will be subject to an expropriation scrutiny 
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should be the measure which is relied on by the foreign investor in proceeding with 
the investment. If a series of regulatory measures appear, which is likely to 
frequently occur in a longstanding relationship between a host state and a foreign 
investor, the scope of regulatory measures subject to the scrutiny can be determined 
by using the reliance criterion. In addition, whether a causal nexus exists between 
the failure to fulfil a foreign investor’s expectation and the damage inflicted on the 
foreign investor should be examined.775 Legitimate expectation initially determines 
a state’s regulatory measure or measures that will be subject to the expropriation 
scrutiny on the basis of the reliance criterion. Then, the legitimate expectation 
identifies the damage that would result from the frustrated legitimate expectation.  
 
In Metalclad, from the outset of Metalclad’s investment-making, Metalclad received 
assurance that the federal government would support and help Metalclad obtain all 
the necessary permits for the operation of the landfill. Metalclad was later granted a 
federal permit for the operation of the landfill.776 Metalclad had already previously 
been accorded a federal permit to construct a hazardous waste landfill and a state 
land use permit to construct the landfill.777 In these circumstances, Metalclad 
formed a reasonable and legitimate expectation that it was entitled to proceed with 
the construction.778 However, Metalclad’s application for a municipal construction 
permit was denied. As a result, even though Metalclad completed the construction, 
it failed to obtain the full entitlement to operate the landfill and was in effect barred 
from operations. In this case, the foreign investor had relied on the federal official’s 
assurances and the relevant federal permits when proceeding with the construction. 
The denial of the municipal construction permit reflected that Metalclad’s legitimate 
expectation was not fulfilled and led to Metalclad sustaining damage. The tribunal 
followed this line of reasoning when considering all of the Mexican government’s 
measures, consequentially finding an indirect expropriation: 
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These measures, taken together with the representations of the Mexican federal 
government, on which Metalclad relied, and the absence of a timely, orderly or 
substantive basis for the denial by the Municipality of the local construction 
permit, amount to an indirect expropriation.779 
 
Further, the NAFTA expropriation enquiry of legitimate expectation demonstrates 
that certain factors can be considered in order to inspect a breach of legitimate 
expectation. It examines whether the foreign investor’s business was conducted in a 
‘heavily regulated industry’ and considers whether the foreign investor was afforded 
‘specific commitments or assurances’ that certain state regulations would not be 
enacted. The first consideration is general in nature, reflecting how seriously an 
industry can be regulated. The second consideration is directed specifically at the 
relevant foreign investor. This enquiry method was clearly demonstrated in the case 
of Methanex. The tribunal, in Methanex, while admitting that California’s ban of the 
gasoline additive MTBE diminished the value of the foreign investor’s investment, 
also observed that the industry was already highly regulated: 
 
Methanex entered a political economy in which it was widely known, if not 
notorious, that government environmental and health protection institutions at 
the federal and state level, operating under the vigilant eyes of the media, 
interested corporations, non-governmental organisations and a politically active 
electorate, continuously monitored the use and impact of chemical compounds 
and commonly prohibited or restricted the use of some of those compounds for 
environmental and/or health reasons.780 
 
Secondly, if a state committed to a foreign investor that certain regulations would 
not been enacted, regulations in breach of such commitments could be evaluated to 
constitute indirect expropriation, even though the regulations were not in themselves 
expropriatory. The Methanex tribunal admitted that the police power, which was 
                                                
779 ibid para 107. 
780 Methanex (n 747) pt IV, ch D, para 9. 
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exercised in violation of the specific commitments, could be deemed expropriatory 
and compensable: 
 
But as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for 
a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
affects, inter alia, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory 
and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating 
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that 
the government would refrain from such regulation.781  
 
The ECtHR and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) recognise the principle of 
legitimate expectation in expropriation scrutiny on the basis of specific 
commitments. 782  Likewise, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in Starrett Housing 
Corporation v Iran relied on legitimate expectation in concluding that the 
claimant’s expropriation claim could not be upheld because no legitimate 
expectation existed.783 
 
Given the role of legitimate expectation and the considerations that can be taken 
into account in its operation, it is important to note that it is not a stand-alone 
element in the context of indirect or regulatory expropriation. Even if a state fails to 
implement its commitments or representations, the breach of legitimate expectation 
will not justify a finding of indirect expropriation unless a substantial deprivation of 
foreign-owned property occurred. 784  Therefore, in this way, it only provides 
assistance in the process of finding indirect expropriation. 
 
3.1.3.2.4 The Principle of Proportionality 
                                                
781 ibid para 7. 
782 Thomas Waelde and Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and 
“Regulatory Taking” in International Law’ (2001) 50(4) International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 811, 844; Fredin v Sweden (1991) ECtHR 12033/86, para 54. The ECHR 
denied the expropriation claim for the reason that no legitimate expectation was formed.  
783 Sampliner (n 759); Starrett Housing Corp (n 443). 
784 Newcombe (n 1) 351. 
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The principle of proportionality is a criterion which weighs the relevant factors for 
the purpose of determining whether a state’s regulatory measure constitutes indirect 
expropriation. The principle, as a means-end test, seeks to find whether a balance or 
a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality’ 785  exists between the regulatory 
measure that a state takes and the public purpose that the state seeks to achieve. This 
principle puts forward a standard that may sit somewhere between the requirement 
that there be a ‘plausible basis’ for the measure and the requirement that the 
measure is the least restrictive option required to achieve the public purpose.786 It 
also takes into account whether the consequence of the measure is an excessive 
burden to the foreign investor. If the relationship between a regulatory measure and 
its public goal is disproportionate, the state’s regulatory measure will be deemed to 
constitute indirect expropriation.  
 
This principle has been used by the ECtHR and certain NAFTA tribunals which 
appear to have embraced the principle from the ECtHR. The ECtHR in James and 
Others v United Kingdom, in stipulating the principle, quoted the principle of ‘fair 
balance’, another formulation of the principle of proportionality, from the ruling of 
the ECtHR in Sporrong and Lönnroth. It held that: 
 
Not only must a measure depriving a person of his property pursue, on the facts 
as well as in principle, a legitimate aim ‘in the public interest’, but there must 
also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed 
and the aim sought to be realised … This latter requirement was expressed in 
other terms in the Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment by the notion of the ‘fair 
balance’ that must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights … The requisite balance will not be found if the person 
concerned has had to bear ‘an individual and excessive burden’.787 
 
                                                
785 Technicas Medioambientales Techmed SA (n 481) para 122. 
786 Newcombe (n 1) 365. 
787 James and Others (n 541) para 50. 
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Certain NAFTA tribunals, in finding an expropriation, have quoted the ECtHR’s 
rulings containing the principle of proportionality; for instance, the tribunal in the 
Techmed v Mexico case.788 The tribunal in the Fireman’s Fund case also adopted the 
principle requiring the ‘proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised’789 and clarified that the Techmed tribunal had also depended 
on this principle. The tribunal in LG&E also employed the principle of 
proportionality, as follows: 
 
With respect to the power of the state to adopt its policies, it can generally be 
said that the state has the right to adopt measures having a social or general 
welfare purpose. In such case, the measure must be accepted without any 
imposition of liability, except in cases where the State’s action is obviously 
disproportionate to the need being challenged.790 
 
The tribunal in Azurix Corp v The Argentine Republic acknowledged that the 
principle of proportionality, as adopted by the Techmed tribunal and the court in the 
James and Others case, would be a useful criterion serving to determine whether a 
state’s regulatory measures could constitute indirect expropriation where the 
compensation obligation could occur.791 The principle of proportionality that has 
been relied on by these tribunals and the court is in fact very similar to the 
‘substantially advance test’ which was adopted by the US Supreme Court since 
Nollan. This test, as previously observed, consists of two sub-tests: a means-end 
sub-test and a cause-effect sub-test, and examines whether the regulatory measure 
can in practice fulfil its purpose and whether there exists a proportionate basis 
between the amount of public harm caused by the owner and the burden that the 
regulation imposed.  
 
                                                
788 Technicas Medioambientales Techmed SA (n 481) para 122. The tribunal adopted and 
quoted the ECtHR’s employment of the principle of proportionality. 
789 Fireman’s Fund (n 697) para 176(j). 
790 LG&E (n 596). 
791  Azurix Corp v The Argentine Republic (Award) 14 July 2006 (ICSID Case No 
ARB/01/12) paras 311–12. 
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On the other hand, the principle of proportionality operates on the basis of a 
reasonable proportionality between means and ends, and the fair balance test. The 
principle and the ‘substantially advance test’ are similar to each other in that they 
operate within the framework of the ends-means and the cause-effect tests. 
However, they are a little different from each other with regard to the cause-effect 
principle. The principle of proportionality concerns the demands of public interest, 
while the test concerns the public harm caused by an owner of a property or 
investment. The public harm element in the test also indicates the need for 
protecting the public interest; thus, the common element shared by both of them is 
their concern for the public interest. Therefore, in other words, the principle of 
proportionality that operates within the framework of the ends-means and the cause-
effect requires that there be a reasonable proportionality between governmental 
objectives and means, and a fair balance between the safeguarding of the public 
interest and the protection of the investment. This principle is capable of serving to 
identify regulatory expropriation in international investment law by embracing a 
balanced approach towards considering private and public interests in an investment 
dispute which involves a state’s exercise of regulatory power and a foreign-owned 
investment interest.  
 
3.1.3.2.5 Due Exercise of Police Power 
 
It has been generally recognised in international law that a state’s regulatory act of 
interfering with foreign-owned property, falling within the scope of its police 
powers in pursuit of what a state deems to be in the public interest, does not 
constitute an indirect expropriation. This is the so-called ‘doctrine of police power’. 
A variety of regulatory measures fall within the scope of police power: 
 
(a) forfeiture or a fine to punish or suppress crime; 
(b) seizure of property by way of taxation; 
(c) legislation restricting the use of property, including planning, environment, 
safety, health and the concomitant restrictions to property rights; and 
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(d) defence against external threats, destruction of property of neutrals as a 
consequence of military operations and the taking of enemy property as part 
of payment of reparation for the consequences of an illegal war.792 
 
The principle of police power has been described in scholarly opinions, legal 
instruments, and arbitral awards; for instance: 
 
state measures, prima facie a lawful exercise of powers of governments, may 
affect foreign interests considerably without amounting to expropriation.793 
 
Regulatory functions are a matter of sovereign right of the host state and there 
could be no right in international law to compensation or diplomatic protection 
in respect of such interferences.794 
 
International authorities have regularly concluded that no right to compensate 
arises for reasonable necessary regulations passed for the protection of public 
health, safety, morals or welfare.795 
 
A state is not responsible for the loss of property or for other economic 
disadvantages resulting from bona fide taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, 
or other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police power 
of state.796 
 
The reference … to … ‘measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation’ 
… does not establish a new requirement that Parties pay compensation for losses 
                                                
792 UNCTAD (n 417) 79. 
793 Brownlie (n 238) 532. 
794 M Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment (Cambridge University 
Press 1994) 357. 
795 Newcombe (n 1) 23. 
796 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States, s 712, comment (g). 
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which an investor or investment may incur through regulation, revenue raising 
and other normal activity in the public interest undertaken by governments.797 
 
It is now established in international law that states are not liable to pay 
compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their 
regulatory powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide 
regulations that are aimed at the general welfare.798 
 
The relevant state agency took measures within its mandate, in a non-
discriminatory manner, motivated by the increasing awareness of the dangers 
presented by lindane for human health and environment. A measure adopted 
under such circumstances is a valid exercise of the state’s police powers and, as 
a result, does not constitute an expropriation.799 
 
The exercise of police power basically involves a state’s autonomous determination 
of what is in the public interest. In the context of US 5th Amendment jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court in Lingle v Chevron USA, Inc, held that the purpose and 
effectiveness of governmental action has no bearing on the obligation of 
compensation.800 The Takings Clause gives deference by presupposing that the 
government has taken measures for a valid public purpose.801 In this respect, in the 
context of NAFTA, the Lingle tribunal would not accept the relevance of the 
purpose of governmental action in addressing Article 1110 expropriation claims.802 
The SD Myers tribunal, in contrast, stated that ‘it is appropriate to examine the 
purpose and effect of governmental measures’ for the analysis of Article 1110.803 If 
it is accepted that an arbitral tribunal should offer some degree of deference to a 
government’s regulatory autonomy and, accordingly, its judgment as to what is in 
                                                
797 Interpretative note to Article 5 of the draft MAI ‘Expropriation and Compensation’. 
798  Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic (Partial Award) 17 March 2006 
UNCITRAL Arbitration para 255.  
799 Chemtura (n 446) para 266. 
800 Lingle (n 664) 548; Kahn (n 647) 411. 
801 ibid. 




the public interest when taking a regulatory measure, the finding of an expropriation 
is not likely to be affected by a state’s decision with regard to public purpose. 
Specifically, if ‘no error of fact or law, an abuse of power or a clear 
misunderstanding of the issue’ exists, an arbitral tribunal should respect the 
discretion of the government of what are imperatives of public need or national 
interest.804 This may reflect the basic function of the doctrine of police power. The 
doctrine of police power can play the basic role of demarcating between regulatory 
autonomy and international legal regulation.  
 
Even though it can be recognised that this doctrine is useful and widely employed, 
the issue should be discussed in more depth as to whether the application of the 
principle can guarantee an unconditional exemption from a state’s responsibility. 
With regard to the nature of the doctrine, it has been viewed that police power can 
be the sole determinant which can outweigh any other considerations and guarantee 
the unconditional exemption from the obligation to compensate. However, on the 
other hand, there exists the view that police power should be taken into account, in 
combination with other relevant factors, for the finding of an expropriation.805 
According to the first view, a state can justify its regulatory act of interference with 
private property simply by declaring that its act falls within police power. This view 
runs the risk that the public interest consideration can both easily and predominantly 
outweigh the protection of a property interest.806 Alternatively, the second view, 
which recognises police power not as the sole determinant but as one of a number of 
significant factors to be taken into account for the finding of regulatory 
expropriation, may provide a more balanced approach in the application of the 
doctrine, by not ruling out private interests from consideration. Therefore, a state’s 
contention that its regulatory act of interfering with foreign-owned property falls 
                                                
804 Antoine Goetz et al v Burundi (Award) 21 July 2012 (ICSID Case No ARB/95/3) para 
126. The tribunal found that ‘in the absence of an error of fact or of law, of an abuse of 
power or of a clear misunderstanding of the issue, it is not the Tribunal’s role to substitute 
its own judgment for the discretion of the Government of Burundi of what are imperatives 
of public need … or of national interest.’  
805 OECD, ‘“Indirect Expropriation” and “Right to Regulate” in International Investment 
Law’ Working Papers on International Investment (2004) 18.  
806 ibid 377. 
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with the scope of its police power cannot bar an arbitral tribunal from rendering an 
award after an enquiry of all other considerations.807  
 
Under international law, a state is entitled to exercise the right to expropriate as a 
sovereign right, and is also accorded a wide discretion to determine what regulations 
will be pursued to serve the public interest.808 A state, thus, enjoys the presumption 
of validity in such an exercise, which means that a state is presumed to act in good 
faith unless proven otherwise.809 Therefore, ‘if the reasons given are valid and bear 
some plausible relationship to the action taken no attempt may be made to search 
deeper to see whether the state was activated by some illicit motive.’810 In view of 
the presumption of validity, the foreign investor endures the burden of proving that 
the measure is ‘mala fide’, fails to seek a genuine public purpose, or violates 
discrimination and the due-process requirement.811 However, prior to this point, the 
state should make a prima facie case to prove that its regulatory measure pursues a 
legitimate public purpose, is not discriminatory, and was conducted in accordance 
with due process.812  
 
The commentary to the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States provides useful guidance when dealing with the 
issue of how to discern a normal regulation from an indirect expropriation: 
 
                                                
807 George C Christie, ‘What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?’ 
[2009] BYIL 338. 
808 Jon A Stanley, ‘Regulatory Takings as Defined in International Law and Compared to 
American Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence’ [2015] Emory International Law Review 349, 
387. According to Jon A Stanley, while both the US Takings Clause doctrine and 
international law accord some deference to a state’s discretion in exercising its police 
power, they are different in terms of the degree of deference. The US Supreme Court has 
considered it as one of factors used for a balancing test, whereas international courts and 
tribunals have accepted that police power is a far more significant factor in comparison with 
other factors. 
809 UNCTAD (n 417) 92. 
810 Christie (n 807) 338; UNCTAD (n 417) 93. 




A state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic 
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for 
crime or other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police 
powers of the states, if it is not discriminatory …813 
 
In Emmanuel Too v Greater Modesto Insurance Associates, the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal denied an expropriation claim on the basis of the police powers doctrine. It 
held as follows: 
 
A State is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic 
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation or any other action that is 
commonly accepted as within the police power of states, provided it is not 
discriminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to 
the state or to sell it at a distress price.814 
 
What is commonly observable in the commentary and in the Emmanuel Too case is 
that both put forward a common additional condition, in addition to the exercise of 
police powers, in order for a state to be exempt from a responsibility for ‘loss of 
property’ or ‘other economic disadvantage’. The commentary additionally demands 
that the regulation that is taken in the exercise of police powers be non-
discriminatory; this is mirrored in Emmanuel Too. The additional requirement of 
non-discrimination means that police powers are to be exercised in a non-
discriminatory way. If police powers are exercised in a discriminatory manner, then 
the state will not be able to evade responsibility by invoking the doctrine of police 
powers. This indicates that even though the doctrine of police power can create the 
presumption of validity, the police power still needs to be exercised in a certain 
way. Here, it was a non-discriminatory way. It was noted that a normal regulation 
which was initiated as an exercise of police power could develop into an indirect 
expropriation. In Pope & Talbot, in addressing the claim that Canada’s export quota 
                                                
813  The commentary to the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, 20, s 712, comment g. 
814 Emmanuel Too (n 755). 
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policy under the US-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement violated the prohibition 
of expropriation, the tribunal did not find an expropriation; however, it did admit the 
potential for a normal regulation to constitute ‘creeping expropriation’, as follows: 
 
Regulations can indeed be exercised in a way that would constitute creeping 
expropriation … Indeed, much creeping expropriation could be conducted by 
regulation, and a blanket exception for regulatory measures would create a 
gaping loophole in international protections against expropriation.815 
 
In the same vein, the UN ILC Fourth Report on International Responsibility stated: 
 
The intrinsic lawfulness of such measures [ie, certain ‘police power’ measures] 
does not … exclude the possibility of their adoption or application amounting to 
a ‘denial of justice’, and of the act of omission concerned consequently giving 
rise to international responsibility.816 
 
It is obvious that a state’s regulatory autonomy and its exercise of its police power 
should be respected. However, a normal state regulation can develop into a violation 
of international law in certain circumstances; more specifically, by the state abusing 
the use of its police power authority.817 Caution needs to be taken when considering 
the possibility that a regulatory interference with private property, conducted in the 
undue exercise of police power, can result in regulatory expropriation. In 
consideration of international investment agreements, principles of international 
law, and investment arbitral jurisprudence, certain conceivable conditions, 
circumscribing certain ways in which police powers are to be properly exercised, 
can exist. This consideration is similar to the reasoning of Justice Holmes, being 
that if a regulation went too far, it would constitute a taking.818 Under international 
                                                
815 Pope & Talbot (n 135). 
816 ‘Fourth Report on International Responsibility’ (1959) 2 Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 1, 11, para 43, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1959/Add.1; Stanley (n 810) 377. 
817 Stanley (n 808) 378. 
818 Pennsylvania Coal (n 642).  
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investment law, a state is ultimately under specific legal restraints when exercising 
its regulatory power. When a state enters into an international investment 
agreement, it accepts treaty-based restraints, based on the terms and provisions set 
out in the agreement. The state is not entitled to override such restraints in 
conducting its regulatory interference with foreign-owned property. If treaty-based 
restraints are breached in the exercise of police power, the state will not be able to 
justify its regulatory measure. 
 
Additionally, a state should also comply with the principles of international law. 
Two principles, for instance, can be drawn from investment arbitral jurisprudence, 
which govern the exercise of police powers. The first is the principle of legitimate 
expectation, which has been previously explored. If, as an exercise of police power, 
a regulatory act creates a reasonable expectation for a foreign investor and this 
investor conducts investment activities in reliance on the state’s act, the police 
power should be exercised in a way that does not breach the investor’s expectation. 
If a state’s regulatory interference could not be expected as the industry where the 
foreign investor conducted investment activities was not heavily regulated, or if 
specific commitments provided for by a state were violated, then the regulatory act, 
even if initiated though police powers, will constitute a regulatory expropriation.  
 
The second principle is that if the exercise of police powers results in the 
irreversibility of the deprivation of property rights or interests, it should be regarded 
as constituting a regulatory expropriation. In certain circumstances, when a state 
undertakes a regulatory interference of foreign-owned property, substantial or total 
deprivation of property interests can result. If such a regulatory interference was not 
temporary, but has continued its deprivation effect irreversibly, it could violate the 
prohibition of expropriation. The NAFTA tribunal in Metalclad found that such an 
irreversible deprivation of property interests could constitute expropriation. It stated 
that the Ecological Decree issued by the Mexican local government gave rise to the 
‘effect of barring forever the operation of the landfill’819 and ‘effectively and 
                                                
819 Metalclad (n 285) para 109. 
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permanently prevented the use by Metalclad of its investment’.820 If the deprivation 
of property rights or interests becomes irreversible, the exercise of the police power 
causing such a deprivation will become excessive and constitute a regulatory 
expropriation. In a similar vein, a temporary measure can ‘ripen into an 
expropriation’,821 giving rise to an irreversible deprivation. In Sabine G Helbing, the 
United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission accepted this concept when it 
identified what was once a temporary seizure of property as an expropriation. In this 
case, subsequent to the temporary seizure of property, governmental authorities had 
issued a return order. However, the execution of the return order failed and the 
seized property was never returned to the owner.822 This case indicates that if 
property is seized in circumstances where an expropriation does not initially occur, 




3.2 The Development of Principles and Rules of International Law on 
Regulatory Expropriation 
 
A general source of challenges for the international law on expropriation is the lack 
of detail and precision of the concept of indirect expropriation set out in 
international legal instruments and the awards of arbitral tribunals. Consequently, 
the most imminent issue is how to discern a normal legitimate regulation that does 
not incur the obligation of compensation from a compensable expropriation. The 
main function of the concept of regulatory expropriation is to assist in discerning the 
above. The concept of regulatory expropriation serves as a medium through which a 
more precise analysis can be conducted of a state’s regulatory act of interfering with 
foreign-owned property which is alleged to constitute indirect expropriation. The 
                                                
820 ibid para 96. 
821 Christie (n 807) 322. 
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analysis identifies certain characteristics that turn an ordinary regulation into 
indirect expropriation, in order to verify in practice whether indirect expropriation 
has occurred. It has been observed above that there exist certain conditions that 
characterise the existence of such a regulatory expropriation.  
 
The US and Canada Model BITs’ adoption of the three-part Penn Central test is 
notable. By concentrating on the three decisive factors of economic effect, the 
character of a regulation, and legitimate expectation, they effectively provide 
guidance as to where to put focus and special attention in order to identify an 
indirect expropriation. It seems desirable that the three-part Penn Central test 
adopted by these model BITs is also employed by subsequent BITs and FTAs. It 
may also be desirable that the test is used as a model for other international legal 
instruments. The conditions for establishing a regulatory expropriation, which have 
been identified above, can be considered in the same vein. Additionally, there are 
also certain common factors shared by these conditions, in order to establish 
regulatory expropriation, and the Penn Central test. These conditions can contribute 
to the finding of an indirect – and especially, a regulatory – expropriation.  
 
The US Takings Clause doctrine, the NAFTA expropriation rule, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights expropriation rule were chosen for analysis because 
they have long employed and developed rules and principles dealing with the 
expropriation of private or foreign-owned property. Furthermore, these rules and 
principles exhibit strong similarities in terms of key concepts as well as 
formulations in provisions concerning both the protection of private property against 
expropriation and a state’s right to expropriate.  
 
As noted, a comparative analysis of the US Takings Clause doctrine, the NAFTA 
expropriation rule, and the European Convention on Human Rights expropriation 
rule reveals that they operate within the framework of the ends-means and the 
cause-effect. These rules and doctrine adopt the test that seeks a reasonable balance 
209 
 
or a proportionality824 between means and aims; in other words, a governmental 
measure and public objectives. The US Takings Clause doctrine and the European 
Convention expropriation rule especially employ the test that pursues a fair balance 
between the needs of public interests and the protection of property interests. In the 
matter of finding an indirect expropriation or a regulatory expropriation, the US 
Takings Clause doctrine and the NAFTA expropriation rule do not appear to include 
elaborated principles that are conducive to identifying which type of expropriation 
occurred in a case. They have relied on the consideration of the grave economic 
effect of the measure at issue on a private property and the doctrine of police 
powers. The European Convention on Human Rights expropriation rule, on the 
other hand, goes a step further by conceptually differentiating the deprivation of a 
property (or possession) and the control of use of property. The deprivation 
naturally constitutes an expropriation, whereas the control of use, as a lesser 
regulatory interference, cannot. This differentiation can make it easier to 
circumscribe the scope of the notion of expropriation. Even so, the European 
Convention on Human Rights expropriation rule allows for compensation to be 
accorded in the case of a control of use, from the fair balance consideration, where a 
foreign investor has borne a disproportionate burden as a result of the regulatory 
interference.  
 
The doctrine of police power may prove effective for the finding of a regulatory 
expropriation, rather than finding itself as the determinant that denies the existence 
of expropriation. For the doctrine of police power to fulfil its role, it has been noted 
that certain steps are required. Firstly, in order to differentiate indirect expropriation 
from an ordinary regulatory measure, one must increase the reliance on the 
multifactor, rather than concentrating on the depriving effect of the regulatory 
measure in issue. Then, if arbitral scrutiny has identified that the police power was 
excessively exercised, the principle of proportionality can be applied to aid in 
finding regulatory expropriation. The principle of proportionality can function 
within the framework of the ends-means and cause-effect. What specially 
                                                
824 Fireman’s Fund (n 697) para 176(j). 
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differentiates an expropriation issue from other investment protections is that an 
expropriation is a state’s inherent and sovereign right. This is definitively 
recognised by customary international law and also by significant international 
investment agreements, while other investment protections have no direct bearing 
on a state’s substantive sovereignty. A state is entitled to expropriate a private 
property, whether it is owned by its domestic citizen or a foreigner, in the exercise 
of its sovereign right. The role of international law with regard to the right to 
expropriate is merely to restrain it within an international standard. On the other 
hand, a state has no sovereign right to unreasonably discriminate against a foreign 
investor and his or her investment. An expropriation issue in international law 
prompts the question as to when a regulatory interference with private property that 
falls within sovereign jurisdiction turns into an international legal concern.  
 
The doctrine of police power is a traditional concept that has long been relied upon 
in international law to demarcate the line where a regulatory interference can be 
safeguarded by the doctrine from international legal consequences. In order to 
further develop the rules of international investment law on regulatory 
expropriation, it appears necessary to improve the use of the doctrine, based on an 














In relation to the compensation rules for expropriation, it seems to be accepted that 
the Hull formula requiring ‘prompt, effective and adequate’ compensation in the 
event of nationalisation or expropriation generally applies. ‘Adequate’ 
compensation usually denotes the full market value of an expropriated property. 
Even so, in practice, the full market value has not been universally accepted in 
scholarly literature and arbitral jurisprudence in the field of international investment 
law. Law on the standard of compensation for expropriation is called upon to 
address the increasingly diversified indirect forms of expropriatory regulations in a 
way that adequately balances the public and private interests involved in investment 
treaty claims. In particular, an indirect expropriation that exhibits a regulatory 
nature and pursues legitimate public interests takes a central place in connection to 
the request and brings about a challenging issue of how to discern compensable 
expropriation from ordinary regulations that do not incur the obligation to 
compensate. Furthermore, an important question can also arise regarding regulatory 
expropriation, as to whether the full compensation rule is always applicable to the 
case when a regulatory expropriation has occurred. This is because regulatory 
expropriation can be evaluated as being placed between ordinary regulation, which 
does not incur the obligation to compensate, and a type of expropriation, which may 
entail the full market compensation, and where the less-than-full or minimum level 
of compensation can be conceivable. The current practice of the law on the standard 
of compensation will be considered below. In relation to it, significant issues will be 
explored, such as the Hull doctrine, the Calvo doctrine, and the full compensation 








In relation to the amount of compensation in an event of nationalisation or 
expropriation, widespread and frequently used terms are, for example, ‘appropriate’, 
‘fair’, ‘adequate’ and ‘just’ compensation. ‘Appropriate’ compensation appears in 
Article 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States825 as well as in Part 
1 of the 1962 UN General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources. 826  ‘Just’ compensation can be found in the Norwegian 
Shipowners’ Claims case827 and also in the 5th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  
 
The traditionally recognised Hull doctrine, requiring prompt, effective, and adequate 
compensation for expropriation, has exerted a long prevailing influence on the 
understanding and interpretation of ‘just compensation’. However, the law on the 
standard of compensation in the event of expropriation has taken shape not only 
under the influence of the Hull doctrine, but also in circumstances where the 
interests of developed and developing countries have conflicted. This has also been 
accompanied by the adoption of other international legal instruments, for instance, 
the UN General Assembly’s resolutions and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States.  
 
With reference to the amount of compensation in the event of nationalisation or 
expropriation, the Chorzów Factory case delivers the basic principle, based on 
                                                
825 Article 2 provides in para 2(c) that ‘each State has the right to nationalize, expropriate or 
transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be 
paid by the State adopting such measures’. 
826  The General Assembly declares in Part 1, paragraph 4 that ‘nationalization, 
expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, 
security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or 
private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid 
appropriate compensation’. 
827 Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (n 421).  
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international practice and the awards of arbitral tribunals, requiring that reparation 
must intrinsically eliminate all of that which the illegal act created and restore the 
original situation as if the illegal act had not been committed.828 Alternative 
remedies such as restitution-in-kind or pecuniary compensation are not conceivable 
until the intrinsic goal of the reparation becomes impossible to achieve. In Chorzów 
Factory, one of the arbitrators, M Rabel, clarified the basic rationale underlying the 
judgment’s determination of compensation, by explaining that it resulted from the 
unlawful nature of the expropriation. The rationale, he added, ‘is applicable in 
practice whenever the damage caused appears greater than the compensation which 
would be due if the expropriation is lawful’829 and that the responsible state should 
bear the burden of ‘damage caused in so far as such damage exceeds the amount’ of 
the due compensation. In this respect, the legality of the expropriation is to be taken 
into account in determining the amount of compensation and the extent to which the 
amount may exceed the amount of a lawful expropriation.830  
 
Therefore, despite the significant influence of the Hull doctrine, the fact that other 
influential factors have affected the law on the standard of compensation for 
expropriation may give rise to questions as to whether the Hull doctrine is in fact the 
completely controlling principle of the law on the standard of compensation for 
expropriation. Also, the Chorzów Factory case draws attention to the issue of the 
substantive roles of the legality of expropriation in relation to the standard of 
compensation. This chapter will seek answers to these questions, beginning with a 
consideration of nationalisation, from which contemporary as well as traditional 
expropriations have originated.  
 
4.1.2 The Doctrines and Rules for the Standard of Compensation 
 
4.1.2.1 The Calvo Doctrine and the Hull Doctrine 
 
                                                
828 Chorzów Factory (n 48) para 125. 
829 ibid para 189. 
830 ibid para 193. 
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The Calvo doctrine is aimed at achieving equality not only among countries but also 
between foreigners and domestic citizens.831 This doctrine basically means that ‘the 
responsibility of governments toward foreigners cannot be greater than the 
responsibility of governments toward their own citizens’. The doctrine has appeared 
in the ‘Additional and Explanatory Convention to the Treaty of Peace, Amity, 
Commerce and Navigation’,832 which states: 
 
It is mutually understood, that the Republic of Chile is only bound by the 
aforesaid stipulation to maintain the most perfect equality in this respect 
between American and Chilean citizens, the former to enjoy all the rights and 
benefits of the present or future provisions which the laws grant to the latter in 
their judicial tribunals, but no special favors or privileges.833  
 
During the nineteenth century, developing countries advocated the national 
treatment as reflected in the Calvo doctrine. However, during the twentieth century, 
countries began to move towards the adoption of a new law of expropriation that 
reaches beyond national treatment. This is the principle of no obligatory 
compensation for expropriation.834 Mexico manifested its stance in a note, stating: 
 
My government maintains, on the contrary, that there is in international law no 
rule universally accepted in theory nor carried out in practice, which makes 
obligatory the payment of immediate compensation nor even of deferred 
compensation, for expropriation of a general and impersonal character like those 
which Mexico has carried out for the purpose of redistribution of the land.835 
 
                                                
831 Montt (n 40) 38. 
832 ibid 43. This Convention clarified the meaning of the ‘full protection and security’ clause 
contained in Article 10 of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaty. 
833 ibid 44.  
834 ibid 56. 
835 ibid 56; ‘Translation of note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico to the 
American Ambassador at Mexico City (3 August 1938)’ (1938) 32 AJIL 186, 186. 
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The US Secretary of State Cordell Hull responded to this statement by creating the 
Hull doctrine. The doctrine, deemed to reflect customary international law, required 
that compensation be prompt, adequate, and effective. After the advent of the Calvo 
doctrine, the principle of no obligatory compensation for expropriation asserted that 
international law could not obligate a state to pay compensation. The Hull doctrine, 
in contrast, maintained that international law imposed an obligation on the state to 
pay adequate compensation in a prompt and effective way. Thereafter, the Calvo 
clause came into play, requiring that foreigners be regarded as domestic citizens and 
be exclusively subject to domestic regulation, giving up diplomatic protection. This 
type of clause appeared in the provisions of investor-state contracts, as demonstrated 
in the North American Dredging case.836 Here, in a contract with the Mexican 
government, the clause functioned as a legally binding requirement that domestic 
law applied to compensation matters.  
 
Thus, is the task of determining compensation merely reduced to a choice between 
the Hull and the Calvo doctrine? Before reaching such a conclusion on this issue, it 
is necessary to delve into how the Hull doctrine, specifically the requirement of full 
or adequate compensation, operates in practice and to develop further considerations 
as to how rules of compensation for expropriation can adequately work in regulatory 
expropriation. 
 
4.1.2.2 The Full Compensation Rule and Exceptions to 
the Hull Doctrine 
                                                
836 Article 18 of the contract provides that ‘the contractor and all other persons who, as 
employees or in any other capacity, may be engaged in the execution of the work under this 
contract either directly or indirectly, shall be considered as Mexicans in all matters, within 
the Republic of Mexico, concerning the execution of such work and the fulfillment of this 
contract. They shall not claim nor shall they have, with regard to the interests and the 
business connected with this contract, any other rights or means to enforce the same than 
those granted by the laws of the Republic of Mexicans, nor shall they enjoy any other rights 
than those established in favor of Mexicans. They are consequently deprived of any rights 
as aliens, and under no conditions shall the intervention of any foreign diplomatic agents be 
permitted, in any matter related to this contract’; AH Feller, ‘Some Observations on the 
Calvo Clause’ (1933) 27(3) AJIL 461, 462. This is the Spanish text, as reproduced by the 
American Commissioner in USA (International Fisheries Co) v United Mexican States 
Opinions of Commissioners (1931) 206, 260. See also Montt (n 40) 45. 
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In relation to the standard of compensation for expropriation, the positions taken by 
states tend to diverge specifically over whether expropriation should result in full 
compensation. By and large, capital importing states have maintained a national 
treatment standard or a standard of less-than-full fair market value compensation.837 
Capital exporting states, however, have advocated a full fair market value 
compensation standard, as reflected in the Hull doctrine.838 The Hull doctrine, 
requiring prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, was claimed to reflect 
customary international law. 839  According to this doctrine, under customary 
international law, an expropriating state has the obligation to pay full compensation 
corresponding to the fair market value of the expropriated property.840 This view 
was also reflected in the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, which provided that 
the responsible state, for its international wrongful act, should pay compensation 
which ‘shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits’.841 
The commentary to the Articles prescribes that ‘compensation reflecting the capital 
value of property taken or destroyed as the result of an internationally wrongful act’ 
is generally assessed on the basis of the ‘fair market value of the property lost’.842  
 
Even though the Hull doctrine has been recognised as the traditional rule, it can be 
identified that the term ‘full’, used in conjunction with compensation for an 
expropriation, has not been adopted in certain legal instruments and investment 
arbitral awards. For instance, with regard to the compensation for expropriation, the 
tribunal in the Chorzów Factory case provided solely for ‘fair compensation’, 
whereas the tribunal in the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claim case provided for ‘just 
compensation’. The UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 of 1962 provides that 
the owner of the expropriated property is entitled to ‘appropriate compensation’.843 
                                                
837 Newcombe (n 1) 377.  
838 ibid. 
839 Montt (n 40) 56. 
840 Newcombe (n 1) 378. 
841 ibid. 
842 ibid; 379 ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, UN GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 10, UN 
Doc A/56/10 2001 YBILC, vol II, p 2. 
843 The UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 of 1962 (XVII) Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources provides that ‘nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be 
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The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (the Charter), adopted in 1974 
by the UN General Assembly, provides at Article 2(2)(c) that ‘appropriate 
compensation’ should be paid by the expropriating state.844 In the Aminoil case, the 
tribunal held that the nationalisation of an oil concession was lawful and provided 
for appropriate compensation that was affirmed in the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 1803.845 In addition, Section 712 of the Draft Articles of the American 
Institute’s Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
requires ‘just compensation’, and the comments affirm that the United States has 
maintained the position that ‘just compensation’ indicates ‘prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation’.846 No reference to ‘full’ compensation is made and the use 
of alternative terms such as ‘fair’, ‘just’, or ‘appropriate’ is consistently observable. 
While the tendency may be towards an uncertainty concerning the intentions behind 
the use of such terms, the view that full compensation is required for every 
expropriation case has been vigorously challenged by scholars.847 Furthermore, 
certain arbitral cases have denied that full compensation is required in every case of 
expropriation and, instead, less-than-full compensation has been determined to be 
appropriate.  
 
In the Libyan American Oil Company Arbitration case, the sole arbitrator 
Mahmassani stated that the nationalisation of the claimant’s oil concession was 
lawful and that the compensation should contain, as a minimum, the damnum 
emergens, ie the ‘full value of the nationalised property, including all assets, 
installations, and various expenses incurred’, which was regarded as the market 
                                                                                                                                    
based on grounds or reasons of public utility … in such cases the owner shall be paid 
appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such 
measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law’.  
844 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art 2(2)(c). 
845 Aminoil v Kuwait (1982), (1984) 66 ILR 518. 
846 Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) §712 (Tent.  
Draft No 3, 1982), comment e; Oscar Schachter, ‘Compensation for Expropriation’ 78 AJIL 
vol 78 No 1 (1984) 121, 122. 
847  Even though US government has long advocated that the Hull doctrine requiring 
‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation is required by international law, scholars 
have objected that the Hull doctrine is a general rule of international law applicable to all 
cases of expropriation; Schachter (n 846) 121. 
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value.848 He, while objecting to the ‘full’ compensation approach, affirmed that 
‘convenient and equitable’ compensation should be accorded, which reflected part 
of the loss of profits, but not the full loss.849 According to the arbitrator, the 
‘classical doctrine’ requiring the payment of ‘prompt, effective and adequate’ 
compensation functions, rather than as a requisite general rule, as a technical rule 
for the evaluation of compensation and as a guide in negotiating settlement 
agreements, being for instance a criterion of the maximum level.850  
 
In the INA Corporation case, the tribunal acknowledged the probable deviation from 
full or adequate compensation. The tribunal, while recognising that full 
compensation could be accorded to the foreign owner, affirmed as follows: 
 
The taking might be characterised as a formal and systematic nationalisation by 
decree of an entire category of commercial enterprises of fundamental 
importance to the nation’s economy … In the event of such large-scale 
nationalisation of a lawful character, international law has undergone a gradual 
reappraisal, the effect of which may be to undermine the doctrinal value of any 
‘full’ or ‘adequate’ (when used as identical to ‘full’) compensation standard as 
proposed in this case.851  
 
This statement indicates a change or development of law, being particularly 
influenced by two main characteristics: the scale of nationalisation and its 
lawfulness. In addition, Judge Lagergren, the chairman, in a separate opinion, 
maintained as follows: 
 
An application of current principles of international law, as encapsulated in the 
‘appropriate compensation’ formula, would in a case of lawful large-scale 
                                                
848 CF Amerasinghe, ‘Issues of Compensation for the Taking of Alien Property in the Light 
of Recent Cases and Practice’ [1992] International & Comparative Law Quarterly 22.  
849 ibid. 
850 ibid 8. 
851 ibid 43, citing INA Corporation v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1985) 
8 Iran-USCTR 161, 373. 
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nationalizations in a state undergoing a process of radical economic 
restructuring normally require the ‘fair market value’ standard to be discounted 
in taking account of ‘all circumstances’.852 
 
This opinion implies that the consideration of relevant circumstances can yield a 
deviation from the ‘fair market value’ standard. It is correct to say that case law in 
international law is merely a ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law’.853 Thus, arbitral cases cannot exercise a dominant effect, such as reshaping or 
modifying current rules of international law. Also, the Charter is a programmatic 
instrument and is not designed to declare current principles of international law.854 
Article 2.2(c) of the Charter does not reflect current rules of international law, but 
instead declares a goal to be fulfilled for the advent of a new international economic 
order.855 This is revealed from the travaux préparatoires and the General Assembly 
members’ discussion that deemed the Article as only indicating an objective.856 
Thus, it can hardly be concluded that a firmly-established deviation from full 
compensation or less-than-full compensation has been introduced. Nonetheless, 
further discussions that will be helpful in shedding light on the desirable direction of 
the development of international law on the standard of compensation for 
expropriation, especially regulatory expropriation, can be conducted. 
 
 
4.2 Rules on the Standard of Compensation for Regulatory Expropriation 
 
4.2.1 The Hull Doctrine and its Exceptions 
 
                                                
852 ibid 390; Judge Holtzman, the US judge, however, disagreed, maintaining that ‘whatever 
“reappraisal” of customary international law may have occurred in recent years, it has not 
led courts or arbitral tribunals to adopt a standard of partial compensation’. See 
Amerasinghe (n 848) 43–44. 
853 Article 38 1(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 





The Hull doctrine has been recognised as the classical rule that requires full or 
adequate compensation, exercising a predominant effect in shaping international law 
on the compensation for expropriation. It is, nonetheless, true that its universal 
applicability in all circumstances has been questioned, as witnessed by the 
contrasting positions among developed and developing countries, the UN General 
Assembly’s legal instruments, and investment awards. More specifically, deviations 
from the Hull doctrine or the full compensation rule have been articulated in a range 
of positions, such as the Calvo doctrine and the Calvo clause, both of which indicate 
that the determination of compensation is within a state’s domestic jurisdiction, out 
of reach of international legal regulation. Additionally, further deviation is 
demonstrated by the support of certain investment case tribunals of the exceptional 
application of the less-than-full compensation principle for expropriation. 
Furthermore, whether an expropriation was lawful or unlawful can be a conceivable 
factor to be taken into account when determining the standard of compensation to be 
awarded. The tribunal in the Chorzów Factory case stated that it is significantly 
meaningful to distinguish between lawful and unlawful expropriations in terms of 
their financial outcomes,857 and clarified that the fundamental principle underlying 
an ‘illegal act’ is that ‘reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed’.858 Also, as a result of 
the study on the awards of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Bowett drew the 
conclusion that the tribunal was approaching a position that would accept three 
different standards of compensation for an unlawful expropriation, a lawful ad hoc 
expropriation, and a lawful, general act of nationalisation, among which the third 
standard is the lowest.859 The sole arbitrator in the Libyan American Oil Co case 
asserted that in the situation of lawful nationalisation, ‘convenient and equitable’ 
                                                
857 Chorzów Factory (n 48) para 124. 
858 ibid para 125. The PCIJ asserted that this principle would be ‘established by international 
practice and by the decisions of arbitral tribunals’. 
859  DW Bowett, ‘State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on 
Compensation for Termination or Breach’ (1988) 59 BYIL 49–74, 67. Bowett stated that 
there is no explanation in the jurisprudence in differentiating those standards. See Subedi (n 
8) 128.  
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compensation should be accorded, which consisted of only part of the loss of profits, 
in opposition to ‘full’ compensation.860 As can be observed from the discussion 
above, it can be judicially meaningful that different standards of compensation may 
apply, depending on whether the expropriation was lawful or unlawful, and also 
depending on the different characteristics of expropriations among lawful ones.  
 
If the classification technique could be used in a more refined way to reflect clear 
and diverse circumstances that identify the availability of different standards of 
compensation, on the basis of rules and principles of law for expropriation within 
the spectrum of legality to illegality, it could be helpful in the formation of 
exceptions in relation to the Hull doctrine. In particular, in the case of regulatory 
expropriation, the question may arise as to whether the exceptions to the Hull 
doctrine or any different standards of compensation could apply, if conducted in a 
bona fide way without discrimination for the purpose of legitimate public interests, 
and also if the conditions for lawful regulatory expropriation were met.  
 
4.2.2 The Fair Balance Test in Determining Exception for 
Compensation for Regulatory Expropriation  
 
An exception to the Hull doctrine could be described, in a regional context, as being 
the common outcome resulting from the application of a specific test devised by a 
regional tribunal. If this specific test was identifiable then it could potentially 
contribute, in depth and detail, to the formation of exceptions to the Hull doctrine. It 
may also be used to examine how the standard of compensation operates under the 
regional legal system and to consider whether the standard is effectively applicable 
on an international level.861  
                                                
860 Libyan American Oil Co (n 501); see Amerasinghe (n 848) 41. 
861 Determining exceptions for compensation for regulatory expropriation should not be 
confused with the necessity of differentiating the standard of compensation for lawful 
expropriation with that for unlawful expropriation. In the former, the goal is to establish 
exceptions to the Hull doctrine. In the latter, the necessity comes from the demand for a 
‘general preventive function of law’, which will be marred if lawful and unlawful behaviour 
result in the same financial evaluation. See Sergey Ripinsky and Kevin Williams, Damages 
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Under the ECHR, the ECtHR employs the fair balance test862 for the determination 
of compensation, which permits a flexible, refined consideration of a wide range of 
relevant factors involved in the case. The fair balance test seeks to find a fair 
balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.863 The test involves both the 
means-aim sub-test and the cause-effect sub-test.864 One noticeable difference which 
the European Convention expropriation rule demonstrates in comparison to 
customary international law on expropriation relates to how compensation is 
processed. Under customary international law, it is a condition that a foreign owner 
must be awarded compensation for a lawful expropriation to be recognised. On the 
other hand, even though the fair balance test takes into account compensation, it 
also considers whether the foreign owner has borne an ‘excessive’ 865  or a 
‘disproportionate’866 burden consequent to the regulatory deprivation. If this is the 
case, then the deprivation cannot be justified. In Holy Monasteries v Greece, the 
court held as follows: 
 
Compensation … is material to the assessment whether the contested measure 
respects the requisite fair balance and notably, whether it does not impose a 
disproportionate burden on the applicants. In this connection, the taking of 
property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value will 
normally constitute a disproportionate interference and a total lack of 
compensation can be considered justifiable under Article 1 only in exceptional 
circumstances.867  
 
The court’s adoption of the fair balance test when addressing the control of use of 
private property means that a state’s regulatory interference, in the general interest 
                                                                                                                                    
in International Investment Law (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
London 2008) 65. 
862 Sporrong and Lönnroth (n 726). 
863 ibid. 
864 ibid.  
865 ibid 28. 
866 Erkner & Hofhauer v Austria (1987) Series A No 117 ECtHR 39, 66–67.  
867 Holy Monasteries v Greece (n 722). See Freeman (n 714) 187–88. 
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of the rights of the community, must be balanced against the protections owed to a 
property owner, so that the owner does not bear an unreasonably excessive 
burden.868 In this respect, a stark difference between deprivations and regulatory 
interferences, concerning the control of the use of property, exists. In the latter, the 
state is not obliged to make a payment of compensation if the burden borne by the 
property owner is not unreasonable.869 In applying the fair balance test, the court 
also takes into account the level of legitimacy involved in the purpose of a 
regulatory interference when determining compensation. In James, the court held as 
follows, ‘Legitimate objectives of public interest, such as pursued in measures of 
economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for 
less than reimbursement of the full market value’.870 
 
Considering the way in which the ECtHR has employed the fair balance test in 
dealing with expropriation cases, the noticeable features of the test are not only that 
it involves an in-depth contemplation of private and public interests, but also that 
the test focuses on the outcome that would result from expropriation. In this 
scenario, the court readjusts the balance between the state’s interest and the property 
owner’s interest. Also, the court appears to place priority on the affirmative 
presumption that a state normally has the right to expropriate. The subsequent 
consideration is whether a property owner has had to bear an excessive burden 
consequent to the expropriation. When considering expropriation in international 
law, unlike direct expropriation or nationalisation, it is almost always challenging to 
differentiate between a compensable indirect expropriation and a legitimate 
regulation; while the differentiation can determine whether the claimant property 
owner does or does not receive compensation. If the fair balance test was adopted, it 
could be used to produce a more flexibly balanced compensation level between the 
limited options of no compensation or full compensation. Furthermore, regulatory 
expropriation is usually more likely to involve the legitimate regulatory purpose of 
public interest, not expropriatory intent, than direct expropriation and other types of 
                                                
868 Mountfield (n 721) 136, 137; Freeman (n 714) 188. 
869 ibid. See also Freeman (n 714) 188. 
870 James and Others (n 541) 36. 
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indirect expropriation. The fair balance test can provide due regard to a state’s 





As clearly indicated in the Chorzów Factory case, the objective of compensation for 
unlawful expropriation is that the reparation must intrinsically eliminate all of that 
which the illegal act created and restore the original situation as if the illegal act had 
not been committed. However, the objective of the compensation for lawful 
expropriation may be different. In this scenario, it may be that priority is afforded to 
balancing interests rather than placing an emphasis on cancelling out the original act 
and restoring the original situation. 
 
When a legal dispute involves conflicting interests, with both interests deserving of 
some degree of effective protection or justification, it can be doubtful as to whether 
the dispute system operates effectively by permitting only one party to win. This 
proposition is truer in investment treaty cases. In this situation, a state’s regulatory 
act stems from the exercise of sovereignty, but investment treaty law is basically 
designed to protect foreign-owned property. Bearing in mind these problems, when 
a case is brought to an investment arbitral tribunal, which involves a potential 
regulatory expropriation issue, it is necessary that special care be taken. It has been 
doubted that the Hull doctrine, requiring adequate or full compensation, is capable 
of providing suitable legal consequences in relation to all the various types of 
indirect expropriation. Thus, efforts have been made to establish exceptions to the 
Hull doctrine in order to find an enhanced method of reaching a proper balance 
between a state’s interest and a foreign investor’s interest, one example of such 
being the less-than-full compensation process. Both the finding of regulatory 
expropriation and the determining of the legal consequences of regulatory 
expropriation are ultimately directed at distributing international legal protections 
equitably between a state and a foreign investor. In this respect, the fair balance test 
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provides flexibility in striking a balance between the interests of both parties to a 













Lone Star871 is an on-going case. Proceedings were initially commenced in May 
2015. It is the first investor-state arbitration case under the ICSID with which the 
Republic of Korea has been confronted. This case involves an expropriation claim 
based on the allegation that certain tax-related measures taken by the Republic of 
Korea constituted expropriation. This case is very worthy of close attention because 
it addresses the claim that a state’s taxation, which is usually deemed to be a normal 
exercise of a state’s public authority, constituted expropriation.  
 
Even though the award has not yet been decided, it will be beneficial to analyse this 
case in the context of regulatory expropriation as it will provide the opportunity for 
this thesis to consider creeping expropriation. Creeping expropriation is distinct as a 
type of regulatory expropriation. The inquiry into creeping expropriation takes the 
collective view in identifying and evaluating what is alleged to be an expropriation, 
by investigating a series of regulatory measures in-group, each of which does not 
necessarily constitute an international wrongful act. An analysis of the facts in the 
Lone Star case will assist in understanding the concepts of regulatory expropriation 
and of creeping expropriation, in the context of concrete factual details.  
 
Lone Star, a Belgian investor, represented the interests of six Belgian investors in 
this case.872 These Belgian investors were LSF-KEB Holdings SCA, Star Holdings 
SCA, HL Holdings SCA, LSF SLF Holdings SCA, Kukdong Holdings I SCA, and 
Kukdong Holdings II SCA.873 The investors began their investment activities in 
                                                
871 LSF-KEB Holding SCA and others v Republic of Korea (ICSID Case No ARB/12/37). 




Korea in 2003 and approximately owned a 64.62% stake in the Korea Exchange 
Bank (KEB).874 Post 2003, two sets of circumstances occurred. Firstly, after Lone 
Star purchased 51% of the shares in KEB and merged with the Korea Exchange 
Bank Credit Service Co Ltd (KEBCS), it attempted to sell its stakes in KEB on a 
number of occasions.875 The attempted sales were unsuccessful. Lone Star alleged 
that this was because the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) had 
continuously delayed processing the approval of Lone Star’s transactions with other 
parties.876 Secondly, the Korean National Tax Service (NTS) imposed taxes on 
several share transactions between Lone Star and other companies.877 On 21 May 
2012, Lone Star filed an arbitration claim under the terms of the Agreement 
Between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Belgium-Luxembourg 
Economic Union for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Korea-Belgium BIT), on the grounds that the FSC’s acts of delaying approval and 
the NTS’s taxations were so ‘arbitrary and discriminatory’ that they ‘substantially 
and materially impaired the ability of Lone Star to dispose of its investment in 
KEB’.878 Lone Star claimed that the Korean government violated the prohibition of 
expropriation in the absence of compensation879 and other standards of treatment, 
such as the obligation of fair and equitable treatment880 provided for by the Korea-
Belgium BIT.  
 
The notice of arbitration was submitted on 10 December 2012 and three arbitrators 
were appointed. In this chapter, the two sets of circumstances will be explored 
respectively. This case is on-going and awaits long-term proceedings; thus, the goal 
                                                
874 ibid.  
875 ‘Memorandum Required by Article 8.1 of the Agreement between the Government of 
the Republic of Korea and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union for the Reciprocal 
Promotion and Protection of Investment with respect to the Dispute between Lone Star and 
the Republic of Korea (‘Lone Star Arbitration Memorandum’)’ 
<www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120805005041/en/Lone-Star-Funds-Update-
Dispute-South-Korean> accessed 6 November 2015. 
876 ibid. See Korean Banking Act (2012) art 15(3). 
877 ‘Lone Star Arbitration Memorandum’ (n 875). 
878 LSF-KEB Holdings (n 871) Memorandum. 
879 The Korea-Belgium BIT, art 5. 
880 ibid art 2.2. 
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of this chapter is to explore Lone Star’s claim specifically in relation to the 
expropriation violation and to examine whether its claims are tenable. This will be 
done by scrutinising the FSC’s acts of delay and the NTS’s taxations. As the 
arbitration ruling has yet to be released, the chapter will attempt to show how an 
expropriation claim can be addressed in consideration of a government’s 
administrative delays and taxations, thus not providing a complete review of the 
arbitral award and the case. 
 
 
5.1 The FSC’s Alleged Acts of Delay of Approval of Lone Star’s 




Under the Korean Banking Act, any entity seeking to obtain a substantial stake, of 
over 10 per cent of voting shares, in a Korean commercial bank must first receive 
approval from the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC). 881  Without FSC 
approval, any entity is seriously limited in obtaining such a substantial stake.882 
Pursuant to the Act, Lone Star submitted the required application to the FSC for 
approval shortly after entering into the binding agreement to recapitalise KEB.883 
On 26 September 2003, the FSC approved Lone Star’s acquisition of 51% of the 
outstanding shares of KEB,884 as well as Lone Star’s right to exercise call options to 
acquire additional shares from Commerzbank and KEXIM within the limit of 
65.23% of total shares issued and outstanding voting shares.885 On 20 November 
2003, KEB, with Lone Star’s acquiescence, purchased the shares of KEBCS held by 
                                                
881 Korean Banking Act, art 15(3). 
882 ibid 15(1). 
883 ‘Lone Star Arbitration Memorandum’ (n 875) 3. 
884 According to the Korean Banking Act, Article 16-2, the FSC could only approve such an 
investment if the FSC was satisfied that the potential acquirer was not a non-financial 
business operator (NFBO) (otherwise, the NFBO investor could hold no more than 4% of 
the bank’s total issued and outstanding voting shares). 
885 ‘Lone Star Arbitration Memorandum’ (n 875) 3. 
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the other major shareholder in KEBCS, Olympus Capital, and then merged KEBCS 
into KEB.886 
 
It was alleged that the sale of a majority share in KEB to Lone Star was illegal due 
to the negligence of the Korean government, KEB, and the Lone Star personnel 
involved. Therefore, Korean government agencies conducted a number of 
investigations, including an audit of Lone Star’s acquisition of KEB by the Board of 
Audit and Inspection at the request of the National Assembly on 3 March 2006; a 
criminal investigation of Lone Star by the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office in response 
to complaints filed by, inter alia, the Finance and Economy Committee of the 
National Assembly on 7 March 2006 and an activist group called Spec Watch Korea 
on 14 September 2005; and an investigation by the Financial Supervisor Service, an 
executive branch of the FSC.887 
 
Lone Star claimed that following the initiation of these investigations, it attempted 
to sell its shares; however, the FSC delayed its review for the approval of Lone 
Star’s transactions with other parties. The reason provided for the delay was that the 
FSC believed that it should refrain from proceeding with the review process whilst 
investigations and legal proceedings were still pending in relation to the former head 
of Lone Star Advisors Korea, Mr Paul Yoo, who was charged with manipulating the 
stock price in connection to the KEBCS merger. A timeline of the events 
demonstrates the repeated delays of the FSC in its review process.  
 
On 19 May 2006, Lone Star entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with 
the Kookmin Bank for the sale of Lone Star’s 64.62% stake in KEB.888 Kookmin 
filed its application for the approval of the acquisition with the FSC in late May 
2006.889 The FSC refused to process Kookmin’s application for the reason that legal 
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investigations were on-going.890 After Lone Star’s attempts to sell were frustrated, it 
sold 13.6% of KEB’s shares on the open market for ₩ 1.2 trillion (about €1 
billion).891 Therefore, Lone Star was forced to sell the shares at a discounted price – 
compared to the figure it could have obtained if it had been able to sell a controlling 
block.892  
 
On 3 September 2007, Lone Star and HSBC entered into a SPA.893 On 17 December 
2007, HSBC submitted its application to the FSC for the approval of the 
acquisition.894 The FSC declined to approve HSBC’s application by reason of the 
on-going legal proceedings, relating to allegations that Mr Yoo had manipulated the 
stock price of KEBCS in connection with its merger into KEB.895 On 1 February 
2008, the FSC announced that it would not approve HSBC’s acquisition of KEB 
until all legal disputes would be settled.896 On 18 September 2008, with the FSC still 
refusing to proceed, HSBC terminated the SPA.897 Thereafter, Lone Star and the 
Hana Financial Group (Hana) entered into a SPA and, on 13 December 2010, Hana 
filed an application for approval with the FSC.898 The Fair Trade Commission, the 
Korean antitrust authority, approved the sale on 9 March 2011. 899  The FSC 
announced that Hana’s application, along with Lone Star’s status as an NFBO, 
would be reviewed at its meeting on 16 March 2011.900 During this course of events, 
the Supreme Court vacated the Seoul High Court’s ‘not guilty’ verdict against Mr 
Yoo for stock price manipulation related to the KEBCS merger, and remitted the 
case to the lower court.901 Unsurprisingly, on 16 March 2011, the FSC reaffirmed 
that Lone Star was not an NFBO, but confirmed that it would not approve Hana’s 
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application on the basis of the Supreme Court’s ruling.902 Under Article 16–4(3) of 
the Bank Act and Article 215 of the repealed Securities and Exchange Act, the FSC 
would be entitled to order that Lone Star must sell its shareholding in excess of 10% 
of KEB’s shares if the courts determined that Lone Star had violated a finance-
related law or regulation as part of the merger of KEB and KEBCS.903 
 
On 6 October 2011, the Seoul High Court issued a ruling in the KEBCS stock 
manipulation case, finding Lone Star vicariously liable due to its alleged 
wrongdoing during KEB’s merger with KEBCS.904 On 17 October 2011, the FSC 
informed Lone Star that it would be issuing a compliance order based on the Seoul 
High Court decision in the KEBCS case.905 The FSC issued the Compliance Order 
on 25 October 2011, obliging Lone Star to sell its shareholding in excess of 10% of 
KEB’s shares.906 On 18 November 2011, the FSC issued a Disposition Order, which 
ordered Lone Star to dispose of its shares in KEB in excess of 10% by no later than 
18 May 2012.907 Under the time pressure of the approaching deadline of the 
disposition order, Lone Star accepted Hana Financial Group’s demands to drop the 
sale price for its shares.908 Hana submitted the second application with the FSC on 5 
December 2012, which set out the reduced price.909 The FSC approved the sale to 
Hana on 27 January 2012.910  
 
5.1.2 Can the FSC’s Alleged Acts of Delay of the Approval of 
Lone Star’s Transactions with Third Parties and Other Acts 
Constitute Expropriation? 
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When exploring an expropriation claim under international investment law, two 
questions should be addressed. The first is whether a property interest existed that 
falls within the concept of investment as provided for in the international investment 
agreement concerned. The second is whether the property interest was expropriated 
in violation of the relevant provision in the international investment agreement. 
According to Article 1.1(a) of the Korea-Belgium BIT, ‘investment’ is defined as 
follows: 
 
Every kind of asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an investor of 
one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party and in 
particular, though not exclusively, includes movable or immovable property or 
any other property rights such as mortgages, liens or pledges.911 
 
Accordingly, in connection to the FSC review of approval, Lone Star’s property 
right to transact shares, from which it would be able to obtain economic gain, falls 
within the scope of investment to be protected under the BIT.  
 
Thus, was Lone Star’s right to transact shares expropriated? As for expropriation, 
Article 5 of the BIT provides: 
 
Investments of investors of one Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, 
expropriated or otherwise subjected to any other measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as 
‘expropriation’) in the territory of the other Contracting Party except for public 
purposes and against prompt, adequate and effective compensation. The 
expropriation shall be carried out on a non-discriminatory basis and under due 
process of law.912 
 
                                                
911 Article 1 (Definition) 1(2) of the Korea-Belgium BIT. 
912 Article 5 of the BIT, para 1. 
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The Banking Act allows the FSC to exercise its authority to review a transaction 
application for approval and also gives it a wide discretion when doing so. The FSC 
is entitled to afford the approval of transactions ‘only when it can admit itself that it 
is necessary’, by considering factors such as whether the acquirer can contribute to 
the ‘efficiency and soundness of banking business’, the distribution of share-
ownership of the shareholders of the bank concerned, and so forth.913 The list of 
considerations is not exhaustive and it is likely that the FSC can exercise extra 
discretion when deciding whether approval is necessary, even though the extent of 
this extra discretion is not definitively known. While the review processes allegedly 
lingered, the SPAs were given up or terminated by the transaction counterparts. The 
FSC based its halt of the review processes on the reason that it had to wait while 
investigations and legal proceedings were still pending with regard to the former 
head of Lone Star Advisors Korea, Mr Paul Yoo, who was charged with 
manipulating the stock price in connection to the KEBCS merger. If the arbitral 
tribunal considers the FSC’s decision to halt the review processes as legitimate, it 
will decline Lone Star’s claims with regard to the FSC’s acts. However, if the 
arbitral tribunal views the delay as an abuse of authority, then the FSC’s 
administrative acts can be described as unjustifiable; de facto inaction. Because, in 
this case, no nationalisation or direct expropriation occurred, in light of Article 5 of 
the BIT, a question may arise. This is whether the inaction can be deemed as ‘any 
other measures’914 that can give rise to the effect of nationalisation or expropriation. 
Arbitral tribunals’ views diverge on whether inaction can constitute an indirect 
expropriation. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal denied the potential of inaction to 
become such a measure: 
 
A claim founded substantially on omissions and inaction in a situation where the 
evidence suggests a widespread and indiscriminate deterioration in management, 
                                                
913 Korean Banking Act, art 15(3). 
914 Article 5 of the Korea-Belgium BIT. 
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disrupting the functioning of the port of Bandar Abbas, can hardly justify a 
finding of expropriation.915  
 
On the other hand, the tribunal in CME Czech Republic contended that when a de 
facto or indirect expropriation claim arises, it does not matter whether the effect of 
expropriation was caused by actions or by inaction.916  
 
Therefore, it will need to be decided by the arbitral tribunal in Lone Star whether 
inaction can constitute an indirect expropriation, and the existence of the ‘effect 
equivalent to expropriation’ will be a factor of high importance, possibly the 
decisive factor, from a number of factors which will be considered, for a finding of 
expropriation. The sole effect doctrine, though once recognised as predominant, is 
no longer universally accepted. However, in this case it is very likely that the 
economic effect could be the sole decisive factor, in view of the BIT expropriation 
provisions.  
 
The Korea-Belgium BIT embraces the concept of indirect expropriation on the basis 
that the measure in question gives rise to an ‘effect equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation’. 917 The formulation of indirect expropriation in the BIT shows 
particular differences to those provided for by NAFTA and other BITs. Article 1110 
of NAFTA conceives of indirect expropriation when ‘a measure tantamount to 
nationalisation or expropriation’ occurs. This may indicate that a NAFTA tribunal 
could find an indirect expropriation by taking into account a number of 
considerations in addition to the economic effect. For instance, the tribunal in 
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company put forward several relevant factors, beside the 
economic effect factor, for the finding of an indirect expropriation, such as ‘whether 
the measure at issue is within the recognised police powers’; the ‘proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised’; and the ‘investor’s 
                                                
915 Sea-Land Service Inc v Republic of Iran (1984) 6 Iran-USCTR 149; McLachlan and 
others (n 4) 291. 
916 CME (n 7) paras 604–05; McLachlan and others (n 4) 291. 
917 Article 5 of the Korea-Belgium BIT. 
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reasonable investment-backed expectations’.918 The US and Canada Model BITs of 
2004 also provide for additional factors to be considered, such as the ‘extent to 
which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed 
expectations’ and ‘the character of the government action’.919 It is thus reasonable to 
conclude that the existence of an indirect expropriation under the Korea-Belgium 
BIT requires the actual ‘effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’ to be 
considered as the most significant factor.  
 
When a case involves a series of regulatory acts, for the finding of an indirect 
expropriation, an arbitral tribunal can examine either each regulatory act or the 
collection of all the acts together. In the context of Lone Star, besides examining 
each act of the FSC halting the review process, the arbitral tribunal can scrutinise all 
the FSC’s acts of halting the review processes plus the FSC’s orders and the 
governmental investigations in the collective sense for a potential finding of an 
indirect expropriation. This is because the notion of ‘creeping expropriation’ is 
recognised as a type of indirect expropriation. Creeping expropriation denotes the 
situation where an indirect expropriation occurs through a gradual process over a 
long period of time. The tribunal in Pope & Talbot defined creeping expropriation 
as ‘a process that has the effect of taking property through staged measures’.920 The 
tribunal in the Fireman’s Fund case also recognised creeping expropriation by 
stating that the taking can occur through ‘a series of related or unrelated measures 
over a period of time’.921 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States describes creeping expropriation as a situation where the state 
seeks ‘to achieve the same result [as with formal expropriation] by taxation and 
regulatory measures designed to make continued operation of a project 
uneconomical so that it is abandoned’.922 
                                                
918 Fireman’s Fund (n 697) para 176. 
919 US Model BIT (2004), Annex B Expropriation, 4(a)(ii)~(iii) and Canadian Model BIT 
(2004), Annex B.13(1) Expropriation, (b)(ii)~(iii). 
920 Pope & Talbot (n 135) para 83. 
921 Fireman’s Fund (n 697) para 176(d).  
922 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
(1987) vol 1, s 712, comment g. 
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The final question in this task of finding an expropriation is whether Lone Star’s 
right to transact shares in KEB was subjected to an expropriatory effect as a result 
of the FSC’s halting acts and orders, and the governmental investigations, viewed 
either respectively or collectively in light of creeping expropriation. Lone Star 
attempted to sell its shares in KEB to Kookmin Bank, DBS Bank, and HSBC to no 
avail; it finally sold them to Hana. Lone Star claimed that the FSC created the 
situation where it was indirectly forced to sell shares at a reduced price to Hana. It is 
likely that the tribunal will consider that Lone Star suffered a loss of some degree of 
the value of its property, whether it could be justifiable or not. Even so, Lone Star 
did not lose its right to transact because it was ultimately able to sell its shares to 
Hana. Neither did Lone Star go through a situation where all or a substantial part of 
its shares became economically meaningless. This is true even when all of FSC’s 
acts of halting and orders, and the governmental investigations, are examined 
collectively in light of creeping expropriation. Therefore, the FSC’s acts of halting 
the review process and orders, and the governmental investigations, did not 
constitute an indirect expropriation under the Korea-Belgium BIT. Nevertheless, it 
remains to be seen whether the FSC’s acts violated other BIT obligations such as the 
FET, the prohibition of impairment by arbitrary and discriminatory measures, and 
non-discrimination. Those issues are not addressed in this thesis because they are 
beyond the ambit of its topic.  
 
 




The NTS imposed taxes on Lone Star’s share transactions on the basis of its 
interpretation of the Convention between the Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of 
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Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (Korea-Belgium Tax Treaty).923 
 
Firstly, Star Tower Corporation was owned by Star Holdings SCA, a Lone Star 
investment holding company organised under Belgian law.924 The NTS assessed ₩ 
112 billion (almost €92 million) in capital gains taxes in relation to the sale of the 
shares of Star Tower Corporation.925 The Korea-Belgium Tax Treaty expressly 
provides that Korea may not impose tax on the sale of shares of a Korean entity 
where the seller or ‘alienator’ of the shares is a Belgian resident.926 However, the 
NTS asserted that Star Holding SCA was not the true beneficial owner of the shares 
of Star Tower Corporation.927 In declining the status of Star Holdings SCA as the 
seller of the shares of Star Tower Corporation, the NTS based its decision on the 
fact that the ultimate investors, ie the investors in the US and Bermuda partnerships 
that indirectly owned Star Holdings SCA, were the authentic owners of Star Tower 
Corporation.928 The NTS also asserted that the proceeds were taxable in Korea 
under Korea’s domestic law, regardless of the provisions of the treaty, because the 
gains in question engendered from the sale of a Korean company whose primary 
asset was real estate.929 Accordingly, the NTS assessed taxes against the US and 
Bermuda partnerships that had invested indirectly in Star Tower Corporation.930 
 
The NTS imposes taxes against these partnerships under Korea’s personal income 
tax, not under Korea’s corporate tax.931 In January 2012, the Korean Supreme Court 
found that it was inappropriate to impose taxes under Korea’s personal income tax 
                                                
923 The Convention between the Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of Belgium for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes 
on Income (Korea-Belgium Tax Treaty) was signed on 20 April 1994 and came into force 
on 31 December 1996. 
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and ordered that the NTS cancel the personal income tax imposed on Lone Star.932 
Accordingly, the NTS imposed corporate tax on Lone Star.933  
 
Secondly, in 2007, five Belgian investment holding companies affiliated with Lone 
Star sold shares in three Korean companies.934  
 
In July 2008, the NTS assessed and imposed taxes of ₩153 billion (about €93 
million).935 The NTS, having no regard for each of the Belgian entities that had sold 
the shares, asserted that the upstream US and Bermuda partnerships had permanent 
establishments in Korea (and a portion of gains from the sale of the shares can, 
therefore, be taxed in Korea) due to business activities conducted by employees of 
LSAK and Hudson Advisors Korea Inc, an affiliated asset management company in 
Korea.936 
 
Thirdly, in February 2012, Lone Star was permitted to sell its majority stake in KEB 
to Hana Financial Group.937 Then, the NTS directed Hana to withhold taxes in 
relation to the transaction of the KEB shares.938 Lone Star argued that the NTS’s 
direction to withhold taxes in this case indicated that the NTS had inconsistent 
views of the tax assessment.939 This was because the order to withhold taxes 
indicated that the NTS viewed Lone Star as having no permanent establishment in 
Korea, while the exemption from withholding taxes under the Korea-Belgium Tax 
Treaty (or embracing for the purpose of discussion the NTS’s position that the 
ultimate fund investors were the true taxpayers with respect to this investment, 
under the treaties with the countries of residence of those ultimate investors) in the 
case of the proceeds of the 2012 sale indicated that the NTS did in fact view that 
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Lone Star had a permanent establishment in Korea.940 In accordance with the NTS’s 
direction, Hana withheld taxes of ₩ 431 billion (almost €292 million) from the sale 
proceeds and paid it to the Seoul Regional Tax Office and the Namdaemun District 
Tax Office on 5 March 2012 and 7 March 2012, respectively.941 
 
5.2.2 The State’s Right to Tax under International Law and Double 
Taxation 
 
According to basic principles of international law, a state exercises the power to tax 
on the basis that it has sovereignty over a ‘defined territory’ and a ‘permanent 
population’. 942  States tend to prefer bilateral treaties as the legal instruments 
imposing limitations on their fiscal sovereignty, where the principle of reciprocity 
can operate. 943  Multilateral treaty regimes have been declined by developed 
countries.944 The authority to tax is also exercised subject to constraints formed by 
general principles of international law.945 International taxation regimes operate 
upon two foundations: (i) the identification of the taxation basis and (ii) the 
international allocation of taxable income or properties between tax authorities.946 A 
taxation basis can be established on the basis of predominately two main tax 
principles: the residence principle and the source principle. 947  The residence 
principle involves taxing income, without regard for where it originated from, based 
on the residence of the natural or legal person who obtains the income.948 In contrast, 
                                                
940 ibid. 
941 ibid 18. 
942 The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States provides in Article 
1 that the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: 
(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) the capacity to 
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943  Fiona C Beveridge, The Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment under 
International Law: Toward International Disciplines (Juris Publishing, Manchester 
University Press 2000) 78.  
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945 Wolfgang Schon, ‘Persons and Territories: on the International Allocation of Taxing 
Rights’ [2010] British Tax Review 1. 
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according to the source principle, tax is imposed on income in the jurisdiction 
within which income-generating business activities take place.949 In a situation 
where these two principles intersect each other, double taxation becomes a potential 
issue.950  
 
In relation to the potential for double taxation, a large amount of double taxation 
treaties exists; more than 1,500 treaties at a minimum. Even though some variances 
exist in the relevant provisions of these agreements, most of them pursue the general 
approach adopted in the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
2010 (OECD Model Tax Convention).951  
 
In determining whether to tax an enterprise from state A, the taxing authorities in 
state B confront two questions, as follows: 
 
1. Do the enterprise’s business activities fall within the scope of state B’s 
domestic tax law? 
2. If so, is it protected from such taxation by the provisions of a double tax 
treaty between state A and state B?952 
 
The OECD Model Tax Convention basically employs the residence principle, but 
allows deviations from it by taking into account the ‘permanent establishment’.953 
Therefore, suppose that the business is prima facie taxable and that the tax treaty 
between the two relevant states follows the OECD Model Tax Convention, the 
question of taxation leads onto whether the enterprise has a permanent 
establishment in state B.954 Paragraph 3 of the Commentary to Article 7 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention provides that: 
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It has come to be accepted in international fiscal matters that until an enterprise 
of one State sets up a permanent establishment in another State it should not 
properly be regarded as participating in the economic life of that other State to 
such an extent that it comes within the jurisdiction of that other State’s taxing 
rights. 
 
The definition of ‘permanent establishment’ is articulated in Article 5(1) of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention, according to which, it is ‘a fixed place of business 
through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on’. 
Paragraph 2 of the Commentary to Article 5 expounds details of the definition, as 
follows: 
 
1. the existence of a ‘place of business’, ie a facility, such as premises, or in 
certain instances, machinery or equipment; 
2. the place of business must be ‘fixed’, ie it must be established as a distinct 
location with a certain degree of permanence; and 
3. the carrying on of the business of the enterprise is through this fixed place of 
business. This means, traditionally, that persons who, in one way or another, 
are dependent on the enterprise (personnel) conduct the business of the 
enterprise in the state in which the fixed place is situated.  
 
Article 5(5) of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides an alternative method of 
recognising permanent establishment. An enterprise is deemed to have a permanent 
establishment in a state where there is a person – other than an independent agent – 
(a dependent agent) who is ‘acting on behalf of and has, and habitually exercises, in 
a Contracting state, an authority to conclude contracts in the name of the 
enterprise’.955 However, Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides 
a general carve-out provision for cases where business activities performed through 
a fixed place of business or a dependent agent are characterised as being preparatory 
or auxiliary for the enterprise, because ‘such a place of business’ only affords ‘the 
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services so remote from the actual realisation of profits that it is difficult to allocate 
any profit to the fixed place of business (or dependent agent) in question’.956 
 
5.2.3 Taxation Claims and Investment Treaty Arbitration 
 
Governmental taxation measures normally meet four conditions: it must be 
exercised (i) for something other than a certain benefit (service, right or 
performance); (ii) to a public body; (iii) with the aim of raising revenue; and (iv) 
based on a liability in law or regulations.957 International investment agreements do 
not usually contain express provisions that directly address such governmental 
taxation measures. Even so, can a foreign investor bring a claim before investment 
treaty arbitration in relation to a tax measure? Investment treaties are not intended to 
afford foreign investors with rights concerning taxation and tax calculation.958 A 
taxation measure as such, thus, cannot be a subject matter about which to raise a 
complaint under international investment agreements. However, when a tax measure 
can be construed as a type of treatment which has been afforded to a foreign 
investor, the investor would be able to raise an investment treaty claim for a 
violation of standards of treatment afforded by the treaty. 959  In this regard, 
international investment agreements become applicable to taxation matters; only in 
a different way to that of double taxation treaties.960 For a taxation claim to be 
brought to investment treaty arbitration under the ICSID, there are additional 
conditions to be met. 
 
First of all, the ICSID Convention provides in Article 25 that ‘the jurisdiction of the 
Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment’. 
                                                
956 Paragraph 23 of the Commentary to Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
957 Edwin Vanderbruggen, ‘Investment Arbitration in Tax Matters: Some Thoughts on 
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Although there is no indication that a tax dispute related to an investment is a ‘legal 
dispute’ over which the ICSID tribunals have jurisdiction, the early jurisprudence of 
the ICSID has recognised that tax disputes related to an investment are indeed ‘legal 
disputes arising directly out of the investment’.961 In Kaiser Bauxite v Jamaica, a 
case relating to an investment treaty which contained a tax-stabilisation clause, the 
tribunal acknowledged that a dispute over a tax increase would fall within the scope 
of the jurisdiction of the ICSID Convention because ‘the dispute concerned the 
alleged rights and obligations stemming from the particular provisions in the 
agreements between Kaiser and Jamaica and was therefore a legal dispute’.962 In 
Goetz v Burundi, where the investor claimed that the revocation of a duty free zone 
constituted the expropriation of his mining operation, the tribunal made an award on 
the basis that the issues of reparation for damage to a foreign investor are invariably 
legal disputes, irrespective of the types of governmental measures involved.963 In 
Feldman v Mexico, the tribunal concluded that the failure of the tax authorities to 
refund excise tax for exported cigarettes brought about a violation of the national 
treatment of the investment treaty.964 
 
Secondly, unique to taxation matters under international investment agreements is 
the limited ability that foreign investors have to file a taxation-based investment 
claim, due to the existence of a ‘taxation carve-out clause’ in all contemporary 
international investment agreements.965 Taxation carve-out clauses first appeared in 
international investment agreements in the late 1960s. Previously it seemed that 
taxation matters in general were not been covered by international investment 
agreements because they had been recognised as being covered in bilateral tax 
treaties.966 A taxation carve-out clause can be understood as circumscribing either 
the ‘admissibility of a claim’ or the ‘host state’s consent to arbitration’, and 
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therefore the ‘jurisdiction of the tribunal’.967 In this respect, a taxation carve-out 
clause can function as a procedural limitation to the arbitral judgment of a taxation-
based investment claim.968 For instance, Article 16(1) of the Canada Model BIT of 
2004 provides at Article 16(1): 
 
Except as set out in this Article, nothing in this Agreement shall apply to 
taxation measures. For further certainty, nothing in this Agreement shall affect 
the rights and obligations of the Parties under any tax convention. In the event 
of any inconsistency between the provisions of this Agreement and any such 
convention, the provisions of that convention shall apply to the extent of the 
inconsistency.969 
 
Article 16(4) of the Canada Model BIT provides, in particular to a taxation-based 
expropriation issue, as follows: 
 
The provisions of Article 13 shall apply to taxation measures unless the taxation 
authorities of the Parties, no later than six months after being notified by an 
investor that the investor disputes a taxation measure, jointly determine that the 
measure in question is not an expropriation. The investor shall refer the issue of 
whether a taxation measure is an expropriation for a determination to the 
taxation authorities of the Parties at the same time that it gives notice under 
Article 24 (Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration).970 
 
Article 16(4) renders the arbitral acceptance of a taxation-based expropriation claim 
conditioned on the joint veto of the tax authorities of both the home state and the 
host state.971 When a foreign investor files a notice of arbitration, it should also refer 
its taxation-based expropriation claim to the tax authorities of both its home state 
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and its host state. Both tax authorities will determine whether a taxation measure in 
question constituted an expropriation in the period of six months. If the tax 
authorities jointly decide that it did not constitute an expropriation, the investor’s 
claim will no longer be processed in the arbitration. Canada’s Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development clarified the purpose of the Canada Model 
BIT’s taxation carve-out clause: 
 
In general, taxation measures are outside the scope of a FIPA [Foreign 
Investment Protection Agreement]. Taxation matters are addressed through 
bilateral double taxation agreements … Canada does, however, negotiate its 
FIPAs on the basis that tax measures will be subject to the disciplines of the 
FIPA with respect to expropriation and tax measures that form part of a private 
investment agreement or contract between an investor and host government.972 
 
Article 21 of the US Model BIT of 2012 also provides that the BIT only applies 
exceptionally to taxation measures, as follows: 
 
1. Except as provided in this Article, nothing in Section A shall 
impose obligations with respect to taxation measures. 
2. Article 6 [Expropriation] shall apply to all taxation measures, 
except that a claimant that asserts that a taxation measure involves 
an expropriation may submit a claim to arbitration under Section B 
only if: 
 
(a) The claimant has first referred to the competent tax authorities of 
both Parties in writing the issue of whether that taxation measure 
involves an expropriation; and 
                                                
972 ibid 12. 
246 
 
(b) Within 180 days after the date of such referral, the competent tax 
authorities of both Parties fail to agree that the taxation measure is 
not an expropriation.973  
 
The foreign investor, prior to submitting its taxation-based expropriation claim to 
arbitration, should refer to the authorities of both the home state and the host state. 
The matter should only be referred to arbitration if the tax authorities of both states 
cannot agree within 180 days, since the alleged expropriation was referred to the 
authorities, whether the taxation measure constituted an expropriation.  
 
NAFTA provides in Article 2103(1) and (2) in relation to taxation: 
 
(1) Except as set out in this Article, nothing in this Agreement shall apply to 
taxation measures. 
(2) Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of any Party 
under any tax convention. In the event of any inconsistency between this 
Agreement and any such convention, that convention shall prevail to the extent 
of the consistency. 
 
Article 2103(6) of NAFTA also provides, concerning a taxation-based expropriation 
issue, that: 
 
Article 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation) shall apply to taxation measures 
except that no investor may invoke that Article as the basis for a claim under 
Article 1116 (Claim by an Investor of a Party on its Own Behalf) or 1117 
(Claim by an Investor of a Party on Behalf of an Enterprise), where it has been 
determined pursuant to this paragraph that the measure is not an 
expropriation.974  
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NAFTA also provides for a joint veto mechanism whereby the tax authorities of 
both the home state and the host state can jointly decide the continuous arbitral 
judgment of a taxation-based expropriation claim in the period of six months.975 The 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) similarly contains the taxation carve-out and the joint 
veto clauses. Article 21 (1) provides that: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this Article, nothing in this Treaty shall create 
rights or impose obligations with respect to Taxation Measures of the 
Contracting Parties. In the event of any inconsistency between this Article and 
any other provision of the Treaty, this Article shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency.976 
 
It is submitted that the version of the joint veto mechanism of the ECT is weak, in 
that the tax authorities of both the home state and the host state are obliged to ‘strive 
to resolve’977 whether an expropriation occurred and the tribunal may ‘take into 
account’978 conclusions made by the tax authorities. 
 
5.2.4 Taxation-Based Expropriation Claims 
 
Tax intrinsically involves a ‘partial confiscation’ 979  or an ‘appropriation of 
property’980 that incurs no compensation.981 Thus, it is clearly a challenging task to 
differentiate a compensable expropriation from normal taxation measures. Since 
international investment agreements do not provide extra guidelines in order to 
helpfully conduct this task, it is almost inevitable that one has to rely on what can be 
derived from arbitral jurisprudence. Furthermore, what may render the issue more 
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complicated is that wide disagreement exists between states within the global tax 
system on what constitutes a ‘legitimate exercise of the taxing power’.982 For 
instance, states can apply differential tax treatment to a corporate group where its 
holding company, situated in a tax haven, ‘state A’, is the owner of an ‘operating 
subsidiary with valuable property’ in ‘state B’, which seeks to obtain a capital gain 
from the value of the assets by transacting its shares into the operating company.983 
Western states deem that this share transaction brings about a capital gain, taxable 
only in state A.984 On the other hand, India and China view that state B has the right 
to tax the group in relation to the gain.985 Therefore, it is significant to pay close 
attention to specific bilateral tax treaties as well as relevant arbitral jurisprudence.  
 
What can be observed from recent arbitral cases, to be explored below, which 
involve taxation-based expropriation claims, is that the most frequent reason for the 
rejection of claims has lain in the failure of proving substantial deprivation.986 In the 
case of Archer Daniels Midland Company, the amendment of the Mexican 
Congress, imposing a 20 per cent excise tax on soft drinks and syrups that used 
sweeteners other than cane sugar, such as high fructose corn syrup, was at issue.987 
Even though the claimant argued that the excise tax was expropriatory, because it 
was ‘discriminatory and also interfered with their legitimate and reasonable 
expectations regarding the economic benefit to be obtained from the use and 
enjoyment of the investment’,988 the tribunal was not convinced. The tribunal 
advocated that the ‘effect test’,989 indicating that an expropriation occurs when the 
measure at issue causes the investor to lose control of the investment by losing the 
property rights, even if the legal title remains intact990 or ‘rendered useless the most 
                                                




986 ibid 5. 
987 Archer Daniels Midland Company (n 462) para 2. 
988 ibid para 251. 
989 ibid para 240. 
990 ibid para 244. 
249 
 
economically optimal use of it’.991 Furthermore, the tribunal recognised that the 
economic effect of deprivation was the factor of highest priority to be taken into 
account for the finding of an expropriation. The tribunal clarified its stance by citing 
the cases of Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (1922) and Polish Upper Silesia 
(1929), in which the tribunals admitted that an indirect expropriation could occur ‘as 
a result of a government measure which results in the effective loss of management, 
use or control, or significant loss or depreciation of the value or the assets of the 
foreign investment’.992 The Archer Daniels Midland Company tribunal also stated 
that the decisive element was whether the government measure interfered with 
property rights to an extent that these rights were rendered ‘so useless that they must 
be deemed to have been expropriated’.993 The tribunal conclusively rejected the 
claim on the basis that the tax did not prevent the full operation of production 
activities.994  
 
In Feldman, the Mexican government’s refusal to afford rebates on exported 
tobacco products was at issue.995 The refusal resulted in a tax liability that made the 
claimant’s tobacco export business unprofitable.996 The tribunal did not accept the 
claim as it felt that a tax that made ‘certain activities less profitable or even 
uneconomic to continue’ did not necessarily amount to an expropriation.997 In 
EnCana, the claimant contended that the denial of VAT credits and refunds, 
estimated to be 10 per cent of the value of its business transactions, constituted an 
expropriation under the Canada-Ecuador BIT.998 The tribunal denied this contention 
as the state measure in question did not impair the claimant’s ability to maintain 
normal business activities, or render the economic profit from its investment ‘so 
marginal or unprofitable as to effectively deprive them of their character as 
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investments’.999 In Occidental Exploration and Production Company, the tribunal 
concluded that the denial of VAT refunds did not constitute an expropriation under 
the US-Ecuador BIT because of the absence of a substantial deprivation of the value 
of the claimant’s investment.1000 In both Burlington Resources and Perenco, in 
relation to Ecuador’s Law 42, heavy taxes were imposed on sales of oil exceeding 
certain amounts. In Burlington, the tribunal rejected the claimant’s contention that 
taxation that occupied 50~90 per cent of profits constituted an expropriation under 
the US-Ecuador BIT and held that the taxes did not render the claimant’s investment 
completely unprofitable.1001 In Perenco, the tribunal rejected the expropriation 
claim even though the taxes caused the claimant a loss of 99 per cent of windfall 
profits.1002 It held that: 
 
The financial burden of paying 99% of the revenue above the reference price, 
while disadvantageous to Perenco, did not bring its operation to a halt or, to 
revert to the tests previously cited, effectively neutralise the investment or 
render it as if it had ceased to exist.1003 
 
Despite being rare, successful cases involving taxation-based expropriation claims 
have materialised; in particular, in the circumstances of the nationalisation of the 
Yukos oil company by the Russian government. Yukos’ production companies sold 
oil to its affiliated trading companies in locations which were exempt from profits 
tax.1004 The trading companies sold oil at market price to foreign purchasers.1005 
This oil was subject to VAT, but received a zero-rate benefit as it was on exported 
goods.1006 In 2003, Khodorkovsky, Yukos’ CEO, was prosecuted for corporate tax 
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evasion.1007 At this point, the Russian tax authorities re-examined Yukos’ accounts 
for the period of 2000 through to 2003, and found that more than US$24 billion in 
liabilities were overdue.1008 The new assessments neglected the existence of Yukos’ 
affiliated trading companies and removed Yukos’ advantage of the exemption from 
profits tax.1009 Besides the loss of the exemption of profits tax, Yukos was deprived 
of its zero-rated VAT benefit filed by its production companies, becoming subject to 
the full VAT rate. 1010  In response, the state seized Yukos’ properties and 
implemented a ‘non-competitive’ auction whereby Yukos’ properties were sold at 
below-market price to Rosneft, a state oil company.1011 
 
Yukos’ shareholders filed investment arbitration claims against Russia under the 
UK-USSR BIT, 1012  the Spain-USSR BIT 1013  and the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT),1014 claiming that Russia had expropriated their investments. All the tribunals 
under these international investment treaties accepted the expropriation claims. In 
RosInvestCo UK Ltd v Russia, the tribunal established under the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC) Rules concluded that Yukos suffered from ‘relentless 
and inflexible attacks’ that could only be construed as ‘steps under a common 
denominator in a pattern to destroy Yukos and gain control over its assets’.1015 In 
Renta 4 SVSA v Russia, the tribunal looking at the SCC Rules examined whether 
‘Yukos’ tax delinquency was indeed a pretext for seizing Yukos’ assets and 
transferring them to Rosneft’. 1016  Yukos was liquidated through bankruptcy 
proceedings and the rest of its assets were sold in liquidation auctions.1017 The 
tribunal, while admitting that the claimants had failed to prove that the ‘manner in 
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which the bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings were commenced or conducted 
violated Russian law’,1018 concluded that: 
 
Yukos’ tax delinquency was indeed a pretext for seizing Yukos’ assets and 
transferring them to Rosneft. As discussed above, this finding supports the 
Claimant’s contention that the Russian Federation’s real goal was to expropriate 
Yukos, and not to legitimately collect taxes.1019 
 
In Yukos Universal Ltd v Russia, the tribunal concluded that an expropriation 
occurred, holding that: 
 
The tribunal has earlier concluded that ‘the primary objective of the Russian 
Federation was not to collect taxes but rather to bankrupt Yukos and appropriate 
its valuable assets’ … Among the many incidents in this train of mistreatment 
that are within the remit of this Tribunal, two stand out: finding Yukos liable for 
the payment of more than 13 billion dollars in VAT in respect of oil that had 
been exported by the trading companies and should have been free of VAT and 
free of fines in respect of VAT; and the auction of YNG at a price that was far 
less than its value. But for two actions, …Yukos would have been able to pay 
the tax claims of the Russian Federation justified or not; it would not have been 
bankrupted and liquidated. … Respondent has not explicitly expropriated Yukos 
or the holdings of its shareholders, but the measures that Respondent has taken 
in respect of Yukos, set forth in detail in Part VIII, in the view of the Tribunal 
have had an effect ‘equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’.1020 
 
From the examination of the above expropriation cases, it seems apparent that it is 
rarely likely for foreign investors to succeed in taxation-based expropriation cases. 
Expropriation cases involving the Yukos oil company represent a taxation-related 
example in which a state significantly abused its tax power and surreptitiously 
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managed to bring about an indirect expropriation. As the tribunal in Yukos 
Universal Ltd clarified, in relation to the question as to when a taxation measure can 
constitute an indirect expropriation, the important core element is an effect 
‘equivalent to expropriation’. The tribunal in Archer Daniels Midland Company 
introduced ‘substantial deprivation’, as follows: 
 
Judicial practice indicated that the severity of the economic impact is the 
decisive criterion in deciding whether an indirect expropriation or a measure 
tantamount to expropriation has taken place. An expropriation occurs if the 
interference is substantial and deprives the investor of all or most of the benefits 
of the investment.1021 
 
In articulating the concept of substantial deprivation, there are three conceivable 
approaches. The first approach is to calculate the tax rate. Although the tax rate is a 
key element in taxation, international law does not inhibit tax rates of 90 per cent or 
more.1022 Case law of international courts and tribunals does not specify the 
maximum tax rate that a state must abide by in accordance with international 
law.1023 In fact, the tribunal in Burlington did not give much weight to a high tax 
rate.1024 A second approach is to examine the variation in the tax rate. If an 
extremely wide variation gap or a sudden advent of a new tax at a high rate exists, it 
may create the implication of an indirect expropriation.1025 However, because there 
can be occasions in which some part of the high tax burden is transferable to a 
foreign investor’s customers, 1026  then it cannot be guaranteed as an accurate 
criterion. A third approach is to focus on the ‘profitability of the investment’ and to 
determine whether a taxation measure has extinguished profitability, in order to find 
an indirect expropriation.1027 The tribunal in Burlington expounded this approach: 
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What appears to be decisive, in assessing whether there is a substantial 
deprivation, is the loss of the economic value or economic viability of the 
investment. … What matters is the capacity to earn a commercial return. After 
all, investors make investments to earn a return. … ‘loss of benefits or 
expectation … is not a sufficient criterion for an expropriation’.1028 … While 
losses in one year may indicate that the investment has become unviable and 
will not return to profitability, this is not necessarily so and a finding of 
expropriation would need to assess the future prospects of earning a commercial 
return. It must be shown that the investment’s continuing capacity to generate a 
return has been virtually extinguished.1029  
 
Tax by nature involves the taking of a portion of property. With such an 
appropriation being justifiably allowed, arbitral jurisprudence does not put more 
emphasis on factors other than economic effect for the finding of an indirect 
expropriation. Thus, the substantial effect of economic deprivation is deemed as the 
most decisive factor. This means that in addressing a taxation-based expropriation 
claim for the finding of expropriation, rather than seeking to articulate other 
conditions than economic effect to establish taxation-based expropriation, it is 
necessary to maintain the focus on the notion of substantial deprivation. In 
connection to substantial deprivation, the tribunal in Burlington emphasised that as a 
result of the state’s conduct, the ‘investment’s continuing capacity to generate a 
return has been virtually extinguished’. In fact, it is usually unlikely that a simple 
taxation measure alone can cause such an enormous impact on a whole investment. 
As is observable in the Yukos cases, the taxation itself was merely used as a pretext 
for the Russian government to deprive Yukos of its assets. Other tax enforcement 
measures, such as the seizure of Yukos’ assets, an auction, the bankruptcy, and the 
liquidation collectively resulted in the effect amounting to expropriation. In this 
regard, a wider scope of taxation-related measures, beyond a simple tax rate or 
variation, should conceivably have the capability of bringing about an indirect 
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expropriation. In other words, a series of taxation-related measures, when the scope 
of scrutiny is properly circumscribed, could be recognised as having a much higher 
potential of constituting an indirect expropriation; this possibly constituting a so-
called creeping expropriation.  
 
Creeping expropriation is recognised as a type of indirect expropriation. During 
investigation, the scope of the tribunals’ scrutiny is directed at the state’s series of 
acts. This concept was defined by the tribunal in Generation Ukraine Inc: 
 
Creeping expropriation is a form of indirect expropriation with a distinctive 
temporal quality in the sense that it encapsulates the situation whereby a series 
of acts attributable to the State over a period of time culminates in the 
expropriatory taking of such property.1030 
 
The tribunal in RosInvestCo UK Ltd highlighted the concept of creeping 
expropriation and, in doing so, concentrated its scrutiny on the sum of a series of 
state acts and the collective or cumulative effect of those measures, as follows: 
 
In conclusion therefore, the Tribunal considers that the totality of Respondent’s 
measures were structured in such a way to remove Yukos’ assets from the 
control of the company and the individuals associated with Yukos. They must be 
seen as elements in the cumulative treatment of Yukos for what seems to have 
been the intended purpose. … The Tribunal ... considers that this cumulative 
effect of those various measures taken by Respondent in respect of Yukos is 
relevant to its decision … In the view of the Tribunal, they can only be 
understood as steps under a common denominator in a pattern to destroy Yukos 
and gain control over its assets.1031 
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Arbitral practice concerning taxation-based expropriation issues exhibits a strong 
adherence to the effect test that requires the substantial deprivation of property 
interest for establishing indirect expropriation. It has been demonstrated that 
expropriation claims simply based on some degree of loss of value or enjoyment of 
property interest are ultimately unsuccessful. If the notion of creeping expropriation 
is embraced by arbitral tribunals, it will increase the likelihood that a series of 
taxation-related measures could be recognised as constituting an indirect 
expropriation. The Yukos cases effectively represent this potential. In addition, it 
should not be neglected that the sole existence of substantial deprivation cannot 
guarantee the constitution of an indirect expropriation. There are other factors that 
must be taken into account, such as proportionality and legitimate expectation.1032  
 
5.2.5 Can the NTS Taxes on Lone Star’s Transactions and the 
Withholding Taxes Constitute Expropriation? 
 
Lone Star has disputed, in the Korean domestic courts, the jurisdiction of the 
Korean tax authorities, namely, the NTS, and permanent establishment. As 
previously mentioned, the appellate judgments have yet to be concluded. Despite 
this inconclusiveness, it is worth exploring the issue of expropriation on the 
supposition that Lone Star’s contention concerning the NTS’s tax jurisdiction and 
permanent establishment issues are accurate; meaning that the Korean government 
imposed taxes on Lone Star in violation of the Korea-Belgium Tax Treaty. Lone 
Star argued that the Korean tax authorities deprived it of its property interests by 
exercising its tax power despite Belgium retaining the power to tax Lone Star under 
the Korea-Belgium Tax Treaty. The NTS imposed taxes on the sale of Lone Star’s 
holding company (Star Holdings SCA), in relation to the shares in Star Tower 
Corporation under the corporate tax regime, not a personal income tax regime. It 
also imposed taxes on the sale of shares in three Korean companies by five Lone 
Star holding companies. Further, it executed withholding taxes in respect of the sale 
by Lone Star of shares in KEB to Hana.  
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According to Article 1.1(a) of the Korea-Belgium BIT, what falls within the scope 
of investment to be protected is, namely, ‘every kind of asset’. In this case, this 
would be Lone Star’s ownership of shares in the Korean companies. Additionally, 
as touched upon previously, Article 5(1) of the Korea-Belgium BIT requires that the 
actual effect be ‘equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’. This is the most 
significant factor to be considered in establishing indirect expropriation. In view of 
recent arbitral practice, it is probable that, besides effect, other factors such as the 
proportionality and the legitimate expectation can be considered. With regard to 
economic effect, in the context of taxation-based expropriation issues, it is primarily 
necessary to articulate the existence of substantial deprivation, which encompasses 
such outcomes as the deprivation of all or most of the benefits of the investment,1033 
the demise of all profitability of the investment,1034 or the removal of the assets from 
the control of the investor.1035 All NTS taxes imposed on the sale of Lone Star’s 
shares, viewed either respectively or collectively in light of creeping expropriation, 
do not appear to have produced a substantial deprivation at such an enormous scale. 
Also, given that Lone Star ultimately sold its shares to Hana, it was not deprived of 
all or most of the benefits of the investment or of its control over its assets. 
Therefore, it is hard to conclude that the NTS taxes on Lone Star’s transactions 
constituted indirect expropriation. However, it remains to be further investigated 
whether the NTS taxes on Lone Star’s transactions violated other standards such as 





The Lone Star case is the first investor-state arbitration case that the Korean 
government has experienced and is experiencing. Since Lone Star filed its 
arbitration claim on 21 May 2012, under ICSID, the arbitration proceedings have 
been on-going. The outcome of the arbitration proceedings is still awaited. This case 
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is special not only because it is the first arbitration case that the Korean government 
has faced, but also because it involves a taxation-based expropriation claim. A 
state’s taxation power is the most ordinary type of police power and it may be very 
challenging for a foreign investor to succeed with such a claim because, from a 
theoretical perspective, the effect-oriented doctrine requires that the taxation 
measure in question bring about an extraordinary financial impact on a foreign 
investor’s property. Another issue is whether the state’s delay of approval of a 
foreign investor’s business activities, as a series of administrative acts, can give rise 
to an accumulative effect of economic deprivation. The FSC’s acts of halting the 
review processes and the NSC’s taxation measures did not involve a high degree of 
interference with Lone Star’s property interests. However, it seems likely that if 
Lone Star’s claim would be raised in circumstances where creeping expropriation is 
deemed to occur, it would be successful.  
 
While customary international law does not provide specific helpful guidelines in 
addressing this type of expropriation claim, the Korea-Belgium BIT offers some 
clues as to what the tribunal will rely on, this being indirect expropriation or 
creeping expropriation; requiring an actual effect equivalent to expropriation. In 
comparison with other indirect expropriation provisions, such as additional BITs 
and FTAs, the requirement can be construed as the effect-centred doctrine or 
possibly the sole effect doctrine. It is likely that the arbitral tribunal will take 
account of either doctrine. From the facts of the case, it can also be noted that the 
FSC halted its reviewing processes not only out of concern regarding Korea’s 
banking business, but also due to concern in relation to the pending legal 
investigations and proceedings, the outcome of which would affect the FSC’s 
decisions of subsequent administrative acts in relation to Lone Star. In this regard, it 
will be more likely that the arbitral tribunal may give deference to the FSC’s 
regulatory discretion or rely on the presumption of legality.  
 
Furthermore, among taxation-based expropriation claim cases, Yukos provides a 
good example of a viable taxation-based expropriation claim. A substantial number 
259 
 
of claims of a similar type have failed, but Yukos’ expropriation claims have 
survived. In Yukos, it is clear that the Russian government’s taxation authority was 
abused. This is because the taxation of Yukos’ properties was merely a method by 
which to embark upon de facto expropriation. The measures that the Russian 
government took resulted in almost the same effect as nationalisation or 
expropriation. Thus, the circumstances indicate which type of taxation-based 









International economic law has laid the foundations for economic interdependence 
in the globalised world. In the field of international trade, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) have contributed to trade liberalisation through member states’ negotiations 
and trade dispute resolutions. In the field of international investment, it is the 
international investment law regime, based on customary international law and 
international investment agreements, that has provided guidance and dispute 
resolution mechanisms for the purpose of protecting and promoting foreign 
investment. Most noticeable is the explosive growth of bilateral and regional 
investment agreements. These types of agreements have become almost a global 
trend.  
 
At the dawn of international investment law, the protection of foreign-owned 
property was merely a matter between states. The principle of state responsibility 
for a state’s international delinquency, concerning a breach of treatment to aliens, 
could only be invoked when the state of the injured national opted to exercise 
diplomatic protection on behalf of its injured citizen. In this scenario, the dispute 
resolution process was inevitably subject to the political and diplomatic influences 
of the states concerned. The growth of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 
regional free trade agreements (FTAs), which govern investment issues and 
disputes, is a double-edged sword. BITs and FTAs provide for dispute resolutions to 
be conducted by a tribunal, which is authorised to interpret international investment 
agreements in accordance with principles of international law, and accord a foreign 
investor the entitlement to file a legal claim directly against a state for violations of 
international investment agreements. This development could have strengthened the 
neutral and juridical nature of investment dispute resolution, contributing to an 
attenuation of political and diplomatic influence that could potentially hinder the 
operation of investment treaty arbitration. However, because BITs and FTAs are not 
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multilateral agreements, but bilateral or regional ones, they are unable to establish 
unified rules or principles of international investment law which could guarantee a 
certain degree of legal certainty and stability. Multilateral efforts have been made to 
establish a universal investment treaty, but these have been to no avail.  
 
Furthermore, investment arbitral tribunals do not proceed under the legally binding 
force of precedents. Simply put, tribunals retain the autonomous authority to 
interpret international investment agreements in any manner that they so wish. In 
this respect, the international investment law regime is vulnerable in terms of legal 
certainty, stability, and consistency. Fortunately, on a more positive note is the fact 
that BITs and FTAs have the tendency of containing very similar or common 
terminology in their provisions concerning standards of treatment. This does not 
mean, however, that such a tendency could eradicate all the weaknesses that have 
been noted above. Instead, it is very likely that interpretations as to the standards of 
treatment and investment arbitral award-making decisions both could produce 
specific outcomes, which may help significantly to narrow the gaps or avoid 
inconsistencies if these are properly and effectively managed. In order not to miss 
the potential advantages resulting from the similarity of treaty languages, it may be 
both a conceivable and promising option to identify and elaborate certain rules or 
principles of international law which can achieve acceptable results in the resolution 
of investment disputes from an international legal perspective.  
 
The research of this thesis is concentrated on exploring the question of how to 
establish and justify regulatory expropriation in international law. This task involves 
obtaining a fundamental understanding of international law on expropriation, 
drawing some useful guidance from other regional expropriation rules and 
jurisprudence, and considering their cross-applicability to investment issues and 
disputes. Current international law on expropriation, based on customary 
international law and international investment agreements, and supplemented by 
investment arbitral jurisprudence, does not provide a definitive answer to what can 
constitute an expropriation in international law. Alternatively, it clearly provides for 
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four conditions to be met for an expropriation to be lawful. The limited options 
available for finding expropriation and determining the legality of expropriation, 
and the lack of definition for expropriation under international investment law, 
cause difficulties in differentiating legitimate regulations from compensable 
expropriation. It may also appear that the advent of the concept of regulatory 
expropriation, besides indirect expropriation, can further add to these complexities. 
 
It has been observed that the US Takings Clause doctrine, the NAFTA expropriation 
rule and the European Convention on Human Rights expropriation rule are worthy 
of comparison. It was shown that they operate within the framework of the ‘ends-
means’ and the ‘cause-effect’. The scrutiny of those rules and the doctrine proves 
that they commonly pursue a reasonable balance or a degree of proportionality1036 
between the means and aims; in other words, a government measure and public 
objectives. To a degree, it appears that these principles or rules on expropriation are 
possibly open to a mutual transplantation when seeking more reasonable and 
balanced legal consequences in a regulatory expropriation situation. International 
law on expropriation, in an attempt to refine the rules and principles of regulatory 
expropriation, can develop by embracing rules and principles that are acceptable 
from the perspective of international law with the goal of achieving the 
aforementioned reasonable and balanced legal consequences. Especially in relation 
to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the comparative 
analysis of those rules and doctrines becomes more significant. The TTIP, if 
concluded, will be one of the most comprehensive regional free-trade agreements 
that will geographically cover the United States and Europe. In the TTIP 
negotiations, relating to international investment law and policy on expropriation, 
one of the urgent goals will be to measure an appropriate and legitimate scope of a 
state’s regulatory interference with foreign-owned property on the basis of rules and 
principles that are compromised by TTIP member states. Further analytical 
exploration of the US Takings Clause doctrine, the NAFTA expropriation rule, and 
                                                
1036 Fireman’s Fund (n 697) para 176(j). 
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the European Convention on Human Rights expropriation rule will significantly aid 
in fulfilling such a mission. 
 
Among a range of standards of treatment under international investment 
agreements, rules of international investment law on expropriation carry the 
strongest substantive nature. This is evidenced from the fact that the provision 
allows international legal scrutiny to interfere with a state’s sovereign right to 
regulate while other standards of treatment do not directly intrude into matters of a 
state’s sovereignty. Regulatory expropriation emerges from a broad concept of 
indirect expropriation and can serve to distinguish between a justifiable regulation 
and an expropriation that cannot be justified without compensation. Several 
conditions for establishing regulatory expropriation have been examined, such as 
the intent and motive of a state’s measure, a state’s measure’s economic effect, the 
legitimate expectation, the principle of proportionality, and the doctrine of police 
power. These conditions are worthy of being incorporated within international 
investment agreements and of being relied upon by arbitral tribunals. Also, it is 
imperative to develop continuously elaborated and increased criteria. It has also 
been shown that the conditions to be met for lawful expropriation and the principles 
of necessity can be invoked to justify regulatory expropriation in international law.  
 
Regulatory expropriation gives rise to the legal consequence of compensation, as is 
the case with other types of expropriations. Standards of compensation that are 
available for regulatory expropriation, on the other hand, need not be limited to full 
compensation. There exists the doubt as to whether the full compensation rule can 
reasonably encompass every case of expropriation. From the perspective of the 
equitable principle, deviation from the full compensation rule can be reasonable 
when an investment dispute involves both legitimate public interests and property 
interests that are entitled to be protected. Regulatory expropriation exerts a 
substantial impact on private property, which is also certainly directed at regulatory 
and public objectives. Thus, the proportionality principle or the fair balance test 
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needs to be used in order to produce a reasonable or equitable compensatory 
outcome.  
 
Lone Star is yet to be decided; thus, it is not presently clear as to what the outcome 
of the arbitration will be. However, in relation to Lone Star’s taxation-related claim, 
it is certainly expected that the outcome will be either that of the Yukos cases or the 
cases in which claims on taxation-based expropriation failed, such as Archer 
Daniels Midland Company, Feldman, or EnCana. Nonetheless, there are significant 
benefits to be derived from conducting a review of this case. It can be observed that 
the notion of creeping expropriation can assist in providing increased security for 
foreign-owned property by expanding the scope of arbitral scrutiny. The notion of 
creeping expropriation has the potential to prohibit a state measure involving the 
abuse of tax power. It appears that a taxation-based expropriation claim will not 
easily succeed under the current international investment law on expropriation. 
Thus, what can increase the likelihood of the success of taxation-based 
expropriation claims? One conceivable notion would be a shift of approach away 
from the effect-centred approach, giving less weight to the economic effect and 
conferring more weight to non-effect criteria, even though it remains to be seen how 
viable this approach could be in terms of international legal deference to state 
sovereignty. It would also be a challenge to achieve international consensus on how 
far the notion of creeping expropriation could or should extend the scope of 
scrutiny. 
 
The expansive growth of international investment agreements since the end of 
World War II has been remarkable. According to the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development, as of January 2015, 2,924 BITs exist, of which 2,222 BITs have come 
into force. Another 345 other types of international investment agreements exist, of 
which 274 have come into force. Despite this noticeable growth across the world, no 
multilateral investment regime exists thus far. Efforts were made at negotiating a 
‘multilateral agreement on investment’ (MAI) by governments at the Annual 
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Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial level in May 1995. 1037  It was 
envisioned that a MAI would provide a broad multilateral framework for 
international investment which could contribute to investment liberalisation and 
protection and to effective dispute resolution. However, negotiations were halted 
after April 1998. Since then, low expectations concerning the advent of a new 
multilateral investment agreement have been persistent.  
 
Recently a number of regional comprehensive investment regimes have been 
conceived. They include the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). The TPP is a regional free trade agreement that is 
currently negotiated among the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The 
negotiators describe the TPP as a ‘comprehensive and high-standard’ FTA that 
purports to liberalise trade in almost every sector of trade and investment and 
involve a higher level of commitments than those stipulated in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).1038 The membership of the TPP will be based on countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region. The RCEP is also a free trade agreement between ten 
ASEAN countries and six of ASEAN’s FTA partners: China, India, Japan, South 
Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. The RCEP is designed to facilitate deeper 
regional economic integration by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and by 
maintaining consistency with the rules of the WTO.1039 The RCEP negotiations 
were pursued to ‘establish an open trade and investment environment in the region 
to facilitate the expansion of regional trade and investment and contribute to global 
economic growth and development’.1040  
 
                                                
1037 The OECD’s ‘Draft MAI Negotiating Text’ contains the text of the agreement 
negotiated until 1998 < www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf> accessed 13 August 
2015. 
1038 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress, Summary. 
1039 CSIS, ‘ASEAN and Partners Launch Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership’ 
<http://csis.org/publication/asean-and-partners-launch-regional-comprehensive-economic-
partnership> accessed 26 August 2015. 
1040 Joint Statement of the first RCEP Meeting, para 2(i). 
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The TTIP is a free trade agreement that has been negotiated between the United 
States and the European Union. The greatest and most immediate challenge that will 
confront these regional FTA negotiations will be the management of the varying 
positions held by states concerning the manner in which to establish a common 
international standard with regard to targeted subjects. If any regional FTA is to be 
successfully concluded, the FTA must achieve, at least to some extent, unified rules 
of international trade and investment law. When it comes to the investment 
protection standards afforded by international investment agreements and, in 
particular, the prohibition of expropriation without compensation, international 
investment agreements tend to exhibit a high degree of similarity in their provisional 
languages. Furthermore, as for the international law on regulatory expropriation, the 
doctrine of police powers, if further elaborated, can contribute to creating enhanced 
rules of international law on regulatory expropriation. In this respect, if the 
negotiations being pursued in the TPP, the RCEP, or the TTIP seek to narrow the 
gaps as much as possible in the interpretation of treaty languages with regard to 
expropriation and establish agreements on the operation of the doctrine of police 
powers and the principle of proportionality, there will be a greater likelihood that 
these regional FTA negotiations can achieve a compromise on the rules of 
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